


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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM
ORO-T-10 (EUSAK)

NORTH KOREAN PROPAGANDA
TO SOUTH KOREANS
(CIVILIAN AND MILITARY)

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BY FRED H. BARTON

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
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Project POWOW

GRO-T-10 (EUSAK)
1 February 1951

Technical Memorandum

NORTH KOREAN PROPAGANDA TO SOUTH KOREANS
(CIVILIAN AND MILITARY)

by

Fred H. Barton

OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
FAR EAST COMMAND

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CRO-T-10 (EUSAK)
1 February 1951

ERRATA

- Figure 34: For the second sentence of the caption, read; "The theme: Let's go forward and repel the US Imperialists!"
- Figure 47: For the first sentence of the caption, read: "This figure....."
- Figure 88: In the caption, for tableaux read: "tableau".
- Figure 90: In the caption, delete the second sentence beginning "The heading....."
- Figure 103: Delete from the caption, "and translation".

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INTRODUCTION

A thorough knowledge of the methods employed by the North Korean propaganda apparatus in its campaigns through which the people of the Republic of Korea are influenced to make common cause with the communist aims and to turn against the Rhee regime and its UN allies, is deemed of considerable importance for the planning of US psychological warfare against the enemy. One of the principal aims of enemy propaganda has been to disrupt the existing good relations between US and ROK Forces fighting side by side for what is well established as a common cause: The threat of communist aggression.

The South Koreans have not been propagandized by their enemy solely regarding Korean matters. They have been exposed to a large and continuous dose of anti-US propaganda at a time when large contingents of US troops are in their country supporting them for the independence of their state. Enemy propaganda does not distinguish (pointedly perhaps) between the US Forces and those of the United Nations. Thus NK propaganda has attacked so far, only two specific targets: The US (forces, policies, people, philosophies, etc.) and the government of the ROK. A situation exists, therefore, where an ally of the US is constantly incited against US; that is, where anti-US propaganda is waged but not directed to US target groups but exclusively at the local allies of the US Forces fighting in the area.

The extent to which US military groups can gain the cooperation of the people of the ROK will determine, in a measure, how groups in other nations will accept the US and be prepared to collaborate. The presence of US forces in Korea has been utilized, propaganda-wise, by NK. It is important that such activities be counteracted.

To understand better the general line of argumentation followed by NK in its propaganda directed at the ROK, the question should be answered as to what kind of people, in what state of morale, existed, and what kind of an internal situation in the ROK did NK propaganda find there on 25 June 1950 and subsequently? It is not felt, however, that the problem is entirely within the scope of this technical memorandum.





FOREWORD

This paper gives a general account and analysis of NK propaganda to the civilian and military population of the ROK. Only NK propaganda has been analyzed; no consideration has been given to anti-ROK propaganda waged by other communist countries such as the USSR and China.

The memorandum is limited to the period covering the war from its start on 25 June 1950 to the second NK occupation of Seoul in the early days of January, 1951.

This is an interim, preliminary report, and the findings and conclusions embodied herein are tentative. Not all documentary material collected has been translated and studied. Further investigation of the subject treated herein, and an amplification thereof on the basis of more source material analyzed, is intended at an early date.




NORTH KOREAN PROPAGANDA TO SOUTH KOREANS
(CIVILIAN AND MILITARY)

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Technical Memorandum

NORTH KOREAN PROPAGANDA TO SOUTH KOREANS
(CIVILIAN AND MILITARY)



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SUMMARY

PROBLEM

The problem is to organize and survey all information regarding NK propaganda techniques and procedures into a single comprehensive presentation. Such a presentation is intended to provide an over-all picture of the NK propaganda activities in relation to different ROK target groups during various stages of the present war. The data compiled would enable the US and its military allies to: analyze and evaluate the more important propaganda themes and the media employed for disseminating them; to ascertain to what extent, if any, there is a deviation among the various themes, when directed to different target groups, in order to produce the same results; and to extract therefrom findings bearing on the problem of enemy propaganda directed at the allies of the US.

FACTS

The NK war machine has conducted, at all times, propaganda activities directed to the population of South Korea, and to the ROKA.

The enemy proceeded in the conduct of psychological warfare, according to predetermined plans. Especially with regard to consolidation propaganda, a minute planning is discernible.

In addition to standard propaganda means and methods, the enemy has used a well-trained group of agitators and, frequently, existing guerilla forces operating from within South Korea in the conduct of propaganda activities.

Enemy propaganda warfare, directed at South Korean troops (both civilian and military), has been waged independently of communist propaganda directed at the non-Korean elements of the UN Forces present in the ROK.

NOTE: Under the term "enemy" and with regard to this report, only NK is understood. This paper does not include consideration of psychological warfare waged by the Chinese.

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The enemy has tried, through propaganda, to: (1) incite local elements against UN (US) forces present in Korea; (2) destroy the confidence in the noble aims of the UN in helping the South Koreans; and (3) utilize the position of the UN Forces in Korea for a more or less concentrated propaganda campaign to other world areas which are potential dangers of conflagration.

Enemy propaganda concentrates its attack (even in its play to other target groups) against the US specifically, and ignores the non-US (and non-Korean) elements of the UN Forces in the country.

DISCUSSION

No special attention, in terms of studies, seems to have been given to aspects of enemy propaganda directed to our allies. However, such propaganda presents an interesting element insofar as it seeks to bring out the disaffection of South Korean groups and thereby turn the masses against the UN Forces in the country. The leitmotiv of enemy psychological warfare directed to the Koreans is that of nationalism, i. e., the idea of unification of the fatherland, which is very dear and palatable to the majority of the people, regardless from which part of the country they come. The presence of foreigners, no matter of how friendly a power they be, is bound to be an irritating element among a population which has craved for independence after many decades of foreign domination. Therefore, any propaganda theme playing on the inherent right of independence is prima facie, acceptable, listened to, and thought through.

The regime of Syngman Rhee has lost considerably in popularity since the outbreak of the war. It has been found to be largely undemocratic and a police state system. Its behavior with regard to the local population, during the various stages of the war, has been such as to discourage large segments thereof from believing it, and serves to make them aware that their government does not follow its professed altruistic course. As a conclusion, the Syngman Rhee regime has lost much of its following and most of its creditability.

We face then a situation where a suffering and fearful local population, which has gone through harassing experiences in the course of the war, is exposed to quite intensive enemy propaganda, operating both overtly and covertly and through promises, palatable argumentation, as well as panic and threats; this population is surrounded by allies, who, however, have largely failed to establish a workable rapport with the population on a mass basis; and where the existing local government is increasingly unpopular.

A full understanding of enemy propaganda (choice of themes, choice of media, techniques, etc.) beamed at our allies, is indicated for an easier planning of public relations on the part of US Forces to local allies who may, at certain times, bring about serious annoyance to US military planning as a result of undue panic. For this reason, the present paper, which is tentative and preliminary, tries to lay down a general picture of enemy propaganda to the South Koreans as a basis for future research on certain details of such enemy activities.

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding analysis of the enemy's propaganda as waged against South Korean target groups up to the end of 1950, leads to the following conclusions:

1. Enemy propaganda was, on the whole, very effective, so far as the civilian population of South Korean areas, was concerned. This primarily is due to the use of covert propaganda methods such as agitation, rumor spreading and guerilla activities employed by the NK. Enemy psychological warfare directed at the ROKA has been considered largely a serious failure.
2. In his propaganda messages, the enemy did not generally indulge in voicing vain promises regarding liberation by a specified time, and did not predict events which, in actuality, never materialized. The fact that the Peoples Army made good on most of such promises as were made, such as reoccupation of Seoul and the counteroffensive southward from the Manchurian border, have tended to increase the credibility of his propaganda line, at least where straight news reporting is concerned. This strategic advantage is enhanced by the fact that the credibility of South Korean home propaganda has been on a constant decline since the beginning of the war.
3. The enemy is exploiting very cleverly and with great emphasis, the conduct of the UN Forces in Korea in support of his assertions that "liberation" by the US means, in reality, destruction and death to the innocent South Koreans. Thus far the US Forces have brought material destruction and death both, when "liberating" communist-held territory as well as when retreating from friendly localities. The fate of Seoul and accounts of atrocities committed as a result of UN bombings are cited as examples in point.
4. Enemy propaganda never has accepted the UN Forces fighting in Korea as a bona fide instrument of the UN. The presence and intervention of UN Forces in Korea has been consistently ignored

and interpreted as a guide for US Forces. Not once during this war, has the UN as an organization been attacked by the enemy's propaganda except for reproaches of the purported illegality of its decision to intervene in the Korean conflict, a decision "forced upon it by the US, anyway." The war in Korea is being consistently presented as an essentially US scheme and no particular blame is placed on those member nations of the UN fighting with the US in Korea. British Prime Minister Clement Attlee's recent actions have only tended to fortify the enemy's argument that the "US Satellites" (members of the UN who have been forced by the US to send their troops, at least as a token participation into the Korean venture) are forced mostly against their will, to participate in this US scheme.

5. The enemy's propaganda has made it a point not to belittle the fighting qualities of the South Korean soldier nor to ridicule or otherwise offend the dignity of the South Korean population. The wrath of NK attacks is directed exclusively at Syngman Rhee and his "clique" who are presented as the lackeys of the US and as traitors to their people. NK propaganda has thus far refrained from attacking the people themselves. Instead, it has concentrated on a conciliatory and constructive line of appeal in an attempt to gain the sympathies and cooperation of the South Korean masses.

6. NK propaganda directed to both the civilians and military population of South Korea is not conducted in any too lofty a fashion. It is patterned in choice of theme and media strictly after the Soviet propaganda techniques, except that it does not indulge to any considerable extent in theoretical and abstract political arguments. The themes are in general down-to-earth arguments of direct significance and relation to the daily interests of the target audience. The ideals of international communism, or communism as an ideology in general, are almost entirely omitted and in their place a strong nationalistic (unification of Korea), appeal is substituted. The enemy uses a sentimental-emotional approach exhorting the South Koreans to take up arms or otherwise to commit acts of resistance to help liberate the country by aiding the Peoples Army in destroying the enemy. The enemy does not attack Syngman Rhee or the US by appealing to the reason of the target population but instead throws calumnious attacks and undocumented assertions into the propaganda themes employed. Only occasionally does the enemy resort to a rational refutation of anti-NK propaganda.

7. The enemy has, at all times, employed both covert and overt propaganda to both civilian and military population. A definite trend is discernible showing that as time progresses, covert propaganda, and agitation is used with increasing frequency and, due probably to the deterioration of morale of the South Korean target population, with increasing effectiveness.

The enemy has largely operated through and always employed elements planted in the rear of the South Koreans who perform one or more of the tasks of gathering intelligence, recruitment of guerilla bands, sabotage, agitation and propaganda. The Rhee government was unable to prevent the enemy from carrying out his underground work and the local population was fully aware of this fact so that as a consequence it was more attentive to manifestations of enemy propaganda among themselves.

8. Enemy propaganda was always directed at a target population that although completely patriotic was disposed critically toward the Rhee regime. Many of the themes employed therefore tended to be attractive, interesting or promising to the South Koreans. The failure of the ROK government to conduct a more efficient domestic propaganda and especially to live up to its statement of purpose, have impaired its credibility with the people. After the liberation of South Korea from communist rule, the sympathies of the population became more favorable to the ROK government but that body did not take advantage of the prevailing currents in its favor. The lack of concern for the masses when a crisis was again approaching, its failure to give the people information and guidance, brought renewed distrust and weariness on the part of the people against the Rhee government.

Yet there is evidence of a deep-rooted antipathy against the NK regime and communism in general on the part of the South Korean majority who by degree of education can be presumed to have given thought to the matter. However, as in most areas of the world, the numerical majority of the population can be presumed as willing and ready to hail any government that will achieve the ideal of the majority, namely, a unified state of Korea.

The Syngman Rhee regime, too, has been tolerated in a largely passive manner. Both the NK and Rhee regimes are totalitarian regimes, governed however, by different ideologies and there is no reason to assume that the NK type of government has been hated by the South Koreans merely because it is a communist rule.

The masses fleeing before the advance of the communist forces from the North are not per se, a proof of the universal sympathy for the South Korean government and of resistance to communism. More probably, it is only evidence of the people's desire to survive despite the war by fleeing from the scenes of fighting. Another reason for the mass exodus southward is the memory of the first NK occupation in the fall of 1950 which gave large segments of the South Korean population the bitter experience of being exploited by their occupiers. The enemy's ruthless methods of annihilating all those who could even remotely be considered as enemies of his regime, brought despair and unhappiness to many a South Korean

family. Thus today, many a South Korean holds a personal grudge against the NK Forces and thus, the communists, since they identify the two as one and the same.

There is no evidence at this time to support the above conclusions aside from conversations held with Korean officials who, by virtue of their positions, are considered authoritative sources on this subject. However, the vast majority of refugees interviewed by various war correspondents, reportedly fled because of the danger to their lives and limbs rather than because of political convictions. This is quite natural and applicable to all people. However, it is significant in the case of Korea because none of the fleeing citizens, when asked why they hated communism, could give a plausible reason other than fear of brutalities and exploitation. Whereas, many of the communists, low and high in the hierarchy, who were jailed in South Korea, were able to name some reasons to explain why they were communists. Maybe this is a result of communist political indoctrination. By the same token, democratic ideological guidance, if there were some, could bring about some convictions that might be the foundation of democratic faith in those who live in democratic countries and profess to be adherent to democratic principles.

9. Enemy propaganda is patterned in style as well and its skill of presentation after the Soviet example. Both the organization of his propaganda apparatus and the approach to the target population are straight copies of Soviet practice.

10. The source of much NK propaganda indoctrination and material (other than posters and leaflets) is largely Soviet Russia and occasionally China. Some of the leaders of the NK propaganda apparatus, such as Kim Il Song, Kim Du Pong, Pak Kwang Ho, Chang Sun Myong, received their training in Moscow. About 40% of all propaganda publications found in South and NK consist of translations from Soviet Russian books. The style of graphic presentation of the appeals to the population reflect attempts to imitate the Soviet pattern. The majority of propaganda films shown by the NK to their own, and especially to the South Korean audiences, are Soviet products. The USSR maintained an elaborate propaganda and propaganda-supply apparatus in NK. Tons of books and posters as well as handbooks on communism, propaganda agitation and guidance were stocked in Pyongyang, Wonsan and other NK centers and captured by different elements of the then advancing UN Forces.

11. The enemy knew how to coordinate rumors spread by him and at the same time exploit rumors that had sprung up from his target audience through causes other than his own machinations. On the other hand, neither the ROK propaganda apparatus nor the psychological warfare of the UN Forces has emphasized or used the medium of rumor as a means of propaganda.

12. In the enemy's propaganda there is no clear distinction between psychological warfare and propaganda to the civilian population. A definite effort has been made by the communists to bring about a cross-information of propaganda messages from civilians to the military and vice versa. The messages took the form of appeals from home to the fighting sons, fathers, and brothers, and messages contained in leaflets and in the radio broadcasts. This is still another proof that the enemy's propaganda tactics are guided by the maxim that has governed communist propaganda for the past 25 years, and enunciated by Kowrow, to the effect that propaganda on the fighting man will be truly effective only when it reaches the soldier through his own rear ranks.

13. Whereas ROK and UN propaganda does not seem to have made a special point of considering the changes in style and intensity of propaganda messages in relation to the physical proximity to given target groups, the enemy has varied his intensity as the distance of the target group varied from the core of the enemy. The closer the target, the more intensive his play over all media available and the more he uses covert propaganda. The more removed the target group, the less he is attacked propaganda-wise and the more the enemy uses white (or standard) propaganda.

14. Because the enemy's propaganda publications cover an exceedingly wide range of subjects, he can appeal to most segments of the target population with considerable probability the "reading eye" will be gained. All professional, vocational, artistic and other interests, predilections and hobbies are appealed to.

15. Contrary to the US Information Service practice enemy propaganda literature does not concentrate exclusively on the presentation of works by national authors. Most of the communist propaganda libraries and book collections found in communist-held South Korea, and in NK contained a sizable percentage of "international" literature. Part of the stock of literature prepared for distribution by the Publications Bureau of the NK Ministry of Cultural Propaganda contained works by Bernard Shaw, reproductions of Picasso's works, books by Jonathan Swift, and, of course, Marx and Engels in Korean, Russian and German languages. The propaganda library of the Soviet mission in Pyongyang, the function of which is roughly equivalent to that of a USIS office in a foreign country contained, in addition to a collection of Soviet literature and art books, communist works in Italian, French, Czech, English, and Chinese, and general literature including a German translation of Dante's "Inferno," Lessing's "Minna von Barnhelm" in the original German, some works by Shakespeare in English and a quantity of novels in German, English, and French.

16. Enemy propaganda to the South Koreans holds many implications for the US military. Many broadsides of NK propaganda have issued forth that the South Korean population and the ROKA are allies of the US people and the US Army, respectively. The effect may have considerable bearing on the manner other potential allies regard the US.

If the enemy succeeds through this propaganda in disposing a major portion of the South Korean peoples toward the US, such an attitude may lead to acts of nuisance and harassment against the US Forces in Korea.

If the enemy's propaganda results in panic among the population and a mass stampede, UN military movement would be greatly impaired and the attention of local law-enforcing agencies would be diverted to permit large-scale infiltration of saboteurs, agitators, and other subversive groups. Through appeals of "better things to come," the enemy has attempted, at every chance, to get hordes of refugees on the roadways to hamper UN Forces troop movements. These appeals were followed by propaganda releases to the effect that the UN Forces "cannot handle the refugee problem."

17. The enemy in his propaganda to other areas of the world, exploits to the full the US position in the Korean war. The US situation is made to look precarious by use of the "non-cooperation of other UN elements with the US," theme. The enemy quickly presents an NK-slanted version of any (temporary or otherwise) US reverses. Stress is laid to the "maltreatment" accorded its South Korean ally. Too, the US is in Korea only for the convenience it gives her "to take armed action against communism."

18. To date there has been little coordination of propaganda activities of the UN Forces and the South Koreans other than in the field of radio broadcasting. In the latter instance, the 8th US Army retained policy control, and the messages emanating were well coordinated and integrated to the joint war effort. This measure has not held true for the output of other propaganda media.

Although the US officer in charge of Radio Seoul (at the time of the UN reoccupation) desired that the South Koreans put in use its eight (new) stored public address systems, the ROK officials would not agree that this was a feasible move.

Similarly, it might be said that the South Korean Propaganda Section of the Ministry of Defense in many instances distributed leaflets to the enemy that were not "in line" with the tenor expressed in the UN-printed leaflets.

NOTE: It is reported that the South Koreans were manufacturing leaflets for consumption by the Chinese written in very faulty Chinese. It appears that the presence of a US coordinator in such a propaganda office would help largely to prevent any possible reoccurrences.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In the light of the foregoing conclusions the following recommendations are submitted.

1. The standard maxim governing the strategy and tactics of US psychological warfare "never argue with the enemy or refute directly his allegations," should be subjected to a careful revision for situations where it becomes necessary to combat covert propaganda and activities of propaganda agitators operating among the native population physically close to the US troops.

To an excited and panicky population covert propaganda is, naturally, effective and it is hard to combat such propaganda by "white" propaganda alone. This is especially true of the situation as it is presented in Korea where little rapport, if any, exists on an individual or social basis between the natives and the US elements. Lack of the proper reaction on the part of the US to enemy agitation themes may bring about a variety of unexpected and violent reactions on the part of the masses of the people. By the same token it may tend to lower the confidence in the intentions and capacities of the US propaganda apparatus to keep them supplied with information and advice.

There is a principle that, in order to ward off effectively an attack, an arm at least of the same effectiveness (as the attacker's arm) must be used by the defense. This principle also holds true with propaganda. As with the choice of weapons, a dagger is less effective as a weapon against an attacking sword, or a pistol. This principle is one of strict military theory in the choice of weapons.

The weapon which is more likely to wreak havoc on the target is the one to be countered first. And there appears no reason other than blind and inflexible adherence to what is presented as a principle, not to apply this same theory to propaganda warfare.

An argument disseminated by an agitator operating from within the local population is stronger than that coming to that target group by way of the conventional mass media.

Similarly, the most effective countermeasure to anti-US agitation is deemed counter-agitation, masterminded by US elements and carried out by a local apparatus. If this proves impractical, an alternative must be sought to refute and correct the misleading

statements hurled forth by the enemy propagandists.

2. Increased and improved "public relations" activities on the part of the US psychological warfare machine to allied populations within the war zone is recommended.

In the eyes of the native population in Korea the US Forces, (as part of the UN Forces) are present as allies. However, there was little direct public relations activity on the part of the US Forces in the name of the US Forces. The advice and assistance rendered Radio Seoul in an instant case could hardly be called an act expressly for good public relations.

Much in the way of morale strengthening could have been done had the US Forces operated a public relations setup directed to the local civilians and to the allied troops. It is recommended that this be further investigated as a stepping stone to a workable public relations organization.

With such a well-organized public relations operation, much of the "sting" could thus be removed from the enemy's propaganda arguments. This is favorable moreso since the local population, already indifferent about the ROK propaganda machine, would have another channel through which to seek information and guidance.

Thus far in Korea, the closest apparatus to an ideal public relations organization is the USIS. However, it is felt that this information service, no matter how well defined, is, for all intents and purposes, inadequate to function as a public relations organization.

It is suggested that the recommended public relations setup concentrate on three types of activity: (1) straight and up-to-date world-events; (2) propaganda actions designed to show the true US sympathy toward the Korean peoples; (3) a restatement of US policies and ideals, in general, especially toward the area in which presented.

3. It is further recommended that preparations be made in advance to assess the impact of enemy propaganda upon the target population (involved and likely to become involved in the war). Questionnaires could be utilized in the interrogation of the representative factions of the various segments comprising the local populations as well as prisoners of war. This would insure a uniform procedure in obtaining data for a subsequent formulation of our assessments. For this purpose, designated officers of the military could obtain such data which, upon receipt of same in an evaluation center, could be used for a general, and more critical assessment.

4. It is recommended that an effort be made to subject to a minute study the exploitation by communist propaganda of the Korean war. This study should consider of primary import a survey of how the communist propaganda has dealt with the US participation in this war, and to what extent this anti-US theme is directed to other (peaceful) world areas.

The ORO studies of propaganda in the Far East give rise to the suggestion that an operational SOP be compiled for the use of US psychological warfare (propaganda actions) in this and other potential danger spots.

The subject of propaganda warfare is of tangible military importance because a clever exploitation of the Korean war (in the anti-US sense) by the enemy in their propaganda to the world may have serious consequences as to affect adversely the population and the military personnel of countries which are considered reliable allies of the US.

At the same time the US will be faced with the task of combating enemy propaganda to such areas. In order to do an effective job, detailed knowledge of enemy propaganda techniques must be readily available.

However, it is believed that the study of enemy propaganda in Korea (local population) will not be complete and wholly beneficial to the US military unless a follow-up study is made of how NK propaganda (including the Soviet propaganda machine) to the world at large exploits advantageously the Korean war and developments. (See Appendix K.)

5. It is recommended that a study be dedicated to the problem of creating the best possible rapport between US soldiers and the civilians and military elements of the allied country. This suggests that the proper level for indoctrination of "friendliness toward the allies," attitude should be ministered when our soldiers are training within the US--not after they have reached foreign soil.

The US soldier, representing the US, is a vital propaganda weapon. He can create and promote goodwill and confidence in those who suddenly find themselves in the midst of an affray between foreign troops. It remains that the patriot will either take a friendly or unfriendly attitude toward invading forces. The individual soldier can do much to cement good relations, and his behavior and attitude are essential to this end.

As to the indoctrination phase, probably the most important factor is to teach the soldiers something of the peoples with whom they will come in contact. The soldier could effectively convey to the masses an interpretation of the ideals of democracy and the aims of the US in a given war situation.



THE ENEMY'S PROPAGANDA APPARATUS

Specific information about the working organization of NK propaganda apparatus is necessary for a clearer understanding of the activities and methods they use.

As is to be expected, the NK propaganda machine follows closely the pattern of the Soviets, where propaganda is a function of the government and is a component part of the governmental organization of the state. Being a function of the Communist Party, the Party alone determines and controls the propaganda, even exercising this civilian control over army-conducted psychological warfare activities. Intelligence reports indicate that NK consolidation propaganda, though conducted by the military to a large extent, is totally subject to control by the Party Committee in each province or town. Only in straight combat propaganda to both the enemy soldiers and enemy population does the NK military propaganda apparatus exercise its own discretion in the implementation of Party policies. The Party alone, however, controls the domestic propaganda output, even by the Peoples Army to its own soldiers.

Figures 1 to 4 present a clear picture of the organization of NK propaganda as an element of both the Party command and the administration, and show the interrelation of these two commands in the various subordinated echelons.

CULTURAL PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION

Information extracted from Figures 1 to 4 reveals that the "resorts" of education and of propaganda are closely related. In fact, the Party maintains only one bureau for these two categories. The Party administration has divided them up into an educational department and a cultural propaganda department. In the Peoples Army, propaganda is a part and function of the education and orientation branch. The officer charged with the conduct of propaganda in the Peoples Army bears the title of "cultural officer" rather than "propaganda officer" and is under the jurisdiction of the Military Education and Orientation Department that maintains branches in all echelons of the military forces.

As in the Soviet Union, and other communist-dominated states, propaganda work has two main functions: (1) cultural propaganda, i. e., orientation, education, and enlightenment; and (2) agitation, which consists partly, at least, of undercover work of importance to the political police. The agitator becomes more important in the lower echelons. He is a component part of a communist cell and similarly, of a communist military squad. He is a specially trained assistant to the propaganda officer charged with the conduct of propaganda to the masses at all levels, both civilian and military.

The agitator is an enforcing and informing agent, and in some ways is tantamount to a propaganda storm trooper. He may be attached to any group of citizens or soldiers or both. The presence of agitators with communist guerilla bands in South Korea has been established beyond doubt. Their main functions are: (1) to maintain and boost the morale and politico-patriotic convictions of the "herd;" and (2) to conduct, and guide others to conduct, psychological warfare and propaganda acts ranging from tactical to consolidation propaganda in accordance with directives received from the next higher command. The agitator is, in addition, an informer. He is a channel of communication to the higher command, and reports on the general situation among those with whom he works and about individuals who, because of signs of non-cooperation, are deemed undesirable, unreliable, or dangerous elements in the midst of the mass.

Apart from the agitator, but under the same command, are other experts of communist cultural propaganda. These are usually the men charged with the production and supply of cultural and enlightenment material. They are the ones who control the press, the theater, films, and the arts, and who organize the multitude of activities which altogether are standard manifestations of communist propaganda.

A similar picture appears in the propaganda organization of the NK armed forces. It is patterned very closely after that of the Soviets at close of World War II. The Peoples Army maintains a propaganda section of about 240 men with each of its divisions. This section is charged with procuring and preparing propaganda material. It is also the section which conducts consolidation propaganda jointly with the Party Political Committee administering the captured area until the Party propaganda organization can take over that region.

On the regimental and battalion levels, special cultural officers conduct propaganda among their own troops, and implement directives regarding propaganda to be waged against the enemy. They also help to determine what course the propaganda should follow.

The propaganda officer is assisted by: (1) one to three officers in charge of propaganda by publications, film, and radio; procurement or production of propaganda material; and (2) one to three agitators charged with the dissemination of propaganda through mass meetings, lectures, orientation classes, etc.

A similar division of work is noticeable in the Party's propaganda organization in countries, townships, and rural areas, while the apparatus of the Province (equivalent to the propaganda organization of the division) is the main production and supply point.

POLICY

The general picture of the NK propaganda machine shows that policy is determined by the Party Bureau, with concurrence of the Peoples Committee and the executive organs of the government (ministries) concerned. In NK, Kim Il Song is the vice chairman of the Party; he is also the chairman of the Peoples Committee; and, he is the Prime Minister of the government. Thus, the determination of policy is almost exclusively dependent on the concurrence of Kim Il Song with himself.

Operational policy is formulated in accordance with the basic policy enunciated by the ministers of Education, Cultural Propaganda, and Defense, in joint sessions with the chief of the Propaganda Agitation Section of the Party's Central Committee.

PLANNING OF OPERATIONS

Operation planning is undertaken by the Propaganda and the Education Ministries jointly with the Propaganda Agitation Section of the Party's Committee, and by the Ministry of Defense (Department of Education and Propaganda, General Staff), insofar as propaganda to the troops is concerned. Consolidation propaganda and propaganda to the enemy is reported not to lie within the jurisdiction of the NK Defense Department.

OPERATIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE SUBORDINATE PROPAGANDA APPARATUS

Propaganda for home consumption and consolidation propaganda are the direct responsibility of the Party apparatus of the province which maintains, as can be seen from Figure 1, a substantial propaganda section, closely supervised by one of the two vice chairmen of the Party's Province administration.

On the side of the military, the division with a staff of from 200 to 300 persons is equipped to prepare, procure, direct, and otherwise conduct, propaganda activities directed at the enemy's troops and civilians.

NOTE: Propaganda to the non-Korean elements of the UN Forces by the NK is in the hands of a specially constituted sub-organization of the Party's Central Committee which maintains its own facilities for the implementation of the central policy.

The Party apparatus of the province controls the propaganda apparatus of the county and city governments, and the propaganda apparatus of the military division controls the propaganda apparatus of regiments and battalions.

The Province Party Committees are reported to have a relatively wide range of discretion as to the organization of their propaganda machine into subordinate echelons. Since all provinces differ in size and population, and possibly in propaganda importance, this flexibility is not surprising.

The agitator in the cell has probably the most personal discretion, although his assignment is very rigorously predetermined and he is constantly subject to control by other agitators spying on him. This is less true of an agitator working in enemy held territory. Similarly, the agitator at squad or platoon level is reported to have a wide range of discretion due to the number of unforeseen situations in which he may find himself because of changes of mood and receptiveness in his target from hour to hour.


On the whole, however, the propaganda apparatus of the enemy is organized in strict fashion and its various channels are most rigorously controlled and invariably concentrated in the office of the commander of a particular echelon for transmittal up or down the line. In the army the propagandist encounters equally firm channels of communication. However, his commanding officer is not the only recipient of political information for, though the commander is the administrative head, and all communications are expected to funnel through his office, the Party maintains close contact with the propaganda committees of the area in which operations are conducted. Thus, another channel of information is open. Frequently a city or county party committee receives progress reports from military propaganda personnel and reports them to the policy-making or planning echelons. This overlapping of Party and military responsibilities is said to have caused considerable friction between the military and the Party at the higher echelons.

In addition to this civilian and military NK propaganda apparatus, the enemy has used, on many occasions the guerilla bands operating in the ROK for the production and distribution of leaflets. These guerilla members were part of the communist underground in South Korea (i. e., cell organizers left behind when the NK Forces retreated in September of 1950., and infiltrators and intelligence

agents in general). These latter two were guided by radio and were active instruments of the enemy's efforts to smuggle propaganda material and weapons into South Korea.

According to information given by at least three political arrestees during November 1950, many NK infiltrees had the dual role of intelligence agent or courier, and agitator. In this connection, attention is invited to a revealing document showing standard procedure for underground agents in ROK-held territory (Appendix A). A quantity of documentary material was found by ROK authorities in and around Seoul showing beyond any doubt that detailed and thoroughly planned measures were taken to organize and to leave in the area, cell or organizers, spies, and couriers. Through these measures the NK Forces hoped to maintain:


1. Communication with such areas;
2. Communist elements in those areas;
3. An organization for better dissemination of propaganda in those areas;
4. An organized sabotage, espionage, or other underground apparatus in the area;
5. Recipients of weapons and propaganda supplies in the area;
6. A liaison apparatus to the guerillas;
7. An apparatus for the recruitment of citizens to the cause, and for purposes of covert propaganda (e. g. , rumor-spreading); and
8. An apparatus to give information about the attitude of individuals toward communism, the ROK government, the UN, etc. , and, through its mere existence, subjecting such individuals to fears for their future should the ROK-UN tenure end.




*NUMBER OF AGENTS VARYING IN DIFFERENT JURISDICTION

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3




ORGANIZATION CHART OF NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT



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FIGURE 2.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF NORTH KOREAN PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE



ORO -11-3 APR 51

Figure 3. NK Peoples Committee advises the Party and controls the policy of the various ministries.

FLOW CHART OF NK MILITARY AND CIVILIAN OFFICES FOR PLANNING AND OPERATION OF PROPAGANDA




FIGURE 4.

ORO - II-4 APR 51

CONFIDENTIAL



조선민주주의인민공화국은 세계민주진영을 피로울수없는 반공그룹과의 미묘한
 슬로와 피로공작에도 불구하고 나날이정신을대하여 자기목적달성을
 있다 조조문화경제협정—주년 조조협정 기라민주주의국가간의 친선
 동맹은 반공그룹에게대하여 최후의라적을두고있으며 대우기때까지
 조당에게 계속적 위협이되고있다

Figure 5. A cartoon from the July (1950) issue of the NK magazine "Arrow," depicting, through the clasped-hand symbol, the close relationship between the NK and the USSR governments. The handshake of friendship is surrounded by flags of the USSR satellites. The trembling figure (bottom center) represents the capitalist-fascist nations of the Western World.

CONFIDENTIAL



ENEMY PROPAGANDA TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

This section is a preliminary analysis of enemy propaganda, as used against the civilian population of the ROK from the outbreak of hostilities to the second invasion of Seoul early in January of 1951.

THEMES OF ENEMY PROPAGANDA

Before discussing systematically the individual propaganda themes, a short summary of the NK propaganda objectives sought and the enemy's general propaganda line is indicated.

Propaganda, no matter by whom conducted, aims primarily to convey to the target audience, in an easily-understood and convincing form, the ideals for which the propaganda maker stands, and for which he fights; also, to impress upon those who are propagandized the necessity and desirability of their acceptance of such ideals as their own, in order to insure for themselves a better and happier future, and spare themselves unnecessary bloodshed. Another aim is to convince the target audience it should stop siding with any group which, as the enemy of the propagandist, is portrayed as being also the enemy of the target as well. To attain its objectives, propaganda warfare is operated by means of threats, persuasion, emotional appeal or rational argumentation, whichever appears most suitable in a given situation.

The primary goal of propaganda is the destruction of the enemy's will to fight, brought about by the creation of such confusion in his ranks as to promote a general demoralization with a resulting disaffection and unwillingness to fight, thus bringing speedier and easier victory to the forces of the propagandist.

This over-all aim may lend itself to implementation by an infinite number of themes and arguments, which, though dealing individually with different problems of the target population's life, attempt to achieve identical results.

An analysis of the NK propaganda output to the ROK reveals the following five apparently primary objectives.

1. It attempts to convince the people of the ROK of the righteousness and justness of the NK ideals and of the sanctity of their cause. It appeals for their sympathy and their understanding; it asks for their acceptance of the cause that prompts the NK to resort to war.

2. It attempts to impress on the South Koreans the advantages and benefits that will accrue to them as a result of their acceptance of NK ideals and ways of life.

NOTE: Such ways of life are described as unification of the whole of Korea, the ending of the fratricidal war, the distribution of land to the farmers, enactment of a better tax system.

3. It attempts to destroy South Koreans loyalty to the Rhee government, and their belief in the sincerity of that government, thus making the people desert or become hostile to the Rhee regime.

4. It attempts to destroy all South Korean good will, active or passive, now existing towards the US, and towards the Western World concept of democracy, and replace such existing good will with acts of resistance by the South Korean people against the allies of the ROK government.

5. It attempts to promote such confusion among the South Korean civil population as to create general panic and impairment of morale sufficient to be turned to NK advantage for a speedier and less costly advance of NK military forces into South Korea.

These objectives seem to have been pursued quite consistently in the actual output of NK propaganda through the use of a number of more or less determined primary themes, each of them clearly pointed toward one or more of the recognized propaganda objectives.

The themes resemble somewhat the platform of a political party. A variety of secondary themes are usually employed in order to place additional emphasis on the primary ones. For the purposes of this report, secondary themes are classified as those which appear more or less sporadically over a limited number of media, and which tend to supplement or underline the tenor of the primary themes. Secondary themes seldom have been observed to represent the major portion of the contents of any leaflet, poster, radio program, or other expressions of propaganda.

It is impractical to attempt here an enumeration of all themes and slogans used by the NK in their months of propaganda warfare, and to analyze them. Propaganda themes, as discussed in this paper, are primarily the ideas that have been voiced by NK with the greatest

frequency through the various media available which will reach the South Korean target audience.

PRIMARY THEMES

Nationalism, the drive for a united Korea, is probably the strongest appeal—propaganda-wise—either side of the NK-South Korean War can make to the other. The people have not forgotten their 40-odd years of Japanese domination, and they are acutely conscious of their 4,000-year history. The ideal of an independent and united nation appeals to all strata of the Korean population regardless of the degree of their sophistication. The governments of both Koreas were (and are) striving for the same goal, though each desires to superimpose its own regime or philosophy upon the other.

During interrogation of PW's as well as political prisoners (the latter from both the Koreas) the nationalistic ideal of a united Korea appears as an important cause for the individual concerned to become active in whatever work caused him to become a prisoner: to fight with the Peoples Army, agitation, espionage or sabotage. Additional evidence is reported by Messrs. Oh Jae Do and Sun Woo Chong Won, both known prosecutors in Seoul, that it was this nationalistic drive that was the major cause for the appearance of South Korean pro-unification fanatics who, dissatisfied with the failure of the Min Ju Jui Choguk Tong II Chon Sun (Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland), a South Korean league professedly striving for unification by peaceful means, (but which was actually a communistic front organization), made common cause with the communist elements in South Korea and, during the first half of 1950, committed at least 80 acts of violence on South Korean territory, each act being helpful to the North Koreans.

The theme of unification of the Koreas lends itself admirably to rational argumentation. Korea is a country, divided artificially, consisting of one people who belong to the same race, speak the same language, and have the same culture. This implies that an individual who deserts one side and works on the other side for basically the same ideals is not a traitor to his nation but only to one of two regimes. This is the only theme that NK has tried to play up to a considerable extent in a rational as well as an emotional manner. A poster, typical of the emotional approach, is shown in Figure 5.

The Nationalistic appeal seems predominantly in the texts of speeches by Kim Il Song and other NK leaders as well as in editorials for consumption in both the Koreas.

The Anti-US Theme. The leitmotiv of NK anti-US propaganda argumentation seems to be "US Colonial Imperialism—the real enemy of the people." This has been essentially the communist (especially Soviet) propaganda theme the world over during the past six years. The US is represented as a "blood-sucking parasite," a heartless imperial power with colonial aims, totally unconcerned about the welfare of other peoples. It is further represented as using Korea, Korean wealth and the Korean people, through the medium of Syngman Rhee, generally described as a traitor and a lackey of the US, to promote its aggressive fight and exploitation of the honest and peace-building "free peoples" of the world.

To build its material prestige and advantages, the US is represented as being willing to go to any extremes in exploiting the innocent masses of Korea, even to their bleeding to death. There have been noted the following three facets to the general anti-US propaganda line.

1. Rationalization. A presentation of the US and its citizens and the target groups in such a light as to bring about enmity, disconfidence, disappointment, and disaffection within the US by showing them the rottenness of the US regime and the misery of life in the US. Patronage by the US of South Korea has not brought benefit or happiness to South Korea during the five years of life under the Rhee regime. The people are still poor, burdened by an unfair tax system; they work largely on land which is not their own. South Korea has not experienced as much economic and industrial progress as NK can show for the same period.

A good example of the NK anti-US "line" in which the US Forces are explained as the real enemies of the people and their interests represent an appeal of the Central Committee, Democratic Front for the Unification of the fatherland, released over the radio, and in the form of posters and leaflets on 14 August by the NK propaganda machine to the South Korean population at large and also (in leaflet form) to certain ROKA elements. A poster bearing this message is in the possession of ORO. The pertinent portions of the text are given in Appendix B.

Figure 6 is an example of how NK propaganda attempts to portray the rottenness of life in the US and thus create enmity, loss of confidence, and disgust.

2. The Local Patriotic Appeal. Any differences between the peoples of the NK-South Korean governments are basically an internal matter, and no foreign power should interfere. The US, which coerced the

UN into a totally illegal resolution, was the first foreign power to mix into the Korean war; the US is the aggressor. The war is a fight of the Korean people as a whole for national self-assertion.

3. The Emotional Appeal. The war is unnecessary fratricide. Son is fighting against father, and brother against brother. Families are disrupted and Korean blood flows. For whom? The US uses Korea and Koreans as they need them in their scheme of world domination; but they desert their allies when nothing more can be gained from them. Figure 7 gives some idea of how this line is played by enemy propaganda to the South Koreans. Also the intervention of US troops in this war is pictured as a cause of much bloodshed; enemy propaganda plays heavily on the "atrocities" and "barbarous procedure" committed by the US Forces in their air attacks and bombings of Korean target areas in the course of which many people died.

This emotional appeal has been used with great emphasis, especially in the general indoctrination activities of the Communist Party in the ROK for about a year before the beginning of hostilities; has been corroborated from interrogation reports of civilian political prisoners in Seoul and from captured NK material. Additional corroboration is found among the ORO collection of NK propaganda literature. The precedent in point, cited by communist teachers and generally held to have brought a considerable number of South Koreans into the communist camp, is the apparent behavior of the US toward Chiang-kai-Shek from the time of the Chinese Nationalist defeat to the time of their flight to Formosa.

The anti-US line of NK propaganda can be divided into several major sub-themes which have been given play both individually and in conjunction with other anti-US, or anti-Rhee themes during the various stages of the war. A short account of such typical sub-themes in the NK's anti-US argumentation, with a few sample illustrations, follows.

US Brutality in Korea. A frequent theme of anti-US propaganda in that of the many brutal acts committed by US soldiers and, more especially, airmen, on the innocent population of South Korea. Accusations of bombings of hospitals and churches has been standard procedure in modern wartime propaganda. The enemy has a plausible argument: only the UN Forces have used air power in any intensity and in quantity. Thus, if something is bombed, the presumption that this is due to US air action is quite strong—and probably true. Figure 8 illustrates how this argument is conveyed visually.

In addition to complaints of indiscriminate bombing, the enemy's propaganda machine has attempted to present the US soldier as a brutal aggressor and invader, who respects neither the lives nor the property of Koreans and who murders everywhere he goes. The purported atrocities committed by US troops on the Korean population have received the most intensive play in NK propaganda to the ROKA soldiers. It is, therefore, discussed in greater detail in this memorandum under the heading of "Enemy Propaganda to the South Korean Soldier."

In NK propaganda to the civilian population of South Korea this theme manifests itself as an effort to give the idea that what the US calls "liberation" actually means "destruction" to the Koreans. This particular slant came to the foreground since the UN first recaptured Seoul. A good example of how this point is driven home is seen in Figure 9.

Kim Il Sung, in a policy statement made in August, 1950, and which was widely distributed by all media, reported on the US bombings of NK cities such as Pyongyang, Nampo, Haeju, Wonsan, and Hamhung, and expressed his indignation at the US and his commiseration for the South Korean towns suffering under US armed intervention.

He said, "In areas south of the parallel, such cities as Seoul, Chunchon, Kaesong, Uijongbu, Chungjin, Kangnung, and others, and many other farming villages have been placed under continual ruthless bombings by US air squadrons. Mercenary murderers are strafing women and girls busily transplanting rice on paddies, and are pouring bombs on the heads of innocent boys and girls. Thus, the US imperialist-plunderers are employing such brutal means of slaughtering people as Hitler's gang of fascists and Japanese imperial-burglars used in their days."

It can be observed that NK propaganda presents itself as accepting heroically the destruction of their cities brought about by the US Military Forces' attacks, but commiserates the sacrifices of the South Korean population who are caught in the middle and must suffer, not at the hands of the North Koreans, who are labeled enemies, but in reality are the friendly and brotherly liberators, but at the hands of those who purport and present themselves as the allies and protectors of the South Koreans themselves.

As the war progressed, this theme developed with ever increasing plausibility for the ears of the South Korean target audiences. The facts are well presented to show that where US Forces (and the ROKA) fight, destruction and suffering will unavoidably result. Using the case of Seoul as an example, enemy propaganda can, and does, present its argument (thus far primarily over the radio and in the press)

as follows: The city was "liberated" intact by the Peoples Army. No street fighting was necessary and the people and their homes remained unharmed. After the liberation, the US bombing missions did not spare Seoul, despite the fact that it was populated by the very same people who but a few days before had been flattered by the US Military as "important allies" and "friends." When the UN Forces made their return, the city was ruthlessly bombed, and during the street fighting a large part was demolished. Innocent people were killed and the bulk of the population left destitute, hungry, and cold, without water, electricity, or any other facilities (including medical facilities).

When, in November, the communist forces started their successful push south from the Manchurian border, the retreating UN Forces acted "in their accepted fashion" and blew up or otherwise demolished the evacuated towns and villages. Thus, the people once again were exposed to the most inhuman treatment . . . and the Peoples Army following could not but be hailed as liberators; it did not destroy but only liberated, after the destruction had been accomplished. The subsequent developments and the form in which Seoul and other South Korean localities were left after total evacuation by the UN Forces can be expected to lend much more credence and plausibility to this kind of argument.

NOTE: The play of this argument was first reported by an undercover agent of the ROKA-CIC operating within a PW Camp at Inchon and whose name was withheld by ROK authorities. It was repeated by a communist agitator operating in Seoul named Lee Pak Hyong, in an interview, shortly before his execution on 14 Dec 50.

The element of "barbarous" destruction by the US Forces, and the suffering of the innocent South Korean people at the hands of their allies has been depicted widely in cartoons, drawings, (distributed in leaflet or pamphlet form) and posters, not only within Korea and as a product of Korean propaganda, but also as an element of foreign communist propaganda. The Soviet propaganda apparatus is known to have exploited this theme quite intensively, both in its output to the home audience and to Koreans; also, to the world at large. More samples of propaganda argumentation regarding this point and used at different times in various localities of occupied South Korea are presented in Appendix C.

The theme of brutalities and atrocities, while considerably broadcast with reference to the actions of the US Forces in their warfare, is extended to, and exploited with special intensity as a powerful anti-Rhee theme.

Who Is the Real Aggressor and Who Is the Real Enemy? This theme has been emphasized, not only by the NK themselves but also in the press and radio of other communist-dominated countries. (See Appendix D for a typical Soviet Press treatment of this point.)

NK propaganda emphasized US intervention as a hostile act of interference in an internal conflict. This theme has been stated in crystalized form in Kim Il Song's policy speech circulated in leaflet and poster form throughout the Koreas, both during the first stages of the war as well as subsequently (as late as November of 1950), and disseminated by means of the radio. Following are pertinent passages of this speech.

"... US imperialists have launched an armed attack against our fatherland and the people. Their forces are barbarously bombing cities and countrysides of our country, slaughtering peaceful people.

"US imperialist fleets, which illegally intruded into our territorial waters, are bombarding our coastal cities and villages. Units of US ground troops are staining our land with their blood-smearred claws; others landed on the southern areas of our fatherland, which are yet to be liberated, and are extending front lines to delay our troops southward advances perpetrating all violent brutalities.

"Why have the US imperialists sent their troops over the territory of our fatherland?

"What is the objective of the US imperialists?

"At no time did the Korean people ever violate an inch of the US of America's territory, or infringed upon their sovereignty in any way.

"The Korean people have never entered into any hostile relations with the people of the US nor at any time have they committed any damage to the lives or property of the peaceful inhabitants of the US of America.

"Why then is it that the US imperialists are pouring their troops into our land; launching armed intervention in our domestic affairs; slaughtering our people; and painting our beautiful red in blood?

"The objective of the US imperialists, aspiring for world domination, is to make our fatherland into their permanent colony and to make slaves of our people. In order to accomplish this objective, the US imperialists have fabricated in the southern half of our fatherland a South Korean puppet regime headed by Syngman Rhee, proverbial enemy of the Korean people. For the same purpose, the US imperialists

ravaged us by means of terrorism, massacre, intimidation and deception." They induced their forerunning hound, Syngman Rhee, to start a fratricidal war in our fatherland, finally, launched an armed invasion. The US imperialists have no regard for the sacred rights of the Korean people for freedom and independence. Furthermore, they do not think that the Korean people are humans. According to the US imperialists, the Korean people have no other fate than to be colonial slaves in order to fill still more the bloodstained pockets of the Wall Street merchants."

Slander of Rhee, who is labeled "the forerunning hound of the US imperialists," an expression used in scores of leaflets, is usually an introduction to a tirade against the "US aggression," which is said to have brought about a real war defying all principles of international law and humanity. The following paragraph is quoted, in part, from one of many similar leaflets.

"... the treacherous Syngman Rhee clique—faithful dog of US imperialists whom they raised with their dollars, heading for a collapse, the US imperialists stripped their masks, disclosed their identity and began . . . to extend their vicious claws of aggression. . . The Korean people have never invaded an inch of US territory or subjected any of its cities or villages to bombings. And yet . . . the US imperialists desperately perpetrated a brutal, armed intervention designed to encroach upon our territory.

"This is a clear manifestation of the aggressive policy of the US imperialists who, dreaming of world domination, are bent upon converting our fatherland into their colony and enslaving the Korean people. . . By directing the Rhee clique, their forerunning hound, to carry out their aggressive policy against our fatherland, the US imperialists attempted to cloak their aggressive designs. . ." (ATIS collection, No. 20091.)

Figure 10 shows a cartoon used in several NK newspapers and in at least two publications reaching the front, "News from the Front," and "Arrow." It is typical of anti-US cartoons, and is known to have been selected for a poster.

The theme of US aggression seems to be master-minded in the USSR. All the arguments that Kim Il Song's propaganda voices in this respect are but restatements of the many more or less important points made by the Soviets. (Appendix D contains an editorial comment on this subject from the Soviet Russian newspaper "Izvestia," issue of 11 August 1950.)

North Korean propaganda tries distinctly to present the US alone as the villain, using an argument to the effect that "UN Forces," actually means "US Forces," because the US coerced the UN into acquiescing to US intervention in Korea. Kim Il Song's speech, quoted previously in part, implies this in the following.

"The US imperialists try to cloak their brutal armed aggression against our fatherland by what is called a Security Council's decision on Korean problems. This so-called Security Council's decision, however, was adopted in violation of the UN charter with no representatives of Korea, the Soviet Union, or China, present. However, the object of the US imperialists armed attack on Korea has now been made clear throughout the world. No one will be deceived by the boisterous statement by the US imperialists that the US troops, in the name of the UN, are carrying out police functions in Korea."

This argument is also used in the Soviet propaganda line, and is reported to have formed a major portion of all editorial comment of the Soviet press for nearly two months. An article from "Izvestia," reprinted in Appendix D, touches on this particular fact.

Appeals to Fight US Colonial Imperialism. This sub-theme is closely tied in with the NK standard anti-Rhee line which, too, culminates in exhortations to "actively fight and defeat" the ROK Forces in order to help the Peoples Army to achieve a speedier victory for the benefit of all concerned. However, the emphasis remains definitely on the anti-US theme which is presented as the real cause of this war, and the only reason for Rhee's continued existence at this time. The implication is that if the US is defeated and forced out of Korea the Rhee regime will no longer exist. Kim Il Song has repeatedly stated this thought in his speeches, and in interviews with the communist press. In a speech of which a part was previously quoted herein, he said, "Had it not been for the direct, armed intervention of the US imperialists, the internal war which their forerunning hounds have provoked in our fatherland would long have been ended; our fatherland's unification would long have been completed."

In addition to arguments designed to instill the South Koreans with distrust, antipathy, and hatred of the US, NK propaganda attempts to incite them to acts of open resistance, or, at the very minimum, passive resistance. Appeals to the civilian population are made to either join a guerilla band, or to give aid and comfort to such bands when they are operating back of the ROK-UN lines.

The same kind of appeal is made to the ROK soldier, except to him the NK propaganda's primary appeal is to desert the Rhee forces and to surrender in order to fight with the Peoples Army; and,

secondly, exhortations to join the partisans. There is good, common sense in this nuance of play: the ROK soldier who surrenders and joins the NK Forces is already trained and equipped; thus, he is a valuable part of the Peoples Army. The civilian, however, must be both trained and equipped if he is to join the army, while the guerilla will be probably more useful, as he can stay in the regions he knows and, as a rule, does not need special military training. Also, it is much easier for villagers to take to the hills without having to cross the lines where, for certain moments at least, every civilian may easily draw the fire of both sides.

During the first months of the conflict, NK propaganda contented itself with urging the people of South Korea to fight against the US and US imperialism, but seldom gave specific directions to the South Korean as to how he could do so. As the war progressed, and UN troops drew closer to the Manchurian border, a tendency became noticeable for NK propaganda to appeal for specific action against the US.

An example of this is a leaflet, dropped early in August of 1950 over the 34th RTC in South Korea (ATIS Document No. 200921). It was addressed to the "fellow countrymen, brothers and sisters in the southern half of the Republic," and read:

"The heroic Korean people will annihilate, to the last man, the US troops who have illegally invaded our fatherland, and will not fail to defend the unity and honor of the fatherland.

The leaflet then addressed itself to the "inhabitants anxious to be liberated from the dark, reactionary rule." It continued, "... Victory belongs to the Korean people fighting for the glory, freedom and independence of the fatherland. Now is the time for you to fight for the cause of the fatherland and the people... this is the time for you to win the honor of being true patriots!

"If you do not want to become colonial slaves of the foreign imperialists; if you desire to seek the shining road of a patriot; if you want to obtain land without payment; if you want to see carried out such advanced and democratic reforms as were instituted within NK; if you do not want to find yourselves shedding tears of regret over your fatherland and yourselves, rise up immediately and take an active part in the task of supporting the troops of the Peoples Army."

The appeals for active or passive resistance increased in frequency as events turned in favor of the communist forces during the latter part of November, 1950. The population was exhorted to support and join the partisans operating in Korean territory (South and North) held by UN Forces (see Figure 11).

A leaflet dropped or smuggled into various areas north of Parallel 38 (including Pyongyang on 28 November 1950) and addressed to "brothers and sisters in areas under temporary occupation," called for resistance, and presented, by text, a good contrast to the rather general appeal contained in the previously quoted leaflet. It reads:

"The mighty volunteer groups of the heroic Chinese people came to the front on our side to fight against the barbarian US invaders... People, who love the independence and freedom of the fatherland, be more tenacious and be more courageous in defending the banner of the Republic... Resist the orders and the policies of the enemy! Thwart him with every step, no matter what the danger to you may be! Destroy roads in the enemy's rear, transportation and communication facilities, military trains and military warehouses! Do not let the enemy have even a single grain of rice or a single gram of food! Render every possible assistance to the partisans, the honorable sons and daughters of the fatherland! Any person who is capable of taking up arms and fighting, let him join the partisans!"

Several leaflets, a number of which were handwritten, were distributed by NK guerillas in the general area of Kaesong during the first week of December 1950. One of them (Figure 68) underlines its appeal with a threat and says in part:

"All you women and mothers, do not send your beloved sons or daughters to join the National Defense Forces or Security Forces the enemy is organizing.

"All you citizens, be confident that the Peoples Army and the partisans whom you dearly love and support will... take back your independence and freedom from the hands of the aggressor; cooperate with them actively. Anyone who tries to avoid the observance, or ignores those orders, and who thus betrays his fatherland and his people, is warned that he will be eliminated with the enemy."

NOTE: Leaflets and posters bearing similar messages appeared in quantity in certain occupied NK areas—Kang-Dong, Sariwon, Chinampo, and others—shortly before the start of the combined NK-CCF offensive of late November 1950. Some of these were air-dropped, but considerable quantities were reported distributed underground from within these localities. Two instances of agitators distributing leaflets were also reported from Pyongyang on 28 November. In both cases the agitators were supervisors of factory workers.

Appeals to fight the US behind their front lines have received considerable import in visual propaganda media, as evidenced by the cartoons shown in Figures 12 and 13. These cartoons appeared in both NK front-line newspapers and in news-sheets smuggled into ROK units.

Illustrating the important role the NK guerilla is taking in the fight against US imperialism, the cartoon-poster shown in Figure 14 has been termed by officials of the Joint Intelligence Staff in Seoul as one of the most effective displays of anti-US appeals yet seen. It was reportedly circulated in both eastern and western Korea in the forms of posters, cartoon sheets, and as a cartoon in newspapers.

It seems, however, that the most powerful and convincing appeals to join the NK guerilla bands were made by means of rumor. NK word-of-mouth propaganda attempted to convey the impression that all those who did not collaborate with the Peoples' cause would have to be termed anti-Peoples' collaborators. They would, therefore, bear the brunt of the NK ire because of their treason to their own people by becoming lackeys of the US Forces. About 8 December, the people in the streets were quoting "messages" coming to them. Such messages advised the people that they could save themselves if they would only prove that their hearts lay with the cause of the Korean people, i. e., with the communists.

Such threats as these messages contained could be spread by the NK via refugees entering Seoul, many of whom were communist agents. Such a method is standard procedure for NK Intelligence (Appendix A).

As these messages were filtering through to the South Korean people, a continuous stream of retreating US and ROKA convoys was proceeding southward through Seoul. ROK police had begun mass executions of prisoners (which became public knowledge almost immediately), and NK guerilla bands were operating close to Seoul. As a result, many persons who previously may not have been sympathizers of the NK cause, but who now thought they were deprived of a chance to flee before the NK-Chinese avalanche, began to think of a practical way to self-preservation. Logic dictated they jump on the communist bandwagon, and by some deed make themselves persona grata in the eyes of the next masters of the locality. To what extent, and in what fashion, the people of Seoul actually did this is not known with exactness, but the files of the ROKA Provost Marshall's office show that on 12 December arrests for sabotage and murder (purportedly for political motives) had increased 42 percent over the previous week.

The Anti-Rhee Theme. Closely related to the anti-US theme is the NK anti-Rhee platform, an appeal to patriotism and the emotions rather than logic. The theme assumes two basic forms.

1. An assurance to the South Koreans of the desires of their brothers from the north to free them from the catastrophic consequences of the Rhee regime.

2. Insults, calumnies, and derogations thrown blindly at Rhee and his government, including reports of atrocities committed by order of the Rhee regime (see Appendix C).

The anti-Rhee theme may be considered to be very powerful, and largely acceptable for a sizable segment of the South Korean population, as there is evidence to the effect that Rhee's machine is basically a police state and as such is feared and hated by many of the people. Evidence to document these statements exists, but since it may directly affect the careers, and quite possibly the personal safety of a considerable number of South Koreans, no specific reference to source material will be given.

The Rhee regime committed several grave errors in regard to the South Korean population. The government created a strong, ruthless police organization which terrorized the population; unpopular leaders were kept in office; unpopular groups were kept active, and imposed upon the population. The government did not keep the people properly informed of the general war situation, which resulted in a majority of Seoulians being caught by the NK advance a few hours after the ROKA-PIO assured them that the government would remain in the capital, and that the UN Forces were on the move north from Suwon.

All available media was used by the NK to give prominence to the South Korean police terror for which Rhee was blamed. The poster shown in Figure 15 is typical. The original of this poster bore actual photographic prints, with captions as seen in the figure. Figures 16-20 are individual reproductions of the photos appearing in Figure 15.

It is interesting to note that the poster shown in Figure 21 is purportedly a product of NK agitators operating within ROK territory. The original, which was captured in Chongju, was composed of pasted-up photos and hand-lettered text.

Rhee is not attacked as a dignified opponent of the NK cause. He is presented as an old, decrepit "lackey of the US imperialists," one of three cliches almost invariably coupled with Rhee's name. Two other expletives commonly applied to Rhee are, "the forerunning

hound of the US imperialists," and "the traitor." He is never spoken of as a leader, even if a bad one; thus, the anti-Rhee tirades still allow the presentation of the US as the real villain, and Rhee merely as her "powerless, humble and decrepit servant."

It is highly probable that an anti-Rhee line would have a definite mass appeal, especially if it concentrates on derogation and ridicule, which could never be voiced by the domestic population because under the law they constitute punishable offenses against the government. Evidences of a sharp attitude against the Rhee government have mounted since the war, and police records show at least two attempts made on Rhee's life.

Vigorously, and at all times, NK propaganda has emphasized the nation's independence through its warm friendship with other communist countries. During the first six months of the war, the NK government repeatedly emphasized the fact that there was no physical presence on its soil of any foreign "protective" power and that the war was waged by NK Forces alone against opposing forces constituted of elements of many nations. The constant reiteration of plausible arguments showing the total dependence of South Korea on the US, and the physical presence of US troops in Korea, coupled with the latent dissatisfaction of the ROK population with the Rhee regime, are considered an increasingly effective argument.

Some arguments set forth to establish the total dependence of the ROK on the US include references to ECA aid, AMIK and KMAG, and, on 14 January 1951, the statement on the NK radio that the reason for the visit of Rhee's emissaries to General MacArthur was that without US aid the ROK government could neither muster nor clothe a single South Korean division.

The atrocity line of the ROK government has been, and is being, widely exploited by the communist press. The following excerpt from an article that appeared in "Izvestia," 24 July 1950, is a typical example of the communist propaganda pattern of NK and other Peoples Democracies.

The following news release (Shanghai Tass) was entitled "Atrocities of Syngman Rheeites in South Korea."

"It is reported from Tokyo that information has been received there about the shooting of political prisoners by the Syngman Rheeites in the town of Konju (Kosyu). In corroboration of this information there is a photograph taken by the France Presse correspondent which appeared in the evening edition of Sekai Simbun July 19. The photographer has caught the moment when the political prisoners

were being led away by the Syngman Rhee police to be shot in the mountains. It is pointed out in the caption that before their execution the prisoners were compelled to dig their own graves.

"It is stated that mass executions of prisoners are being carried out by the Syngman Rheeites in other regions of South Korea also."

North Korean Achievements, Ideals, and Practices. This is a projection of two positive aspects of NK ideals upon the South Koreans, and is an attempt to convince the target audience of the desirability of unification by citing the advantages that could accrue to them if the country were unified under the regime existing in NK. This appeal attempts to bring about a wider acceptance by the ROK people of NK ideals and practices. An effort is made to give a most favorable picture, not so much of the enemies philosophies and state systems as its people being well-meaning brothers of the South Koreans. Progress and innovations attained in NK are reviewed. Basically, two ideas are discernible.

1. An account of the reconstruction and general progress achieved in NK, for the benefit and persuasion of the South Koreans who have not yet, but could, and will, participate in those benefits "once they have been liberated from US and ROK rule."
2. An attempt to present the people of NK as peaceful and humane, who would not harm the people of South Korea.

Although one school of thought believes these themes were used for every target group of South Koreans, including the intellectuals, there is some evidence to support the belief that the themes were directed primarily to those segments of the population who may not be expected to be swayed by political arguments alone. A sizable portion of the population are illiterates, and are concerned primarily with the fundamental problem of survival. It is logical to assume that such people would be unwilling to risk their safety and lives for a political argument. Since communism was originally an ideology concerned earnestly with the socio-economic betterment of the masses, it is quite natural, and follows the standard pattern of communist propaganda, that a play for the sympathies of the target audience on a non-political ground can be made. This was effective in many lands, and Korea would seem to lend itself admirably to such an approach. It must not be forgotten, in this connection, that the communist propaganda line never ceased to promise a better distribution of the land for the benefit of the working peasant. Typical are the promises, implied and expressed, of more food for more people, more jobs for all and, especially, industrialization of the country.

Many South Koreans have been painfully aware that their country, technically and industrially, is pitifully underdeveloped. Merger of the two Koreas—the NK industrial potential and the South Korean agricultural material—would be an ideal solution for the general betterment of the economic situation of each. Thus, even to those who are not politically-minded, the idea that South Korea could participate in the benefits being derived from NK industrialization, while providing NK with whatever surplus agricultural products were available in the south, projects a dream of greater self-sufficiency and material progress for all.

The most important, or most frequently appearing sub-themes are the promises: land, food, work and housing for all; the achievements and the patriotic convictions of the NK people; and foreign sympathy with the NK cause. The following text develops these themes in that order.

Land, Food, Work, and Housing for All. In the early stages of hostilities the NK propaganda machine seems to have avoided giving straight promises of plenty after the liberation. Rather, it attempted to imply this through the presentation of reports from "liberated" areas. Such reports told of the many and tangible advantages accruing to the local populations as a consequence of the annexation of their towns and villages to the Peoples Republic, and left it to the target audience to conjecture about the benefits that might be derived through "liberation" by the communists. Such NK appeals stressed four points.

1. People would be permitted to follow their occupations peacefully.
2. There would be land for all, and no more feudal tenure of such land.
3. Brotherly love on the part of the government would guide the population in living in peace, harmony and achievement.
4. There would be work and food for all.

Examples of the use of this theme are many. One example was an NK leaflet dropped on ROKA personnel in the vicinity of Taejon in August, 1950. The leaflet in the form of a letter appeal by Un Pyong Myon, a citizen of Kyong Kido, to his brother Koyang Kun in the ROK Army. It read, in part: "The Peoples Army has brought the brilliant days of liberation to our family which lived in hunger for the last ten years as employees of the rich. . . They have distributed 4,000 pyong of land to our family."

Another leaflet, dropped in August, 1950, over Chung'ju, bore an appeal from a father in Kyonggi-Do to his son somewhere in South Korea. It read, in part: "The land reform law has been effective in our village already, and every farmer is joyful and working very hard on his farm in order to harvest every grain of rice... I shall guarantee you work... as soon as you return home..."

The cartoon illustrated in Figure 22 is another example of the manner in which this theme was handled.

Similar media was used to drive home the idea that reconstruction work is in full progress; also, the possibilities for work under the communist rule are unlimited, thus affording a possibility, for the first time in many years, of earning a decent living and not toiling without remuneration for a foreign master. The cartoons shown in Figure 23 implement this theme, and were distributed, or prepared for distribution to ROKA troops in a news sheet, and is representative of many such cartoons and sheets found in re-occupied territory.

Perhaps the most detailed promises, expressed or implied, were given in a leaflet distributed over a sizable part of South Korea during the communist push toward Taegu. It reprinted an Ordinance of the Permanent Committee of the Supreme Peoples Assembly of NK, decreeing the carrying-out of the well-publicized agrarian reforms in the "liberated" districts of South Korea. Translation of the full text of this leaflet is given in Appendix E.

Achievements and Patriotic Convictions of NK. Tied in closely with the theme of plenty, peace and prosperity after the liberation, is the theme reiterating the progress achieved in the NK Peoples Republic, explaining the aims of that regime, and asking for help for an early liberation.

In the February, 1950 issue of the NK Agitators' Manual are found suggestions to the communist propagandist for playing up the achievements of the people under NK rule. The thoughts are used as an argument tending to convince those who need to be convinced that the victory of the Peoples Army will produce benefits and an assurance of progress for all. The following paragraph quotes passages which are of interest.

"... under the leadership of General Kim Il Song, the working classes in the northern half have scored an enormous achievement and gained valuable experience in their struggle to restore the national economy which was disrupted by the Japanese imperialists and developed it under a coordinated state plan. In line with the just policy of the Peoples regime, the state plan has been overfulfilled every year since 1947... The Two Year Plan for 1949-1950, which carries particular significance in the course of attaining the

unity and independence of our fatherland and its democratic development, was formulated on the basis of such remarkable results scored earlier as already stated. Every year the industrial goal set by the Plan was carried out far more successfully than expected. How has it been possible?..Agrarian reform and other just policies, introduced by the Republic government, brought a speedy development of rural administration. With this, the material and cultural life of the peasantry of the northern half has made a remarkable rise in standard. The new position enjoyed by each peasant as one of the masters of their sovereignty called forth and enormous demand for culture among the peasants... For the period from their liberation from August 1948, a total of 126,000 houses were built in rural areas. Facilities for democratic propaganda have been installed in every village. Rural electrification and rural clinic systems are well in progress. With numerous schools and adult education centers established, illiteracy, constituting the majority of the world population, is being abolished speedily. Thus, all rural districts in the northern half are now blossoming into a place of new life...''

NK achievements in most fields have been very heavily propagandized, both to their own people as well as to the South Koreans, long before the present conflict started. Posters displaying statistics of progress in most disciplines of the national life were present in South Korea since 1948, and a good number have been found as late as October, 1950, in Seoul, after the liberation of that capital by the UN Forces. There are unconfirmed reports to the effect that such material, though often out of date, was brought to South Korea by the NK and used, or designed to be used, as teaching aids in schools. Two such posters are illustrated in Figures 24-25. They may be considered a typical treatment of this sub-theme.

The achievements of the NK state and its people have been used as propaganda in the present conflict; what the argument aims to convey has been underlined graphically in the form of now comic cartoons. Technical limitations prevent a reproduction of this material here.

Figures 26-27 are also examples of NK propaganda attempts to stress the progress achieved within NK and the fact that the masses of that country are cooperating to the full with their government, thus underlining the active support of the communist war effort.

A typical example of an NK appeal for South Korean aid and sympathy places emphasis on these NK achievements. The following passage is a quotation from such an appeal leaflet--this time using the political-achievement. This leaflet which was air-dropped south of Seoul following the communist "liberation" of that Capital, is directed to the peasants to "rise and join the anti-Rhee forces."

“Dear peasants to the southern half: The Permanent Committee of the Supreme Peoples Council of the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic has just issued a decree regarding the implementation of the agrarian reform in the liberated districts of the southern half of the Republic. The troops of the Peoples Army, representing the military power of the Korean people, have liberated you from the fascist police rule of the treacherous Syngman Rhee clique and the US imperilaists. The Peoples regime is now distributing land gratuitously, the land that you have coveted for so long. The day is here that you are freed from the tenant system, a feudal institution of thousands of years standing. The land will return to you, who till it yourselves and which has been cultivated with the blood and sweat of your forefathers as well as yours . . . If you wish for a good development of rural administration and for a happy life as enjoyed by the peasants of the northern half, carry out victoriously the agrarian reform”

Foreign Sympathy With The NK Cause. The enemy has tried to convey to his Korean audience, with progressive intensity, that he is not alone in facing the strength of the UN Forces, of which, Communist propaganda has always insisted, it is actually only the US Forces that aid the ROK government (implying that the other members of the UN were railroaded into consenting to an intervention in Korea.)

Thus an attempt is made to show that public opinion in those countries which officially agreed to the UN Resolution, and which may have been forced to send troops to Korea as a token of their assent, does not agree with US policies and is largely favorable to the NK cause. The enemy talks repeatedly about having the sympathies of the “freedom-loving elements of certain countries, or of the world democratic community.”

In Kim Il Song's policy speech broadcast over the NK radio on 2 August and publicized in pamphlets and posters throughout the Koreas, the statement was made that “. . . the armed invasion of the US imperialists has evoked strong resentment of the world democratic community. Under a slogan, ‘Hands off Korea,’ a popular campaign has been launched against the US imperialists' aggressive policy. . . in the Soviet Union, China, France, England, Germany, Australia, Italy, Pakistan, Japan, and even in the US.”

Also, the Stockholm Appeal has received considerable play by the enemy's propaganda both over the radio, in the press, in posters, and cartoons, one of which is reproduced in Figure 28.

This theme has undergone a definite metamorphose since the beginning of the war. Initially, the NK government denied categorically any foreign participation or influence on its own side except in terms

of raw materials and equipment. A leaflet both in English and in Korean for native and foreign soldiers, purportedly written by a Major Charles T. Barter, US prisoner of war in NK, says:

"... we had suspected Soviet influence behind the Korean scene. But nowhere have we seen any evidence of Soviet help. This is utterly groundless suspicion. . ."

That was during the time of the advance on Taejon. Later the NK propaganda machine apparently felt it necessary to reassure the home front as well as the South Koreans, that this was not a "wildcat" war but a crusade for the liberation and unification of a mature people. Thus we find numerous posters and cartoons portraying the unity of the "democratic Peoples" with NK. Figure 29 is a cartoon depicting this idea.

NOTE: An article to this effect was published in the magazine for propagandists, "Discussion Topics," issue of August 1950, No. 2.

Reports about friendly actions from abroad, especially from the Soviet Union and the European satellites, such as the report about the sending of an ambulance train by Hungary, the setting up of a field hospital by Czechoslovakia, the aid given the USSR in supplying military equipment, were mentioned daily over the radio.

New posters extolling the friendship of peoples of NK, Russia, and China began appearing in the latter part of September, 1950. One such poster, found at the time of the UN Forces' capture of Pyongyang, and glorifying the Soviets, is reproduced in Figure 30. Very prominent play was also being given at this time over the NK radio to the establishment of a Czechoslovak and Polish diplomatic mission inside NK.

Reports of indignation from other parts of the world implies sympathy with the NK cause and is another way of implementing the "Hands of Korea" idea. The NK press and radio drive this home constantly and have ample source material in quotations from the communist press of other countries.

The following quotation from an Izvestia news item 27 July 1950 is a good example:

"Dutch soldiers oppose participation in aggression in Korea. The Hague (Tass)—ANP reports that 26 July Gen van Fraiden, Commander of the Dutch forces in Indonesia, stated before his departure from Jakarta for Holland that not one of the Dutch land units in Indonesia would be sent to Korea. 'If the Dutch government wished to send land units to Korea,' he declared, 'we could

not carry out the order for the simple reason that the soldiers do not want it. The Dutch soldiers want only one thing—to return to Holland. ”

In this connection mention is indicated of the increasing trend in NK home propaganda, to emphasize Korean friendship to the Soviet Union and to propagandize it to the Koreans themselves. In addition to displaying Soviet posters in their original form, a practice especially frequent in NK, the communists have given prominence to pro-Soviet agitation. In terms of media used, this theme appears most frequently on the radio and on posters, in most cases photographic tableaux, (see Figure 30). In the former the friendship is extolled; in the latter, significant events are reproduced or admiration to Soviet leaders, Soviet culture, or Soviet people, is expressed.

In most instances these posters show original Soviet photographs with a caption in Russian. The poster, as such, is presented with captions or any given message conveyed in connection with it in the Korean language.

Two typical and relatively recent samples are reproduced in Figures 31 and 32. One of these posters was captured in Pyongyang, the other in Seoul.

NOTE: At the time of this writing, no posters extolling the Chinese had been captured. So far, reference to the Chinese in terms of NK propaganda has been limited to editorial and some radio commentaries; and then only to the domestic audience, and, thus far, not to the South Korean target groups.

SECONDARY THEMES

The criterion used for classifying a theme as secondary is not that of the relative effectiveness or importance, because these factors cannot be assessed with any validity at this moment, but rather the frequency of use. Most of the themes classified as primary, tend to appear fairly regularly in the general output of the enemy's propaganda, whereas those called secondary appear at certain times only and are either tied to the primary themes, or refer to specific phases of the war only, which makes them usable only on certain definite occasions.

Some of the more frequently-appearing secondary themes are: (1) the humaneness of the Peoples Army; (2) the wrath against the US invaders and injustice; and (3) propaganda slogans and cliches.

The Humaneness of the Peoples Army. NK propaganda plays, and loudly, on the benefits accruing to the South Korean population from the liberation by the Peoples Army. Its propaganda reviews the alleged brutalities of the US-ROK elements and presents itself as the champion of Korean freedom. The NK cause is emphasized as just, and designed to benefit the whole of the masses of Korea. With it all a distinct effort is made to dispel the doubts and fears in the minds of the target population with regard to the treatment they may expect at the hands of the invader. This policy becomes so intensive in NK propaganda to the ROK soldier that it must be considered a primary theme in that case.

Enemy propaganda directed to the UN Forces in Korea is equally saturated with this theme. An enemy leaflet bearing an appeal by a US-PW, Maj C. T. Barter, already mentioned previously, designed primarily for consumption by UN soldiers, states in part:

"... The Peoples Army is totally different from what we had expected: The Peoples Army do not kill their PWs, nor do they put us to any labor. In fact the treatment we are getting is remarkable..."

Enemy press and radio are said to have made extensive use of this leaflet, in translated form, representing it as a spontaneous statement of one of their early prisoners, in propaganda directed at the local population of South Korea.

In a leaflet dropped in the Pyongyang area on 28 November 1950, written in both English and Korean, though addressed to US Army Personnel, says: "... The Korean Peoples Army treats PWs well..."

This is understandable since it is the logical theme to employ in exhorting soldiers to lay down their arms and surrender to the enemy. Fear of the treatment to be accorded to them after such an act is a powerful deterrent. Similarly, it is understandable why NK psychological warfare to the ROK soldier concentrates on this theme to a greater extent than it does in its general propaganda line for consumption by the civilian population.

A leaflet directed primarily to members of the ROKA but reported to have been distributed heavily among the civilian population of the areas of Yangsong, Ansong, and Chonan (date unknown), and available in one version in the files of G-2, GHQ (PWB) under the number ROK-19, bears a message from an ex-officer of the ROKA who deserted and returned home, saying in part:

"... The Peoples Army gave us warm reception. Now I am back home in Tukto (near Seoul) and working happily with my family on our farm. I am not doing back-breaking drudgery any longer as I

used to do when I was a tenant farmer. . . The fatherland is now mine; I am a glorious citizen of the Republic. . ."

A rather powerful implementation of the NK propaganda theme of the humaneness of the Peoples Army—the popular acceptance of the ideals for which it fights—represents the leaflet which is reproduced in Figure 33, in both the original and a translation and which was found north of Taejon in August, 1950.

In areas immediately exposed and threatened with communist invasion, the element of fear instilled through threats disseminated by leaflets, letters and posters, was usually the main propaganda weapon. In areas somewhat removed, yet still in the path of the advancing enemy, propaganda activity would appeal for an understanding of the enemy's cause, asking for support of it and reiterating the friendly designs of the advancing forces toward the local population. An example in point (from information supplied by ROKA-CIC elements and National Police in Seoul) is the situation in Seoul when the enemy was advancing on and massing around Kaesong on the 38th parallel. In the villages just south of the massed forces, leaflets appeared threatening those who did not collaborate, while in Seoul, 50 miles away, intensive agitation was going on, especially among ROK troops there, to the effect that all those who remained in the town and did not fight against the NK (and Chinese) Forces would be well treated and permitted to join the Peoples Army and the NK Labor Party.

Of course, in NK propaganda to its own population, no allusion is made to the humanitarianism of its army. On the contrary, the ferocious attitude on the part of the NK fighting man is displayed to show the effectiveness of his intervention.

Allusions to the love of the NK people for their brothers in the south have been made frequently and the ideal of peaceful work for the benefit and glory of all in the united fatherland is constantly reiterated. Thus we find Kim Il Song saying in a radio speech (date of this broadcast could not be ascertained):

"In areas liberated by the Peoples Army the entire population is extending a wholehearted welcome to the heroic Peoples Army for having liberated them. . . The liberated people are reinstating the Peoples Committees which have been disorganized by the reactionaries and are putting into effect the constitution of the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic which safeguards the peoples' rights and freedom. . . Farmers in liberated lands have started already to carry out land reforms. . ."

Wrath against the US invaders and injustice: the might of the Peoples Army: the peoples' convictions and their determination to 'liberate the Republic of Korea.'

This major propaganda theme is composed of a variety of sub-themes. They appear, however, thoroughly interwoven in the general output of NK propaganda and are therefore discussed under one heading in this paper.

Apart from a continuous reiteration of the hatred against the US and the Syngman Rhee clique as "enemies of the people" a distinct effort is made to drive home the grim determination of the Peoples Army to fight the enemy until victory is achieved and he has been driven from the Peninsula; annihilate his forces during the fight. In this connection the popular support that the NK soldiers have from the home front (and sometimes also from the people in "liberated" South Korean areas) is greatly emphasized. Usually the South Korean and UN Forces are presented as morally decomposed and an utterly corrupt lot.

In this "line" a distinct deviation from the standard Communist (Soviet) Party pattern is discernible. Contrary to the tactics of Soviet propaganda, the NKs attack the US as a nation while in Soviet propaganda playing the same theme, the assumption is always expressed that among the masses of the US people there are many sympathizers with the communist cause.

We find this theme played up primarily in the form of pictorial posters, cartoons published in the press of leaflet form, and in short patriotic slogans affixed to the walls, doors and windows of houses (as happened in Seoul). Under the broad theme there fall also the attempts of enemy propaganda to present the NKs as the true fulfillers of a messianic mission of their nation; the saving of the South Korean people.

Figure 34 gives a typical example of how this idea is played in the form of a poster.

Other examples of this general propaganda theme are presented in Figures 35 to 47.

Army Order No. 43, by Kim Il Song, disseminated to North and South Koreans alike in the form of newspaper reports, posters and leaflets, decrying the total war brought to NK, but reaffirming its belief in the strength of the people to achieve victory; (This one addressed to the Democratic Youth League of NK), says, in part:

"...before the might of the heroic Peoples Army, the brutal plan of aggression by the US imperialists, the obedient lackeys

of the Wall Street monopoly capitalists, is being thwarted in a succession of defeats.

"... the matchless and heroic units of the Peoples Army have liberated Kwangju, Mokpo as well as Seoul . . . they are mopping up the US ground forces as they continue massing, like angry waves, toward Pusan and Halla Mountain on Cheju Island . . .

"... as long as the troops of the Peoples Army stand serving the fatherland and its people and enjoying their love and support, no foreign invader will ever be able to violate an inch of our territory.

"... today bombers and warships... are indiscriminately killing our parents and brothers... and subjecting factories built by our parents and brothers to indiscriminate bombings. This, however, will not break the unbending will of the Korean people who have risen and stand united in the just war for the unification, independence and democratization of the fatherland; this will not thwart the great might of the Peoples Army advancing like angry waves..."

Propaganda Slogans and Cliches. The enemy's propaganda machine employed consistently a great number of cliches and stereotyped expressions. A full enumeration of these cannot be given and illustrated at this time since only a limited portion of all documentation available has been translated at this time. For this reason only such slogans and stereotyped expressions that have been observed in use constantly are mentioned.

NOTE: A study and analysis of cliches and stereotypes employed in the communist literature used for propaganda purposes by the NK and of the speeches.

Patriotic Slogans. Into this category fall the many hurrahs for NK, Kim Il Song, the Peoples Army, a unified Korea, and victory over the enemy. Typical examples of these are reproduced in Figures 48-49.

Frequent use is also made by the NK propagandists of the symbol of their flag, without any text, to drive home the patriotic-nationalistic fighting appeal. Thousands of small NK flags invariably appear on the streets of occupied towns and, frequently, in localities still held by ROK Forces but propagandized by NK. Small flags (printed on leaflets) are handed out to the local populace and, during the night, other such flags are posted throughout the city by communist agitators in South Korea. Figure 50 shows a reproduction of these flags which appear in the communist press and which also are displayed as posters.

Pictures of the flag have been used largely to publicize the presence of the Peoples Army in certain parts of South Korea. Typical of such use is the picture of the Capitol Building of Seoul at the time of the NK occupation in front of which the NK flag is flying. This photograph has been widely used in the NK press and in occupied areas as well as in the Soviet press. It is also reported to have been the subject for a painting that has been exhibited in Moscow and received a Soviet art prize. The photograph in question is reproduced in Figure 51.

Generally speaking, a distinct effort is discernible on the part of the NK propaganda machine to play up the symbol of the flag of NK as the true and only symbol of Korean patriotism. In both countries considerable literature exists about the meaning, origin and symbolism of their respective national flags. The NK propaganda machine made wide use of a pamphlet prepared by Kim Du Pong, entitled "Formulation of the New National Flag and Abolishment of the Taekuk (i. e., South Korean, W. N.) Flag." This booklet, in the possession of ORO is still untranslated but is said to be extremely well-written and describes the sanctity of the Korean ideal embodied in the symbol of the NK flag. The booklet is reported to have been widely distributed and intensively used in all schools under NK domination.

Cliches. The enemy uses cliches almost ad nauseam. Some of the more striking ones are described herein.

1. The US imperialists. Almost never are the terms "United States" or "American" used by the enemy's propaganda. Of 42 leaflets read, the term "American bandits" was used seven times and the term "US aggressors" 21 times. In the majority of all leaflets the stereotyped expression "US imperialists" appears so frequently that it often occurs in four or more succeeding sentences, and some times two or three times in a single sentence.

2. Claws of the Enemy. The enemy (US) is frequently presented as having stretched out his claws to enslave the Korean people. A surprisingly large number of NK leaflets distributed to and among the South Koreans, especially those directed at the ROK soldiers, refer to the "claws" of the enemy. Note a reproduction of this symbol in Figure 52.

3. Portrait of the US. In accordance with universal practice in propaganda, the enemy has created a cliché of the US and uses it wherever the US citizen is portrayed. The political form of the US is usually a caricature of General MacArthur, or a fat ugly man representing the Wall Street "imperialist" resembling the Jew in Streicher's defunct "Der Stuermer." The US soldier is represented in a fashion resembling the familiar US "Sad Sack."

Reproductions of "US faces, taken from NK cartoons, posters, newspapers, and books illustrating this particular cliché, are found herein. Into this category fall also the derogations of the US male as a "fighting man," and the thousands of (sometimes clever) caricatures portraying the GI in a very precarious situation, due to the impact of the mighty forces from NK. A few such, rather funny cartoons, are reproduced in Figures 53-56.

4. Anti-Rhee. Enemy propaganda shows only contempt for Rhee. The two most common attributes used with the same frequency as "US imperialists" are "the traitor" and the "dog" or, perhaps even more frequently, "the forerunning hound of the US imperialists." A more or less standard way of graphically presenting Rhee is shown in the reproduction of a cartoon that was prepared for use in the NK press and the newspapers in occupied Seoul (Figure 57).

5. Eulogies and Glorifications of Kim Il Song and the Fatherland and Patriotic Exhortations. A few examples of the many stereotyped eulogies of Kim Il Song and quotations of sentences of wisdom by him and other famous leaders on enemy's power, banners, leaflets, flysheets, etc., are found in Figures 58 through 61.

ANALYSIS OF NK PROPAGANDA THEMES

A preliminary critical consideration of the enemy's propaganda themes used against the South Korean nationals during this war prompts the following conclusions.

1. Relatively few themes have been used consistently in the campaign.

2. The appeal has been to the emotions rather than the reason. Few instances of sound argumentation in pro or contra Rhee or on the aims and causes of the war, or the US part in it can be found. The enemy has contented himself with rather vulgar and unsubstantiated attacks against his opponents. Seldom does he make an attempt to prove his contentions. The style used, by all standards of journalism, is very crude and there is apparently a complete lack of any finesse.

3. In his graphic presentation, the enemy has been far more successful in portraying the gist of his arguments in an interesting and understanding way. Although technically not comparable to those made in the US or the USSR, they are well presented and are said to have been one of the most powerful factors in making his propaganda effective.

4. The enemy's leaflets are graphically and by content primarily a vilification of the enemy. It is only when the people's help is being requested for underground work or acts of active or passive resistance, that the leaflets are matter-of-fact.

5. An over-all examination of the enemy's themes and the way they have been used reveals a striking similarity to the style and arguments of Soviet propaganda during the first two years of the war against Germany. The exception to this is that appeals for surrender, in the case of enemy troops, has almost never been used in the case of Korea but instead pleas to the youth to desert have been voiced.

6. The lack of finesse on the part of the enemy in handling propaganda themes should not be construed to mean that he has not done a convincing job propaganda-wise. The enemy's propaganda machine can validly be expected to be far better acquainted with the social and cultural level of its target audience than can be assessed after a few months perfunctory study. To assess the effectiveness of the enemy's propaganda it would have to be established whether or not those who went over and made common cause with him, did so as a result of the impact of his propaganda or whether other circumstances prompted them to do so. From the impression that the writer has of the cultural and intellectual level of the masses in South Korea, it seems logical to assume that the choice of arguments and themes made by the NKs has not been a bad one on the whole, because their very crudity may have been necessary to have them sink into the minds of those to whom they were directed.

7. The enemy has used, to a great extent, the media of agitation and rumor superimposed upon a nervous and excited population for the dissemination of his propaganda themes. Because they are spread by individuals, they are invariably colored by interpretation. Neither ROK nor UN propaganda appears to have utilized such means of propaganda dissemination for no evidence of rumors planted or black propaganda were detected in the course of interrogation of enemy PWs and communist (civilian) political prisoners.

비 단 옷 입은 문둥이.



높가는 모순진물처럼 요로로
인민의 생활은 지옥으로빠진다



악마는 미망의 주인요모나아서
영원을 죽임으로 보라간다!




도적은 제족을팔고 ORO 11-6 APR 51
인민은 모리처럼 베풀맞는다!

Figure 6. A Soviet cartoon taken from the NK magazine "Arrow." The headline: "US, leopard in the silk dress." Depicted here, are: The rotteness of US life; prices rising above height of buildings; laborers and patriots sent to their graves; and the thief of Wall Street accusing others of thievery.



Figure 7. This NK poster portrays South Koreans wandering alone, tired and starving under US bondage.



ORO-II-8 APR 51

하늘의 도둑들은 군사시설이 아닌 인민들의 주택과 병원 학교 기타 문화시설들을 폭격하고있다

Figure 8. This anti-US cartoon is captioned: "Flying bandits are bombing such non-military establishments as dwellings, hospitals and other cultural institutions."



ORO-II-9 APR 51

Figure 9. A grim portrayal of US atrocities, a common and much used theme of the NK propagandists.



ORO-11-10-APR 51

권 세계 방방곡곡으로 부러 『미제는 조선에서 손을 빼라』 『조선문제는 조선사람에게 맡기라』 하는 소리가 나날이 높아지고있다 미제의 아무런 허위적 선전도 자기의 침략 진상을 권 세계 인민들의 눈앞에서 숨길수는없다

Figure 10. Captioned "Hands off Korea," this typical anti-US cartoon appeared in many enemy newspapers and magazines. To show world sympathy with the NK cause, the legend reads: "No falsified propaganda of the US imperialists can cloak the true picture of US aggression from the eyes of the world."



ORO -11-11 APR 51

Figure 11. This illustration, used as both poster and cartoon, reads: "Even today the partisans are cleaning up the enemy."



ORO-11-12 APR 51
 적 후방에서 인민들은 적의 수송로를 파괴하여 적들을 곤란상태에 빠뜨리며 적들의 후방과 전방의 연락을 차단 하고있다

Figure 12. A cartoon appealing for all-out sabotage against UN Forces. The caption: "In the enemy's rear people are destroying enemy supply lines, throwing enemy into hardships. Thus, the enemy's front is cut off from rear."



ORO-11-13 APR 51
 미해방구 인민들은 발계산을 철폐하여 적의 작전계획을 파탄시키며 모든 력량을 동원하여 인민군미의 진격을 보장하여 주고 있다

Figure 13. This NK cartoon depicts active participation of NK partisans destroying UN areas. The caption: "People in the areas yet to be liberated are assisting the partisans in disrupting enemy operational plans and securing the advance of the Peoples Army."



ORO-11-14 APR 51

Figure 14. This NK cartoon shows the fruits of the combined guerilla-NK volunteer efforts against US imperialism. The volunteers apply the bayonets to the front while guerillas provide behind-the-line assaults.




복병을 몰살하던 놈들의 머리석은
각란을 보라



리승만도당은 그들의 군대 내부에서
위기가 다가올지 모를 위태로운
상황을 맞이하여 이와 같은 악담을



간민무도한 방법으로 조국의 무수한 농
민들을 학살하였다



민중적대와 열악하였다 하더라도
광민을 체포 학살 하라는 지전



애국적 인민들을 체포 학살하고 농가 불령
탄하는 리승만도당

Figure 15. This NK photo-poster emphasizing the Rhee regime atrocities against innocent persons. Poster (upper left) was used to show how, as the signs of mutiny mounted against Rhee, the ROK authorities moved to exterminate all dissenters in their midst.



ORO-11-15-16 APR 51

애국적 인민들을 체포 학살하고 농가 불령
탄하는 리승만도당

Figure 16. This picture was used to depict the Rheeites killing patriots and looting villages.



리승만도당들은 그들의군대내부에서
 의거기세가높아지자이를위협기만
 도는탄압하기위하여이와같은악랄한
 수단을썼다

Figure 17. This NK roadside poster tells of the atrocities of the Rheeites against mutineers within their own ranks.



ORO -11-17-18 APR 51

Figure 18. This picture of South Korean military execution of traitors was presented as a "striking example of the unnecessary bloodshed brought to the Koreans as a result of the stubborn resistance against the NK cause."



잔인무도한 방법으로 조국의 우수한 아들
딸들을 학살하였다

Figure 19. Using the "needless deaths of our sons and daughters" theme, NK propagandists displayed this traitor-execution picture to show the "ruthless methods of the ROK-UN Forces."



ORO-11-19-20 APR 51

인민유격대와 열락하였다 하여 무고한
량민을 체포 학살 하라는 자전

Figure 20. The NK propagandists said this picture "vividly portrays the herding of innocent persons into public places for execution for having contacted NK guerillas."

(A) 살인자 리승만, 영도들은 미제봉주의자들의 조종하에 우리 조국 강토에서 조선의 유능한 애국자들을 무수히 학살 하였다



(B) 고 리 주 하 동지



(C) 고 김 삼 념 동지


(D) 리승만 미제영도들은 우리 조국에서 지도자들이 조선 인민의 가장 유능한 대표자였던 김삼룡 리주하 남 동지에게 사악적 학살을 감행한 것이다



(E) 조선 인민들은 우리 조국에서, 감행한 악한 범죄의 아수라장을 반드시 기억할 것이다. 조선의 유능한 독립 투쟁은 외산 투쟁에서 무수히 희생된 애국자, 특히 리주하, 김삼룡 동지에게 하지 않는 것이

ORO-11-21 APR 51


Figure 21. This hand-lettered poster with paste-up pictures of "lamented comrades" is head-lined: (A) The murderous traitor Rhee and his clique slaughtered top patriots of Korea in their own fatherland. The captions: (B) The lamented comrade Mr. Chu-ha Ee; (C) The lamented comrade Mr. Sam-nyong Kim; (D) Syngman Rhee and his followers killed in a most beastly way, Messrs Sam-nyong Kim and Chu-ha Ee, labor leaders; (E) The Korean people will surely remember the atrocities perpetrated by the traitors of our land, determined to see justice done to patriots who died miserable deaths in their fights for a unified independent Korea.



해방된지역에서는 토지개혁이 실시된결과 장구한 일제통치시기는 물론이요 지난 오년
간에 더욱 쓰러린토지없는 농민의 생활을하던 남조선 농민들은 이제야 참다운 땅의 주
인이되었다
ORO-11-22·APR 51

Figure 22. "Land ownership rests with the people," is the theme for this cartoon. The caption: "As a result of the agrarian reform instituted in the liberated areas, South Korean peasants who led miserable lives under the Japanese and later under Rhee, have become true owners of their land."

CONFIDENTIAL



ORO-II-23 APR 51
 영웅한 인민군대의 진격에 의하여 해방된 지역에서는 5년전 일제의 기반으로부터 해방되자 즉시 설립하였다가 미제와 그의 주구 리승만 역도들에 의하여 폐쇄되었던 인민위원회들이 인민들의 손으로 다시 복구되고있다

Figure 23. Similar to many Soviet cartoons, these NK pictorial presentations show: (top) the happy everyday life of the "farmers of the Peoples Republic;" and (bottom) "the peoples of liberated South Korea joining together to support the Peoples Committees and the Peoples Army in the reconstruction of our land."

CONFIDENTIAL



Figure 24. A pre-war cartoon still used extensively to extol the might of industrial North Korea.




Figure 25. The overfulfilling of the annual quotas within the NK Five Year Plan, such as this 1947-48 representation, is a favored subject for the enemy propagandists.

CONFIDENTIAL



로동자들은 二개년 인민경제계획을 초과완수함으로써 전선에 군수품을 더욱 많이 보
내고 있다


Figure 26. Typically Soviet styled, this graphic representation is from a cartoon newspaper (NK) which was distributed in occupied South Korea. The caption: "More supplies are being shipped to the front by the laborers who are overfulfilling (their quotas) of the Five Year Plan for the Peoples' economy."



농민들은 식량을 전선으로 전선으로 보내고있다 ORO-II-26-27 APR 51
농민들은 전쟁의 승리를 위하여 총 동원되었다 우리의 후방은 공고하다

Figure 27. This cartoon is an affirmation of the homefront cooperation with the NK war effort. The caption: "Peasants are sending more and more food to the front. Peasants, arise for victory. Our rear is secure."

CONFIDENTIAL



ORO-11-28 APR 51


全世界 평화옹호인민들은 새 전쟁을 미연에 방지하고 원자탄 사용을 금할것을 결정한 스톡홀름 호소문에 서명하면서 조선에대한 미국의 무장 침략을 규탄하고있다

Figure 28. From a newspaper (NK) propagandizing the Stockholm Appeal came this widely distributed NK cartoon. It is captioned: "All peace-defending peoples are signing the Stockholm Appeal, which calls for preventing a new war and banning atom bombs, thus condemning the armed invasion of US imperialists against Korea."

전세계근로자들의전투적력량
 검열하며 시위하는 5.1절만세!



Figure 29. This NK poster displayed in occupied South Korea attempts to drive home the idea that many allies the world over stand side by side with the NK Forces. It implies that together with these allies, the NK peoples will trod under the US, UK and ROK elements.



ORO-11-29-30 APR 51

Figure 30. A familiar poster to ROKA men who liberated South Korean territory held by the enemy. The caption: "Long live the everlasting friendship between the great people of the Soviet Union and the Korean people."




Figure 31. Soviet news photographs such as these and similar art work originating in the Pyongyang Soviet Mission, were frequently used as NK poster material. They are often hand-made with photographs superimposed. They invariably imply the "great example" of USSR and extol the Soviets "who work for the comfort of the people."





Figure 32. A (NK) photographic reproduction of a Soviet poster found in the Il Shim School in Seoul after liberation of that city from the NK invaders. This presentation gives statements by Lenin and Stalin which stress the "arts," and which here state that "cinematography is highly important."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



영용한 人民군대에 무한 감사를들인다

소위국군 포로 제10호 수용소 장병들의 인민군대에 감사
를들이는 결기대회광경 /

어제까지 배국역도 리승만도배의 졸도로써 인민을위
한 진정한 인민군대에게 총부리를겨누는 소위 국군


포로병들은 인민군대의 따뜻한 사랑속에 새로운 희망의길을 차져 과거의 어리석은 자신
의행동을 참회하며 우리도 人民과 조國을위해 리승만역도를 무찌르고야 말겠다는 투지
도금세인 1500여명의 제10호수용소의 『국군』 포로장병들
은 자기를 구해준 인민군대에게 무한한 감사를 들이는 결
기대회를 개최하였다

사진상은

리승만 배국도배에게 강제로 끌려다니며 거짓에 속아온 몸매한 자신이 과거를
참회하며 人民의원수 리승만 역도를 못필리 원한에 찬 분노한 찢었다고 언
화한 김중 료문하는 김집중 二등장사

사진하는

리승만역도에게 속사으며 원대받은 과거를 참회하여 오늘 인민군대의 따뜻한
사랑에 감지된 1500여명 제10호 소위 『국군』 포로 장병들은 리승만역
도에 대한 분개심이 더욱 드높다. 다같이 원수를 못필리 원한에 찢치게 나설
것을 맹세하며 열렬히 토론에 참가하고 있다



ORO-11-33 APR 51

Figure 33. Pictures of the "lost sheep" who "learned the truth in the NK prisoners-of-war camps," furnished ready material for enemy propagandists. At top left Sgt Kim Ch'ong Chung delivers fiery speech in which he regrets his own stupidity in being a Rhee follower. At bottom right is a portion of 1,500 prisoners (former ROKA members) who "repented and joined the NK inspired National Army."

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ORO 11-34 APR 51

Figure 34. Captured in Seoul, this poster portrays the willing support of the "cause" by the NK youth to bring about unity of their fatherland. The caption: "Let's save the people in South Korea."

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평화로운 농촌과 도시에 야만적폭격을 가하고있는 미제를 구축하는 전선으로 모든식
 빵을 보내기위하여 공화국농민들은 눈부신 생산투쟁을하고있다

Figure 35. A "Support of the homefront" cartoon. The caption: "Peasants of the Republic engaged in the illustrious struggle for increased production, ship all types of food to the front where US imperialists are being routed. They (the US Forces) are subjecting our rural areas and cities to barbarous and indiscriminate bombings."



ORO-II-35-36 APR 51


원칙 인민들은 자기의 모든 력량과 지성을 바쳐 승리를 위한 원 인민적 진군에 참
 가하고있다

Figure 36. Headlined "Everything for victory," this cartoon is captioned: "The entire people are taking part in the general march for victory, devoting to the cause all their forces, sincerity and enthusiasm."



권체 인민들은 모든 력량을 동원하여 파괴된 교량을 복구하여 수송사업을 보장하고

Figure 37. This "United effort of the homefront," cartoon is captioned: "The peoples have mobilized all forces in order to restore damaged bridges and thus aid transportation of the NK Forces."




ORO 11-37-38 APR 51

아름다운 우리조국해역을 침해하는 미국해적의 순양함과 구축함을 침몰시키고있는 우

Figure 38. The might of the NK Navy is widely publicized by enemy propandists. The caption: "Naval units of our Republic sinking cruisers and destroyers of the US pirates who violate our beautiful territorial waters."

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


ORO 11-39 APR 51

우리의 영웅한 고사포 부대들은 미국강도들의 항공기들을 하나도 놓치지않고 격추시키

Figure 39. Cartoons are also used to show the NK anti-aircraft units can cope with the US airplanes of all discriptions. This caption: "Our heroic anti-aircraft units are downing every plane of the US aggressors."

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우리조국의 자랑인 탱크부대들은 적들의 기계화부대들을 보주리 격파하며 우리 보병부대들의 진격을 보장하고있다

Figure 40. The enemy's pride in its armed might is exemplified here. The caption: "The pride of our fatherland—our tank units—is destroying enemy mechanized units, thus assuring the defense of our infantry."



영웅적 인민군대는 이승만 괴뢰군의 주력을 완전히 소탕하고 강도미케의 침략군대를 소탕 박멸하면서 진공을 계속하였다
영웅적 인민군대는 남한본인민의 92%이상을 해방시키고 부산과 진해를 함하여 총 진공을 개시하였다 적들은 완전히 포위되었으며 적들의 포위망은 점점 축소되고있다
중국적 승리를 위하여 적들을 최후적으로 심멸하는 소탕전이 전개되었다
ORO-11-40-41 APR 51

Figure 41. The "strength and enthusiasm of the NK fighting forces" is depicted here. The caption: "Heroic Peoples Army has completely routed the many forces of Syngman Rhee's puppet army and is advancing to defeat the US invaders. With 92% of the South Koreans liberated, NK mopping-up operations are now underway."



Figure 42. Headlined "Grim determination," this NK poster purported to show that despite temporary set-backs at the hands of the UN Forces, the Peoples Army will win in the end.



영웅한 인민군대는 미군을 격파하며
용감히 전진하고있다
전체인민들이여! 인민군대와함께
미제를 우리강토에서 완전소탕하라!



최후승리를 향하여 번개같이 진격하자
진해로 부산으로! 부산으로!!

ORO 11-42-43-44 APR 51

Figure 43. This caricaturization of the Peoples Army manhandling (presumably) Gen Douglas MacArthur, implies that the NK Forces have the war situation well in hand. The caption of this poster: "The Heroic Peoples Army is driving on, smashing US troops. All the People! Let us rout the US imperialists from our shores."

Figure 44. This poster was used in quantity during the NK advances on Pusan. The caption: "Advance like a thunderbolt for final victory! Forward to Chingha, on to Pusan. On to Pusan!"




Figure 45. This and similar posters appeared in series and featured messages to the South Koreans to arise and revolt against Rhee. The caption: "Let's go forward and repel the US imperialists."




Figure 46. This poster is to "the entire people." The caption: "Subordinate all your work to the war aims and our task of routing the enemy. Organize the entire population. Provide the Peoples Army with all necessities. Insure rapid delivery of war supplies. Organize extensive relief work for wounded soldiers."

미제강탈자본이 우리인민에게 더부러 할일과
포탄에 백발의 명중률으로 보답하라 !!

최후승리는가까워진
진해로
부산을먼개
들진
하라

미군탱크기갑해병부대와
과피패잔부대들을
격멸소탕



ORO 11-46-47 APR 51

Figure 47. This poster comprises a paste-up of four individual messages, each intended for display in automobile and street car windows. Across the top: "Answer the bullets of the US plunderers fired upon our peoples with a hundred direct hits per each shot fired at you." Bottom left: "Final victory is now at hand. Advance with speed to Pusan and Chinha." Bottom center: "US Tank and armored units and motors—remnants of the puppet troops—mounted." Bottom right: "For victory, front-line newspaper, Peoples Army."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Figure 48. A cartoon captioned: "Long live the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic."





Figure 49. Captured by ROK elements in Taejon, this poster was displayed profusely during the NK advance southward. The caption: "Long live the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic."




II-48-49-50 APR 51

Figure 50. Reproductions, such as this, of the NK flag were used as posters for display throughout Red-held cities and made into small paper flags for hand-carrying. This was a common practice for communist rallies.

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


ORO 11-51 APR 51

Figure 51. The NK flag is hoisted over the South Korean capitol building in Seoul after capture of that city by the invaders.

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미국강도들의 피눈은 마수는 아름다운 우리 조국강토를 찍럽히고있다
이것이 자랑하는 미제의 『선행』이며 『독립방조』의 정치이다

Figure 52. This presentation of the "claw" of the enemy, was taken from a cartoon newspaper (NK) and was slanted primarily to the South Korean fighting forces. The caption: "The devilish paws of the US bandits are soiling the beautiful land. For them this is a 'good act' and 'assistance for the independence' in which they take great pride."

작은 ... 최후의운명을강요하는 남반부인민공세.

광복은 긴박한 농민투쟁은 먼
앞에 있다 남반부 인민들의 미국피리에게
한 공세는 끈질기므로 진전되고있다
적송반도당의 비관소리는 인민들의
공격에 대한 최후의 발악이다



ORO 11-52-53 APR 51

Figure 53. Taken from the official organ of the NK Youth League (October of 1950) this cartoon attempts to show the "tongs of a unified effort" of the NK partisans and NK Forces putting the "squeeze" on the US elements in Korea.

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Figure 54. The "hammer of protest" (the entire population) and the strong arm of the Peoples Army, apply a death-dealing blow to the US Forces in Korea.

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「무력」을 표현하며 세계제패를 꿈상하던 미국 침략군대는 우리 인민군대에 의한 참

Figure 55. This cartoon was taken from a (NK) newspaper. The caption: "The invading troops, who once claimed to be invincible, and dreamed of world domination, are surrendering after the Peoples Army dealt them a crushing blow."



ORO 11-55-56 APR 51

Figure 56. This cartoon, which appeared in the organ of the NKLP, 28 Sept 1950, portrays, in true NK style, that the US troops are routed. The black portion of the Korean map which Death hands to the general (presumably Gen Douglas MacArthur) shows only Pusan and Chinha which are yet in US hands.

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ORO II-57 APR 51

조국통일 민주주의 전선 호소문에 서명하면서 전쟁을 도발한 민족반역자들을
범죄자로서 처단할것을 표명하였다

Figure 57. Here the pen of time and death, has dealt a fatal stab to the national traitors.
The caption, in general, implies that the national traitors unleashed the war and should
thus be answerable as war criminals.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



ORO II-57 APR 51

조국통일 민주주의 전선 호소문에 서명하면서 전쟁을 도발한 민족반역자들을
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENEMY PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIRECTED AT THE ROK FORCES

As previously pointed out, the line between the enemy's propaganda to the Korean civilian population and his psychological warfare directed at the ROK soldier cannot be precisely defined. In Korea, combat zones have never been clearly distinguishable from non-combat areas (to which the population of the former is usually evacuated). Any section of the country, whether rural or urban, flat or hilly, industrial or agricultural, is subject to attack and liable to become an actual battleground, with the local civilians being caught in the fray.

ROKA elements are almost constantly in close contact with the civilian population. The officers, and very often the men, eat in local restaurants and often they are billeted in the houses of the local civilian population. The South Korean soldier has considerable contact with and information about the thousands of refugees who often clutter the roads during a retreat. The sight of them can easily cause him to wonder whether his own dear ones may not be among those homeless masses. Being of the same blood and speaking the same language as the local population, the ROK soldier can establish valuable contacts immediately upon arrival in any area of Korea. Thus he is subject, to an incomparably greater degree than is the case with the non-Korean soldier of the UN Forces, to the impact of local rumor, gossip, covert enemy propaganda and other reactions picked up from the local civilian population.

There existed, at all times during this conflict, a quick exchange of rumors between the ROK military elements and the civilian population. Investigation conducted by ROK intelligence, reveals that at least 50 percent of all rumors spread among the local population, have been disseminated, consciously or unconsciously, by military elements who are in contact with the civilians, and whose opinions on the military situation were spread by word of mouth with the tendency to snowball into "hot" news. Similarly, the soldier was prone to pick up all kinds of talk from among the excited civilian population and disseminate it among his troops. The ROK government has been unable to check this trend.

As a result it seems quite plausible to assume that the majority of propaganda themes and arguments, usable and potentially effective upon the civilian population of South Korea, are equally effective

against the ROK soldier. The chief difference in the enemy's propaganda treatment of the soldier seems to be mainly in the choice of media. Not all the techniques of dissemination applicable to civilians can be used against the soldier living a regimented life. As far as themes are concerned, the enemy's propaganda machine does not seem to regard the ROK soldier as an ideal propaganda target, except for the special emphasis of certain themes. But to reach the soldier, he must disseminate these themes through a far more limited number of media than he needs to use when directing the same propaganda line at the population at large. On the whole, no special effort is discernible on the part of the NK propaganda apparatus to conduct psychological warfare against the ROKA in a manner basically different from the propaganda approach directed at the South Korean civilians.

Yet despite the apparent lack of special propaganda treatment against the ROKA man, the South Korean soldier has been given specific and constant attention by the enemy's psychological warfare apparatus through the very intensive play of a limited number of propaganda themes, tailored in style and argument especially for the soldier's consumption and hammered at him with the help of those few media that afford the greatest probability of reaching him.

NOTE: It is established that a special propaganda section of the NK Ministry of propaganda and Education is charged with the planning and preparation of psychological warfare directed at the UN Forces of non-Korean nationality.

There is reason to believe that the enemy's propaganda apparatus in preparing material for the ROK soldier's consumption, is guided by the writings of Kim Du Pong, a prominent Korean communist of long standing and purportedly one of the godfathers of NK propaganda, who wrote that "it is imperative, if we wish to influence the member of the opponent's military forces, to predetermine a limited number of themes with the greatest frequency and intensity attainable under the circumstances. It does not matter that the war situation may temporarily change; the soldier is largely unaware of the changes taking place in the big picture. In his own sphere of interest, his thoughts are mainly occupied with his individual situation such as his uncertainty of survival, exposure to the elements, the consequences of military discipline, etc.; with worries about his dear ones and home sickness; and, invariably, with his latent desire not to be forced to fight but, though remaining a soldier to live in relative safety and in contact with his community. For this reason, any limited number of themes, reiterated constantly, regardless of the changes in the situation, will achieve the purpose sought to attain, and, if these themes are brought to the soldier's attention by way of means which insure his being cognizant of the fact that he is being appealed to, the prime task of propaganda has been virtually accomplished."

NOTE: A free translation of a document on propaganda strategy by Kim Du Pong, which was captured from the files of the Peoples Army command in Pyongyang by ROKA.

A study of the enemy's psychological warfare against the ROK soldier reveals the following five apparent objectives.

1. To make the ROK soldier war weary and willing to surrender, or desert rather than fight for the cause of Syngman Rhee. (The majority of leaflets dropped by the NK Forces for the consumption of ROK troops say just that and attempt to strengthen their exhortations through emotional appeals by mothers, fathers and wives to their sons and husbands to return home to the family fold.)

2. To instill in the (target) people, distrust, hate and possibly fear of his allies who although purportedly fighting with him are, in reality, in Korea only to further their own goals and ambitions, and will readily desert the South Korean soldier whenever the US decides she has nothing more to gain from Korea. (This theme has been expressed with increasing frequency during the second retreat of the UN Forces, December 1950, with the combined NK-Chinese push southward from the Reservoir near the Manchurian border.)

3. To promote the idea that a feeling of national and racial brotherhood has been disrupted by the machinations of foreign elements seeking imperialistic gains in Korea, and to convince the ROK soldier that he is fighting a losing battle against his brothers from the North who now form part of one of the mightiest powers in the world. (This theme is discernible throughout the NK leaflets directed at the ROK soldier and has also appeared in a considerable number of propaganda cartoons and front newspapers distributed to the ROK military elements. It has been used to a somewhat lesser degree in the enemy's propaganda posters.)

4. To make the target reflect on what is best and most profitable for them under the circumstances. Where will he go after the UN Forces are pushed out of Korea and the ROKA defeated? Will he still find leniency and forgiveness when he surrenders to the NK? Will his family suffer because of his determination to fight on for the principles of the ROK? Would it not be better to utilize, to his best advantage, the lenient and forgiving disposition of the NK at this time, when they have not yet taken reprisals against his dear ones at home and when they stretch out a forgiving hand to all those who have seen the light and decide to break with the Rhee regime and make common cause with the "People's ideals?" (While the appeals to the soldier frequently state that their families have not been discriminated against despite the fact that brothers are fighting against brothers, the enemy's propaganda leaves it up to the imagination of

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ORO-T-10 (EUSAK)

NK Psychological Warfare to ROK Forces

the individual soldier to figure out whether or not this leniency on the part of the Peoples Army will continue indefinitely. The cruel treatment accorded to the occupied civilian population by their communist occupants, especially when the communists were about to retreat from a locality, may be considered as an implied threat that reprisals will ensue if the appeals for desertion and return home are not soon followed.)

5. To give the ROK soldier confidence in the NK cause by acquainting him with their goals and the righteousness of their cause.

The themes used to achieve these objectives can be broken down into a number of arguments, yet, all follow two major patterns.

1. The anti-US and anti-Rhee themes which shift the blame for the war onto these two targets; accusing the Koreans of being puppets; reporting casualties perpetrated by "enemies of the people" on South Koreans, etc.

2. The pro-NK (Nationalist-patriotic approach) themes, demanding the unification of the country as one of the primary aims of the NK; extolling the people's achievements in NK; emphasizing the bright future that will shine on the South Korean soldier if he will only "come over to the right side;" promising humaneness and forgiveness; and the rational argument as to who is really the enemy.

In the subsequent pages an attempt is made to crystallize and illustrate the principal arguments thrown at the ROK soldier by the enemy.

Theme I—Who, in Reality, is Your Enemy? This is an argument to the effect that the US Forces are not fighting in Korea for democratic ideals but as egoistic conquerors and colonizers; that they have no concern for the welfare of the Korean people; and that they only use Rhee as their puppet for the exploitation and destruction of the people. Three samples of this theme from the many leaflets dropped to ROK soldiers follow.

"Don't you know and understand, yet, that our real enemies are the US Forces? Do you know why the US intervened with their armed forces in our work for the national unification? The US persuaded Syngman Rhee to give our fatherland to them. Now they attack our land with their own armed forces and kill Korean sons and daughters by bombings and shootings." (Leaflet No. 27 (PWB) which is an appeal from mother to her fighting son.)

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... in order to colonize and enslave South Korea, the US imperialists have perpetrated a series of crimes. They made use of Syngman Rhee's gang of murderers. Let us look back at their crimes.

"One hundred and fifty thousand patriots were massacred; four hundred and eighty thousand were imprisoned and terrorized because they were against US imperialist policies of division and colonization. One hundred and thirty patriotic political parties and social organizations were ordered disbanded. Ninety percent of South Korea's capital was brought under US imperialist control. Forty percent of the land was left uncultivated. ... Along the 38th Parallel they (US Forces) committed more than 1200 acts of provocation." (From Leaflet No. 15 of the PWB collection, G-2, GHQ)

"... since I came here, I could learn exactly which side is truly for our nation, and who is the puppet of US imperialism. US imperialists are attempting to make our country their colony and our people their slaves..." A widely distributed leaflet from the commander in chief of the Peoples Army to the ROK troops.

"Do you know who is your enemy and the enemy of the Korean peoples? The NK people are not your enemy. Your real enemy is Syngman Rhee's reactionary group which provoked this fratricidal war. ... This vicious, reactionary group is trying to secure the dirty interests of the US imperialists at the price of your blood. You have now seen how Syngman Rhee's treacherous group has sold out the fatherland." (From Leaflet No. 6, PWB collection, carrying an appeal by a former Major of the ROK Army who surrendered at Ansong, to the Peoples Army.)

"... Think hard. Who is your real enemy? Could you ever believe that the Korean Peoples Army is your enemy? Your enemies are the US imperialists and their stooge, Syngman Rhee, with his followers who exploit you and utilize you as their tools for bloody aggression of our beloved country. ... Look at those beast-like atrocities committed by the soldiers of the US imperialists and those of the army of the traitor Syngman Rhee. The US troops, wherever they may move on their retreat destroy(ed) the property of your beloved parents and brothers, raped your wives and sisters and at the end of their atrocities they stabbed the bellies of the women to death. Besides ... they bombed your native towns and strafed without discrimination of sex and age. ... If they did regard the Koreans as decent human beings, they could not perform this sort of atrocities. As a matter of fact, the US despise the Koreans as an inferior race!" (A leaflet, captured in the 34th RCT Area during the third week of August (PWB #17), and, purportedly dropped over Pyongchang a week before, addressed to the Soldiers of the National Army" reads in part.)

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NK Psychological Warfare to ROK Forces

Theme 2—US Forces sacrifice Korean lives in their fight; rather than wage the decisive battles themselves, they use the ROK soldiers as cannon fodder. This theme becomes much more plausible of mention is made (as it has been done by the NK radio repeatedly) of the fact that in most advances and penetrations into NK, it was the ROK Divisions that did the spade work. The Capitol (Seoul) Division distinguished itself on many occasions as the spearhead of UN Forces penetrating deep into NK territory. The ROK Army crossed the 38th Parallel long before the UN Forces decided that the enemy should be pursued in NK. Unfortunately, it is also an incontestable fact that the ROKA Divisions suffered the most catastrophic losses on various occasions when a concentrated counteroffensive was launched. An example of this is the fate of the ROK 2nd Division after the Chinese-NK breakthrough near Kuni-Ri in November, 1950.

The following passage (taken from an enemy leaflet—PWB, ROK 17) gives an example of the manner in which Theme 2 was employed.

“... the US Forces put you in the front lines while they sit back behind the lines and shoot you in the back when you retreat. Thus, they are enjoying the sight of a struggle of Koreans against Koreans.”

Into this line of argumentation belongs also the theme that the South Koreans are suffering at the hands of both their government and its US allies. This subject is reported to have received major attention in the indoctrination classes of the NK Army, and an attempt was made to relay this philosophy to those elements of the ROK who were sought to be propagandized by the enemy. This argument has been also followed both in propaganda writings and in graphic presentation. Figure 62 gives an example of the utilization of this theme.

Figure 63 is a representation of a poster found, by ROK authorities, in at least three South Korean localities, during the months of July, August, and September. The same picture was presented in the front-newspaper “For Victory,” which was distributed on several occasions among ROKA elements.

The cause for all this misery is, naturally, the US imperialism and its stooge, Syngman Rhee. The following is a reproduction of a Soviet cartoon which appeared in the NK magazine “Arrow” and the front-newspaper, “News From The Battlefield.”

Theme 3—Liberation “a la Americaine” really means destruction. The facts can be presented so as to confirm this assertion: When NK Forces occupied important localities hardly any damage was

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done; where US Forces entered a town, only death, rubble and misery remain. Both times, when the communist forces invaded Seoul, Uijongbu, Kaesong, and other localities across the Parallel, they were permitted to enter them without much fighting so that no considerable amount of material destruction resulted. However, the UN Forces, on their drive north and in recapturing formerly occupied towns, and in retreating southward have brought with them destruction. In addition, the US with its air power could and has resorted to bombing missions against enemy targets which brought wholesale destruction, whereas the NK and Chinese, due to lack of air power, cannot be blamed for any bomb damage to towns and villages.

This theme, hinted only at during the first months of the war, has been considerably stepped up since December of 1950, especially is this so in the enemy's radio propaganda to the world at large.

Theme 4—Korean Nationalistic-Patriotic Theme. This phase of NK propaganda falls essentially into two major categories—the anti-Rhee theme, and the unification theme. Comprising the anti-Rhee theme are the following topics.

1. The rottenness of the Rhee Regime.
2. The falseness, greed, and exploitation of the Regime.
3. The perfidy of the regime in selling out Korea to the US.
4. The misery into which the Rhee Regime has dragged the Korean Peoples.

To best drive home these anti-Rhee arguments, the NK propagandists resort to leaflets addressed to the "Officers of the Men of the National Defense Army." Such leaflets are signed by Choe Yong Kon, commander-in-chief of the Peoples Army. Typical of this brand of propaganda leaflet is the excerpt printed below:

"Having rejected twice a proposal of the Central Committee, Democratic Front for the Unification of the fatherland regarding a peaceful unification of our country—a proposal unanimously supported by the entire Korean population, and opposing the resolution of the Permanent Committee, Supreme Peoples Assembly, Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea regarding the promotion of a peaceful unification of our fatherland, the treacherous group of Traitor Syngman Rhee resorted to a military action, involving an illegal attack on NK territory.

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ORO-T-10 (EUSAK)

NK Psychological Warfare to ROK Forces

Comrades in the service of the National Defense Army! Against whom are you fighting? At whose chests are you pointing your guns? You have been led astray; you have been duped.

"In the southern half of the fatherland, the foreign invaders—the US imperialists—act as the master, while their forerunning hound, Syngman Rhee, is busy subjecting the people of our fatherland to exposure and hunger; he is fooling and deceiving the people; selling with the madness of a rabid dog all the natural resources of the fatherland—all this at the dictate of his master, the US imperialists. You have seen this, haven't you? In order to place our economy under the control of the US imperialists, to turn our fatherland into a US colony, and to make slaves of our people, you have been driven into this terrible blood-bath. Have your parents, brothers or sisters received land yet? Have the democratic freedoms, including the 8-hour work day, enjoyed by the people of NK been secured? No! There is no such thing for the people of South Korea.

In South Korea, the people are suffering from unemployment, misery and hunger. Syngman Rhee's group has thrown your parents, brothers and sisters into a condition which is more miserable than it was under the ruthless rule of the Japanese colonial imperialism. Moreover, Rhee's collaboration is becoming increasingly pronounced with the Japanese imperialists, our traditional enemy.

"... To risk your life for Syngman Rhee's treacherous group is a national disgrace and makes you a criminal against your people and your fatherland. Therefore, lest you be branded traitors to your nation, to be cursed by posterity for having laid down your lives for the traitorous group that rules you today ... cease this fratricidal war? Turn your sword and gun against your real enemy: Syngman Rhee and his gang! This is a precious opportunity for you to make a start as a child of the people of our fatherland; this is the time for you to come back on the road of happiness and out of the bondage of the US imperialists!"

The preceding quotation is given here in lieu of a quantity of documentary material on the same points, because all, or most of the arguments against the Rhee Regime are well summarized herein. Other leaflets captured make only allusions to the various points brought out in the excerpt. For instance, a leaflet (PWB Collection No. 17) directed to the remnants of the "Puppet Rhee's soldiers" documented its anti-Rhee point by decrying the president's perfidy of fleeing to Japan with the mission of UNCURK, leaving his people in the lurch.

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Front newspapers, and especially cartoon sheets distributed among ROK soldiers reiterate this theme with stereotyped caricatures of the protagonists of this war, i. e., Rhee, prominent UN politicians and MacArthur.

The other phase of the nationalistic-patriotic theme is the appeal for unification. This the enemy has treated in a rather stereotyped and unimaginative fashion. The following approach has been used.

1. An emotional appeal to the "son of the fatherland" to stop the fratricide in Korea.
2. Reports of the achievements of the NK people to point out the advantages to be gained from life in a Peoples Democracy.
3. Sentimental appeals from parents, wives, brothers, and friends to soldiers fighting with the ROK Forces to come back home to family and friends and start a happier life of constructive work.
4. Patriotic exhortations.

Unification has an extremely strong appeal and meaning to the population. This has been observed in the interrogation of NK-PWs and political prisoners from both Koreas.

The way in which the enemy plays up various facets of this broad theme is illustrated by the following quotations from a leaflet dropped in October to undetermined elements of the ROK troops. (PWB No. 17.)

"... You are obviously true Koreans who share the same blood as we do. Why then are you aiming at your own countrymen by helping those Yankees to invade our country?"

A leaflet (PWB No. ROK9) giving an account of the humane treatment of the local population by the elements of the Peoples Army (discussed under a separate heading) and of the progress achieved in the 'liberated' locality since the new order therein, states in part.

"... They (the NK) have already abolished treacherously heavy tax-systems in South Korea; in our village, the farmlands have been distributed equally to the farmers. The Peoples Army is giving me comfort and consolation... They are kind, modest, and truthful." (This from a mother to her son.)

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ORO-T-10 (EUSAK)

NK Psychological Warfare to ROK Forces

Another leaflet (PWB No. ROK4) dropped on soldiers and civilians alike in Central Korea during July and August, 1950, exhorts the readers to believe the righteous and patriotic aims of the Peoples Army and shows the benefit that arises for the population from the liberation. An excerpt follows.

"... The Peoples Army is an army of justice and righteousness... In the liberated areas under the administration of the Peoples Army, land reform laws have already entered into effect under the system of confiscation from the landowners and (re)distribution without compensation... There will be no such things as forced rice collections, or outrageous taxes. Farmers become landowners permanently."

One handwritten leaflet found north of Kaesong in December, 1950, makes an especially sentimental appeal for the unification of the fatherland. It presents, in crude form, the drawing of two Korean figures in embrace with the star from the NK flag casting rays on them. The text says:

"... We stand like one man for the undivided and independent fatherland... We are the heirs of the glory of our ancestors... Who can resist the call of the fatherland and point his gun at the chests of the brothers?"

"... Let us join for the great work in our dear fatherland... Down with Syngman Rhee, the Traitor! Down with the US imperialist colonists! Long live a free and independent Korea."

Theme 5--The humaneness of the Peoples Army towards South Koreans. The communists, in their appeals to the ROK soldier to surrender, went to considerable lengths to drive home the argument that there would be no reprisals against those who had previously fought in the ranks of the ROKA, but that fair treatment and a loving reception at home awaited those who would follow the cause of the fatherland and make common cause with the Peoples Army. Both direct appeals to the soldiers by the NK authorities, as well as exhortations stemming, purportedly, from the parents, wives, and other relatives of individual fighting men in which the humaneness of the NK is emphasized, have been amply used.

Just after Seoul had fallen to the communists for the first time, the headquarters of the Peoples Army broadcast, in the form of a leaflet, and two or three posters (not available for reproduction) a general appeal to the ROK soldiers to desert their colors and come over to the side of NK. In addition to promises of reforms in the "liberated" territory which will insure a better future for the people, the leaflet appeals to the soldier to surrender and desert without fear of enmity from the NK side culminating with the statement

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that those who "courageously joined the Peoples Army from the rank and file of the so-called Korean National Defense Army (ROK) are already free and doing their best for the people and for their country."

A surrender appeal in the form of a safe conduct pass (a rare instance in which the standard procedure of safe-conduct passes is applied by the NK) states that "regardless of what you (ROK soldiers) have done in the past, we (the Peoples Army) shall welcome you and assure your future!" Because of the relative rarity of this form of leaflet in the present war, the original and a full translation are reproduced in Figure 64.

An NK leaflet in Korean and English languages, and found in the vicinity of the Chongju area early in the war, displays quite prominently the statement that, "thanks to the kind care of the Peoples Army, the PWs are treated by doctors at a moments notice."

Another enemy leaflet (PWB-ROK No. 9) from a mother to her fighting son, and which was circulated among ROKA elements in August of 1950, refuted the fears of the South Koreans as to the treatment of the population, especially of ex-ROKA members. The following quotation is from such an appeal.

"... Syngman Rhee and his gang made their propaganda to the effect that the Peoples Army is killing all the Koreans in the Southern part of our land, irrespective of who they are. When I hear this kind of propaganda, I feel sorry because of such infamous lies. Do you know the reality about the heroic Peoples Army? (The text then extolls the humane deeds and the patriotic conviction of the NK Forces.)

Also, the enemy has repeatedly played up the "good treatment" that his PWs are accorded. The translation of a leaflet which the enemy distributed at or about the time of his fight for Taegu is deemed of interest in this connection.

"Many officers and soldiers of Syngman Rhee's puppet government have surrendered to the warm hand of our brave Peoples Army. They have been provided with nice bedding and provisions, which they never had in the National Defense Forces. They are eager to listen to the lectures entitled, "The Koreans Support the Unification of Independent Democratic Korea," or, "US Imperialism Cannot Prevent the Unification of Korea," which are given as one of the series of political lectures.

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ORO-T-10 (EUSAK)

NK Psychological Warfare to ROK Forces

"Through these systematic scientific lectures and speeches, the captives not only become aware of their ignorance, but come to hate Syngman Rhee's followers who had kept them in ignorance."

Another refutation of "enemy propaganda," that the NK Forces treat their prisoners from the ROKA barbarously and take reprisals against their families, appeared during the first part of November in the form of a letter from a wife to her husband who was serving in the "Puppet Army of the National Traitor Syngman Rhee."

"... the vicious officers of the so-called National Army said: 'The Peoples Army will kill not only members of the National Army, but their families as well, by lopping off their noses and gouging their eyeballs.' I realize now that this was only a malignant means to dupe innocent people like you into becoming their dirty dog and fighting against your people. . . The Peoples Army are kind to the people, they are modest. They are kind enough to find jobs for us National Army dependents. They even try to console us, saying, 'No doubt, your husband will turn against US imperialists and Syngman Rhee and come back to you' . . . Even our little ones come to know that the Peoples Army is made up of laborers, farmers, sons and daughters of the laboring masses and that they are an army that truly liberates the people."

In connection with this the "gratitude" of South Korea PWs to their NK liberators, is widely used to support this NK theme.

Another leaflet (PWB No. 25), a message from a father to his son with the ROKA is equally typical of this propaganda theme:

"... all your friends have returned home and they are actively engaged in work in connection with the activities of the . . . Democratic Youth, the Peoples Committee . . . and the Farmers' League. . . Quite contrary to the propaganda of Syngman Rhee, the Peoples Army is a kind, modest, and merciful lot of young people. . . Your brother, Yong Suk, is working with the Peoples Army and he often sings the 'Song of General Kim Il Song.'"

Compared with the propaganda treatment of similar themes by the Germans, Soviet and Spanish propaganda machines, the NK approach may seem crude but the simplicity of style does not detract from the powerful appeal of the argument, especially when it is constantly clothed in the coat of a personal, heart-to-heart appeal from persons specified by name to their dear ones in the field. In evaluating any of these themes, the general level of sophistication and the conversational style of the correspondence familiar to the majority of Koreans must be kept in mind. What may appear as a crude style in a translation, may, in the original, be a vary persuasive form of expression. The

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straightforward and perhaps crude style is a much more effective means of communication among the Korean people than any involved, erudite treatment of the same point.

Theme 6—The Suffering of the South Korean people. ROK and US Atrocities. In a fashion similar to his propaganda approach to the civilian population but in a much more intensified way, the enemy has sought to bring about acute disaffection on the part of the ROK soldier by giving a heavy play to atrocities committed by the US (in first line) and the henchmen of Rhee's clique against the innocent people of South Korea. The ROKA is seldom mentioned by name in this connection.

A clear distinction is made in the type of atrocities committed: the US Forces are blamed primarily for bombing of innocent people; Rhee's "traitorous clique" (a stereotyped expression found in almost all written enemy propaganda literature) are blamed for the whole-sale massacres of the innocent population.

The atrocities apparently are emphasized because an armed soldier may be expected to do something about the situation more quickly and effectively than a mad, but totally ineffective, unarmed civilian.

Samples of posters emphasizing the atrocities of the "enemies of the people" have been reproduced and already been discussed. They were widely circulated among the ROK personnel and have greeted them on entering any town or village. Typical of such leaflets is the following message which was air-dropped on ROKA Forces retreating from Seoul towards Taejon during the first weeks of the conflict.

"Under instructions from US imperialists, the retreating enemy is perpetrating brutal and inhuman atrocities out of desperation. They are slaughtering en masse patriotic and innocent citizens... Immediately before the Peoples Army liberated Suwon, over a period of three or four days, the enemy massacred over a thousand inhabitants of that city, buried patriots and political prisoners alive, with hands and feet bound... The retreating enemy entered houses left vacant... pillaged them, committed atrocities of all kinds, and finally set them on fire... Before the Peoples Army marched into Inchon a total of more than a thousand patriots and ordinary citizens had been massacred... by order of the US military adviser."

A rather powerfully edited leaflet describing atrocities committed by US Forces against South Koreans was distributed to ROKA troops concentrated in the vicinity of Hunghae during the last week of July, 1950. The leaflet follows the familiar pattern of letters written to ROK soldiers. This one purports to be from a mother

living in Pyong Taek City to her son serving with the ROKA. A full translation follows.

"My dear son! I could never have dreamed that this sort of resentful event might happen! Your beloved sister, Kumsun was raped by a beast-like US soldier. Yonsac, daughter of our neighbor and Zonshik's mother of a nearby village were also outraged by US soldiers.

"Besides this, seven women who took shelter in the mountain of Chupung Ryong were raped, despite their opposition and at the end, two of them were stabbed to death and the rest of them were shot.

"Day by day, the Korean's fury against these US beasts rises higher and higher. More than 600,000 of our South Korean youths are volunteering for the fight against these US soldiers who trample our peaceful soil, bomb our homes and property, and destroy our traditional custom and culture of which we have been so proud.

"Your father, too, volunteered for the welfare work of the Peoples Army, in spite of his old age! Listen to the wishes of your parents and aim your gun at the US soldiers, otherwise the parents of the 'National Defense Forces' will not regard you as their sons. Be courageous. Don't hesitate to come over to the victorious Peoples Army."

The atrocity theme has received perhaps the most fruitful results in the enemy's total propaganda output. Attention is invited to a study of the various posters and photographs directed at both the civilian population and the ROK soldier. On such a poster is shown a dead mother and her child lying on her breast. Another shows a mother with her child standing in the midst of strafing aircraft fire asking the Peoples Army for help. These are striking examples of the convincing approach used. Other captured propaganda posters show dead bodies lying in heaps.

One of the many photo-posters (posters displaying photographs, much in the fashion of our photographic exhibits in the windows of newspaper offices) with an atrocity theme is reproduced in Figure 67.

Theme 7—Refutation of anti-North Korean Propaganda. Contrary to the generally accepted theory that in propaganda no argument should be entered into with the enemy, the NK has repeatedly and vociferously refuted ROK propaganda directed against them. A considerable part of their propaganda has concerned itself with such refutations.

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NK Psychological Warfare to ROK Forces

A leaflet dropped to ROK troops defending the Pusan Perimeter represents a fair sample of the enemy's attempt to refute ROK-US allegations regarding the NK Army, the war and the methods of conducting this war. Text of this leaflet follows.

"Soldiers who have survived the defeat suffered by the National Army! Stragglers who are too bewildered to know which way to run in that small piece of land in Kyongsang Namdo encircled on three sides and facing the sea on the other!

"Think it over whether what your vicious officers have told you is true or not!

"The Peoples Army and the constabulary have nothing but Model-99 and Model-38 infantry rifles. Moreover, there aren't enough rifles so that one rifle is shared by three men. Is it true?

"The Peoples Army is a bunch of rabbles without training or military knowledge and they are very weak. Is this a fact? All the planes, tanks, artillery pieces of the Peoples Army are manned entirely by Russians. Is this true?

"On the morning of 26 June SIN, Sung-mo and CHAE, Pyong-tok said, Having driven the Peoples Army clear across the 38th Parallel (we) have occupied Haeju. Was this a fact?

"On the morning of 28 June it was announced, Since the advance hq of MacArthur's command will be established in Seoul the government will stay in Seoul instead of going down to Suwon. Is this true?

"Seoul can surely be retaken by operating from Suwon as a base. Has this word turned out true? A full-scale counteroffensive will be launched at Taejon. The Peoples Army will be crushed in no time. How has this word been carried out?

"We can hold out at Ihwaryong Pass for at least three years. Has this been lived up to?

"Withdrawal is a temporary tactic. Was not this only a scream given by the doomed?

"Being no longer a child you must have realized through actual experience that all this is false and that they had to tell one hundred lies in order to cover up ten lies they first told. They are trying to drive you into a dying, useless death. Instead of facing such useless death, come over to the side of the Peoples Army.

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"When the Peoples Army nabs you they will make a hole through your nose, gouge out your eyes and drag you along. This is another lie. On the contrary, the Peoples Army will meet you as if you were their own brothers when you surrender.

"These days your enemy tells you that the Peoples Army kills off everybody in the family of the National Army. But remember, this is another lie.

"Your parents, brothers, wives and children, far from being killed, have been given land gratuitously and are freely and happily raising their voices for joy of liberation. In fact, they are made real masters over the land the Peoples regime. Every-day they are writing letters, going on the air, urging you to turn against the US imperialists and Syngman Rhee's traitorous gang and come back home as soon as possible. You must have heard their broadcast; you must have read leaflets carrying these heartfelt letters. If not, your vicious officers must forbid you to listen to the radio or to read these leaflets. Lose no time in knocking out the enemy and come back to your dear parents, brothers, wife and children.

"A fact is truth. Those who violate the truth will perish, those who live up to the truth will have a bright future."

Theme 8--Appeals to Desert, Revolt, Join Guerillas. Almost every enemy propaganda message directed at the ROK troops has been spiced with fiery appeals and slogans ranging from standard patriotic appeals to banal, fanatical outcries to the ROK soldier to desert, revolt, etc. A typical appeal to the target audience to rise, turn their arms against the "true enemy", shoot Rhee and the US soldiers or join the partisans, follows.

"If you are a true patriot, and if you have an ounce of conscience... rise and struggle against those brutes. With the hammer and sickle in hand, or taking up a gun and sword snatched from your foes, you personally launch a vigorous struggle against this foe, the US imperialists. You should start a fierce and practical fight to rescue (liberate) Korean patriots from the prisons... Destroy the prisons! Set fire to the enemy police stations and substations... Personally kill the pro-Japanese elements and traitors (among your population). Destroy the supply lines, rail tracks, bridges and highways..."

This leaflet was disseminated during the third and fourth weeks of this war when the communist army was on its advance in South Korea. It was directed to the "Dear fellow countrymen, brothers and sisters" and signed by the supreme command of the Peoples Army.

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ORO-T-10 (EUSAK)

NK Psychological Warfare to ROK Forces

In all his appeals to the ROK Forces, the enemy follows his familiar pattern of directing his messages not to the soldiers but to the "brothers," "sons," etc. He attempts never to let it be forgotten that this war is fratricide and both sides are members of the same family.

As a rule the enemy ends his leaflets with a slogan. Those directed at the soldier are essentially the same as those directed at the people of South Korea in general.

The slogan "pattern" is fairly well summed up by the following: "Follow the way of the fatherland," "Your home country, your father and mother are calling you to return home," "Long live a free independent Korea," "The struggle for the unification of Korea is just and lawful," "Death to Syngman Rhee, the traitor and dog," and "Long live Kim Il Song."

Under this theme of 'desertion,' can be grouped the enemy's appeals to the ROK soldier to make him think of his own future as a member of the losing party. Thus we find threats to the soldier that he will become food for the fish in the Japanese Sea when the "ROK and US Armies are pushed into the sea by the advancing communists."

This desertion theme is further stressed in the following quotation from a leaflet found in the Pugang-ni area.

"... if you continue this... fight for US imperialism against us, the dishonorable name of traitor will be everlastingly impressed on your body which may be buried in a field or on the slope of a mountain without bearing even a grave post..."

Reviewing the Eight Themes. It is apparent that no basic differences can be detected in the fundamental propaganda argumentation issued by the NK for consumption by the ROK soldier or the civilian population. The appeal to the soldier, however, may stress slightly different aspects, since the armed soldier can execute more acts of immediate value to the NK. Before the civilian can be useful, he must first try to get arms and then seek to attach himself to an organization.

From what is generally known about the average standard of sophistication prevailing among the South Korean soldiers, it seems to the writer, that the style used by the enemy, especially in leaflets, is well chosen to impress the bulk of the target audience who read it or who listen to it being read. Even the translations show that a simple style with a relatively limited vocabulary is adhered to, repeating cliches over and over again.

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Without statistical information on the composition of the ROKA in terms of education, sociological background, etc., a closer analysis cannot be made of the correctness of choice of themes by the enemy.

The writer's general impression, supported by the concensus of those ROKA officials consulted, is that enemy psychological warfare on the whole, was not very effective to this particular target group. In the present case, this may not necessarily be a result of an ill-choice of propaganda approach but can be equally a direct consequence of personal reactions to the sufferings of the families of individual military personnel, at the hands of the NK or, generally, as a consequence of the war. In addition, the soldier is, in the instant case, more exposed to battle conditions than is normally the case, due to the practical non-existence of delineated combat and non-combat zones. In the hinterland, he is largely employed to combat guerilla bands; while at the front he is in the first lines.

The soldier thus came to know the enemy better than the bulk of the propagandized (but not yet occupied) population. His non-acceptance of an enemy propaganda argument superimposed upon his state of mind as a battle-ready or battle-hardened soldier with more or less esprit de corps may tend naturally to bring about an acute reaction contrary to the enemy's plans. This, of course, is merely a hypothesis and lacks, thus far, scientific argument.

Still another significant fact may account for the seeming lack of effectiveness of NK propaganda upon ROK soldiers—they are not only armed to give vent to their rage; they are also clothed and fed, largely better than the rest of the population. It is reasonable to assume that these factors determine to a considerable extent the target's susceptibility to enemy propaganda. The ROK soldier has been cared for relatively well and he was not exposed to cold and hunger as the bulk of the civilian population; neither was he exposed to a state of helpless passivity in face of the invader.

This too, is conjecture. The argument however, appears logical and the results bear out the (our) hypotheses as to the reasons why enemy propaganda does not seem to have been all too effective on the South Korean soldier.

Only in very isolated instances did ROKA personnel join with guerilla bands operating in South Korea; no cases of mass desertions or inexplicable surrender in battle are reported; and the rage with which the bulk of ROKA personnel stands with respect to elements of the Peoples Army (PWs and elements of NK political administration in occupied areas) has become almost proverbial.

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PROPAGANDA MEDIA OF NK PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Leaflets were the most common media for overt psychological warfare and rumors for covert psychological warfare by the NK. Radio broadcasting was very seldom used and then only to the population in general because of the low probability that the message would reach any major segment of the target audience.

Posters were seldom used to reach the soldier. But in every town or village in South Korea, communist agitators seemed to have been well supplied with posters and when an army liberated a town from the communists, it was unavoidably exposed to them.

NOTE: ROK intelligence reports only five instances when enemy posters appeared and were confiscated within military compounds and/or in the possession of military personnel in camps or in the field.

NK propaganda literature achieved a wider circulation in the form primarily of front newspapers and cartoon sheets dropped or smuggled to the ROK troops. Title pages of such publications are reproduced in Figure 65. The satirical magazine "Arrow" received major distribution among ROK troops on at least three occasions.

NOTE: Information obtained from the ROKA Military Intelligence Division and from the statements of two political prisoners held in the State Prison of Seoul.

Relatively little entertainment literature was distributed to the ROK soldier except for some "comic books" smuggled or dropped to South Korean troops on various occasions. However, news-sheets (some with pictures) and small fly-sheets giving some very important news in caption form only have appeared. While no copy of such news sheets is available, several of the "headline sheets" have been collected and a few are reproduced herein.

The enemy tried to exploit the Koreans' inherent love of music. In the training of NK soldiers music was widely used for morale-building and entertainment. The NK Forces maintained their own army bands even in the field. On at least two occasions attempts were made to distribute song books to ROK troops.

NOTE: Training of NK troops provided specifically for instruction in patriotic and military songs. In occupied South Korea effort was made to enlist the assistance of local musicians for the dissemination of North Korean songs, over Taejon and north of Pohang.

On the side of covert propaganda, the enemy attempted to utilize the work agitators within the ROKA. Only during the later stages of the war, approximately after the recapture of Seoul, did the organization of internal security within the ROKA permit a more or less effective check on subversive elements among the troops. It is established, and the files of the National Police bear this out, that the enemy succeeded in placing trained agitators within the army.

NOTE: The National Police since the proclamation of martial law in South Korea was under the direct jurisdiction and command of the Ministry of Defense.

According to information obtained from General Pak, the ROK Provost Marshall General, the success of these agitators in inciting defection was not crowned with success. It is the considered opinion of ROK authorities that the primary objective of the enemy's agents in the army was probably the spreading of false rumors to bring about panic on the part of the individual soldier rather than overt incitement of the soldier to mutiny and revolt. An important mission of these agents was to collect intelligence and possibly to keep files on individuals for possible future action by the enemy against them or their families.

NOTE: An exception might be the case of the 2nd ROK Division where the rate of desertions and captures by the enemy in July and part of August 1950 was considerably higher than the circumstances are reported to have warranted.

At any rate, the exact function of agitators infiltrated among the ROK soldiers has not been determined. Documents bearing on this subject existed in Seoul, but had not been evaluated before a second evacuation from the Capital forced the ROK authorities to destroy large quantities of documents, among which probably was this material.

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Figure 63. Oppression of women and children by the ROK-UN Forces is given dramatic emphasis on posters such as this. The caption: "Oh, Peoples Army...of soldiers and officers; please save us."

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


Figure 64. Reproduced here is a typical NK Safe Conduct Pass. It is addressed to "Officers and soldiers of the National Defense Army." It reads: "Rise against the US imperialists and traitor Syngman Rhee's followers, who are forcing a dog's death upon you. Don't you think your life of any value? Don't you want to meet your families again? If you come over to the side of the Peoples Army, your life will be secure and you will be returned to your native town. Regardless of what you have done in the past, we will welcome you and assure your future. Don't hesitate to surrender. Only those who are brave enough to come to our side will survive and be able to return to their native towns. With one copy of Safe Conduct Pass, a group of you can be safely conducted. Every preparation has been made for your surrender. Come over with this Pass in your hand." The message was signed by the field commander in chief, Peoples Army of Korea.




Figure 65. Mastheads from NK propaganda newspapers for distribution to ROK troops. The translations: (1) News from Korea; (2) News from Front; (3) Korean Peoples Army Front-line Newspaper "For Victory;" (4) News from the Front; (5) Korean Peoples Army Front-line Newspaper "For Victory."

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


Figure 66. NK propagandists went all-out to ready the local populations for the "liberators" from the North. Street cars (such as this one in the streets of Seoul) were decked out in gay NK colors and flags and carried appropriate pro-NK slogans. Live propaganda was furnished the people through loudspeakers (attached to top of car) mounted in prominent places.




Figure 67. Handwritten photo-posters (such as this) splattered with "blood" were used extensively by NK propagandists to show the "Rhee regime atrocities." The caption: "Bodies of the patriots citizens shot by the Syngman Rhee gang of traitors can be found anywhere in South Korea."

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ENEMY CONSOLIDATION PROPAGANDA IN OCCUPIED SOUTH KOREAN AREAS

Consolidation propaganda within occupied areas comprises a major effort of the enemy propaganda apparatus. The physical presence of NK elements in occupied localities offers two important advantages for the conduct of a propaganda campaign in terms of probability of reaching, if not affecting, the majority of the given target population: (1) a wider choice of media for the dissemination of propaganda themes with an opportunity to supervise, from close range the techniques and methods employed; and (2) a population that is, as a result of the accomplished fact of occupation, more disposed, or can be forced to become more disposed, to give greater attention, though not necessarily to absorb and accept, the propaganda activities which the invader is developing.

For example, an enemy could bring with him into an occupied area, a powerful radio transmitter and distribute receiving sets among the population, thereby bringing about a considerable increase in radio listening where none existed previously. The NK propagandists did not go that far; yet they made a good attempt to bring radio to their target audience by using loudspeakers mounted on vehicles in streets, relaying over them their radio programs.

Similarly, where only limited facilities exist for the publication of new literature, the importation of printing facilities and paper will create a basis for increased emphasis on publications of all kinds.

Again, the presence of NK troops and of a communist local government in the area allow the enemy to force, if necessary, the population to participate in mass meetings, to study certain political writings, a knowledge of which may often be a prerequisite for qualifying for certain jobs, or to participate in some form of consolidation propaganda.

From what can be observed from the masses of propaganda material used by the NK during their occupation of South Korean areas, consolidation propaganda has been given great emphasis and care. The NK propaganda apparatus is closely linked with the

civilian administration of the country. Since local government, as instituted by the invading communists, was composed largely of local residents of long years of communist standing, who were familiar with the peculiarities of their population, the intensity of play which certain themes received varied from place to place. But, in general, consolidation propaganda followed a more or less standard pattern according to methods devised in (and rigorously prescribed by) the highest NK echelon of propaganda planning. In this connection, attention is invited to Appendix F which presents a translation of a confidential NK document (ATIS, Batch 104, No. 2) captured in Korea. This document represents a directive for the organization of cultural propaganda activities in the "liberated" districts." The document in question was issued from the Ministry of Culture and Propaganda of the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic and is dated 1 August 1950.

The organization of communist (cultural) propaganda ranges down through the ranks from the top echelon and goes into minute details prescribing the actions to be taken in order to accomplish the requirements of the Peoples Republic for what its government considers a desirable method of "re-educating" the masses of occupied South Korea. Persons who lived in Seoul during the first NK occupation and who, for special reasons, closely followed the communist propaganda work done in that area, confirm that the NKs proceeded in the building of their consolidation propaganda in a way that implies strict adherence to the requirements as set forth in this document. However, as has been pointed out, the power of the various local committees to enforce the implementation of directives such as the one in reference with a certain amount of discretion, may have afforded an opportunity for a slightly different emphasis of the same, or different themes, in various areas.

Methods of Consolidation Propaganda. A definite pattern is clearly discernible, possibly as a result of a central directive such as that previously mentioned, or some of the many "Propaganda Guidance Manuals" that are known to have emanated from the NK Ministries of Education and Propaganda during this war, in the methodology of the enemy.

In the enemy's propaganda of liberation and subsequent transition to "propaganda of occupation" the following steps (in order) were observed.

1. Reception and rejoicing during and immediately after the "liberation." This involved the distribution of posters; distribution of leaflets house-to-house and hand-to-hand in public; hoisting of the NK flag on government buildings; and distribution of token (NK) flags to the population; loudspeakers in the city streets.

a. Reception of welcoming committees; agitation for an ovation for arriving soldiers. Proclamation of holiday; proclamation of amnesty. Requisition of government buildings and creation of local committees; integration of local elements (pre-determined or drafted) into the newly organized city-ward or provincial government setup. (Local governments were set up and functioning six hours after occupation of Seoul and Taejon.)

b. Bread and circuses. Installation of public kitchens in the streets; re-transmission of broadcasts through the loudspeakers installed in the streets; relays of public addresses, reading congratulatory messages from abroad; organization of "spontaneous mass meetings;" public concerts by army bands and orchestras; decorations and awards to former underground workers; theater plays and other presentations (see Appendix G).

c. Public showings of propaganda films.

d. Organization of art, industrial, and agricultural exhibits; sports competitions.

e. Exploitation of the local situation of "established order, peace, work, and satisfaction in the liberated areas" in communist propaganda to other target areas and to the world in general (see article "In Liberated Seoul" in Appendix H).

2. Work. A very strictly regulated "back to normalcy" drive. Orders to the effect that schools must reopen immediately, and that stores that remain closed will be penalized or confiscated. Also, a draft for work movement is begun. Organization of "volunteer brigades" doing reconstruction and rebuilding work.

3. Truth and consequences: actions designed to obtain a following through propaganda of terror and intimidation, eliminating undesirable elements and forcing (at least) a passive acceptance of the "new way of life" as a basis for the impact of the intensive "reorientation," "re-education" or "enlightenment" activities of the communist propaganda apparatus.

a. Use of local elements for the conduct of propaganda to ROK soldiers and civilians in still unoccupied parts of South Korea; appeals from parents to their sons to surrender, desert and return home.

b. Forcible recruitment of "volunteers" for service with the NK army. Many instances were recorded of citizens being forced to do undercover work for the communists in the southern areas while their families were held as hostages until the job was completed.

c. Discrimination against clubs and committees. This extends to children in school.

d. Encouragement to informers, giving them regards for information leading to the detection and punishment of saboteurs, reactionaries, collaborators; with the enemy. This system was credited with leading to many of the executions in Seoul after occupation by the NK Forces.

e. Installation of Peoples Courts in cities and villages.

f. Exploitation of the local resources for the benefit of the occupying forces and removal of many supplies to NK as a contribution denoting popular support for the conduct of the war.

NOTE: The Joint Intelligence Staff reported that after the NK occupation of Seoul the following materials were moved north: 45 truckloads of rice; all milk and meat in the city's markets; most other stocks in stores; and 12 truckloads of wire.

Thus, the communists employed two propaganda approaches in occupied territory: (1) Propaganda of liberation in which activities conducive to evoking sympathy, joy and confidence on part of the local populace; and (2) what may be described as propaganda of occupation or a re-education of the masses, oftentimes by force, to obtain a more willing submission to the mandates of the invader, and according to the desires of the communist administrator.

So far as the choice of media is concerned, the following observations are of interest:

1. Only in his consolidation propaganda does the enemy use films to a great extent. The occupied population from the very first is exposed to a multitude of propaganda films (both of Korean and Soviet production) which, in some cases, are said to have been compulsory for those seeking employment or students of certain schools. Although the NK had a relatively well-developed film industry in the vicinity of Pyongyang and had facilities for dubbing in sound tracks in Korean upon films of foreign production, most of the Soviet newsreels and some of the feature films shown in Seoul and other cities south of the 38th parallel are reported to have had their sound track in Korean when received by the NK Ministry of Education and Propaganda (through Gen Stikhov's organization in Pyongyang).

2. Considerable quantities of loudspeakers were hurriedly installed in the streets of "liberated" localities, mounted on vehicles and, in the case of Seoul, attached to streetcars (Figure 66).

3. Posters, banners and placards were used in huge quantities. In most cases such pictorial material concentrated on the theme of NK achievements or promises, ostensibly trying to calm down the local population and to gain their cooperation if not sympathy. At the same time a renewed play was usually given to the theme of ROK atrocities, attempting to drive home the contention that all the great suffering of the population was brought about by the "real enemies of the people." Figure 67 is a reproduction of a NK photo-tableau, displayed reportedly in various occupied areas of South Korea, and found in quantities in Seoul and in Taejon.

4. By far the most used medium of consolidation propaganda lay in the propaganda publications (books, magazines, pamphlets, school books, etc.) imported by the enemy and circulated in enormous amounts, generally gratuitously. These publications ranged in style and content from serious Korean and foreign literature, political and ideological works, to children's books and magazines. In view of the great variety of topics used it can be presumed that practically everybody was appealed to in some way and the chance was given for a goodly number of the citizens to absorb, partially at least, some of the political argumentation in this great bulk of carefully selected reading material.

5. Radio appears to have been of somewhat lesser importance because of the limitations of listening facilities. Loudspeakers were used in the streets but the fact that the population stopped and listened to such programs is no indication of their effectiveness. The population as a whole is very fond of music, and the communists always used musical introductions and postludes over their loudspeakers, so it seems reasonable to assume that a fair amount of the local population did take time to listen to the programs relayed over the public loudspeakers in the streets of Seoul.

6. Music is reported to have been used profusely during the enemy's consolidation propaganda. New bands were hastily constituted and old ones re-organized. An example is the fate of the Seoul Symphony Orchestra. Its members were drafted, clothed in new uniforms and commanded to play for the people at least twice a week. Military bands and singing ensembles received wide application in all areas, not only during the first days of the occupation but almost throughout the duration of that occupation.

7. News tableaux and posters, giving pictorial information about developments in Korea as well as abroad (USSR, satellite countries) have been used in large quantities. They have been changed constantly and thus created the impression that there always existed up-to-date news reporting to the population.

8. Propaganda actions (actions ostensibly for the public benefit and have nothing to do with propaganda as such) as, for example, the setting up and maintenance of public kitchens, public dispensaries, etc., have received wide application, but mostly only during the first three-four days of the occupation. An exception to this is Seoul and Taejon where field dispensaries remained in action for the benefit of the population during almost the entire occupation period. No valid assessment can be made as to the acceptance of such facilities by the occupied population other than based on hearsay.

THE ENEMY'S MEDIA OF PROPAGANDA DISSEMINATION

The enemy has used, at all times, all standard media of mass communications known to us plus a well organized apparatus of agitators and other media suitable for the conduct of intensive "grey" or "black" psychological warfare. An elaborate espionage and underground network, maintained by the enemy in South Korea primarily for intelligence, sabotage and liaison to guerilla bands is also known to have been used for the conduct of psychological warfare in the target areas of South Korea. The NK propaganda machine has also relied heavily on rumors planted or exploited for its advantage.

This section gives a descriptive account of the main methods used for the dissemination of NK propaganda among ROK target groups.

RADIO

According to the Radio Bureau of the (ROK) Office of Public Information in Seoul there were slightly over 184,000 receiving sets in existence in South Korea at the beginning of 1950. Of these 23,000 were installed in public places such as restaurants, bars, clubs, assembly halls, etc.

NOTE: This information obtained from report on World Wide Distribution of Radio Receiving Sets, International Broadcasting Division, Department of State, July 1950.

The greatest concentration of sets, of course, was in the urban area but in rural areas listening is reported to have had a considerable following especially where electrification had been completed.

It can be said that radio listening was a relatively well-established habit in South Korea, especially in the urban areas. This may be partly due to the work of the Japanese who since the early thirties have encouraged the use of radios in Korea and have striven for total electrification of the country.

The NK invaders are reported to have confiscated in some areas all privately owned receiving sets consisting of more than four tubes. Hundreds of sets were commandeered and carried off by the NK troops in the course of their occupation. Then, with the liberation of communist-occupied South Korea, radio listening received another serious blow for, in the course of the fighting, many towns, especially Seoul, had their electric current largely cut off and many receiving sets were lost with the destruction of many South Korean houses. Finally, many South Koreans were forced to sell their radio sets in order to obtain liquid funds in an inflation ridden, post-liberation South Korea. Thus, relatively soon after the war had started, radio listening in South Korea had become seriously impaired. ROK officials who had a better chance than anyone else in Seoul to estimate the number of sets in the Capital estimated 2,000-5,000 sets in the city on 1 December 1950.

The Broadcasting Network in the Koreas. Another factor determining the popularity of radio listening is the size, technical perfection and programming pattern of the broadcasting stations or network of that country. Since the signal of a radio broadcast can and does cross frontiers, it is necessary to consider here broadcasting facilities of both Koreas to give a picture of the relative density of the transmission facilities to the population in the various sectors of the country.

For a fuller treatment of the subject of broadcasting in Korea, attention is invited to ORO-T-1 (EUSAK) prepared by Mr. J. Kim.

As program emanating points, only Pyongyang, Seoul, and Pusan are of major importance because only their signals were strong enough to be received throughout a major portion of the country.

NOTE: Most of the other stations are strong enough to allow them to broadcast on short waves with a signal strength sufficient to be receivable both within the Koreas as well as abroad. However, the ratio of receiving sets in existence in Korea equipped for short wave listening, is not established. It is known, however, that the great majority of sets existing in South Korea did permit short wave reception.

Use of Radio in Propaganda. Radio Seoul remained on the air until shortly before the arrival of the NKs in the city limits. Authoritative witnesses, who have experienced the invasion, assert that during the twelve hours immediately preceding the occupation, radio was the main and essentially only medium of mass information.

The Peoples Army, after capturing the station intact, rehabilitated it and put it on the air with a minimum loss of time. Radio Seoul was a prize capture, as it was the most powerful and best equipped radio station in Korea. ROK administration of that station

had used it largely as the main program-emanating point for radio programs directed to the ROK at large. Most of the smaller transmitters located throughout the country were utilized almost exclusively as relay points for the programs originating in Seoul, although some local stations produced their own programs as well, though not on a full-time basis. NK faithfully copied this programming-relaying pattern. All South Korean stations captured merely relayed the programs emanating from Seoul, and sporadically only those of Radio Pyongyang wherever the latter station was audible enough to be relayed.

Thus, Radio Seoul became the main propaganda station for NK broadcasts directed at the population of ROK held as well as occupied South Korea to the south of the Capital. Since Radio Pyongyang was audible in Seoul, that station was used heavily for the Seoulians. The functions of the radios of the two capitals were ultimately as follows:

Radio Pyongyang (three frequencies). Broadcasts to the audiences in NK (domestic audience); propaganda programs to occupied South Korea, bordering on the 38th parallel and including the metropolitan area of Seoul; occasional transmission of master programs for obligatory rebroadcast over all facilities in NK and occupied South Korea; on one or two short wave frequencies, broadcasts to the world and especially to China and the Soviet Union.

NOTE: NK attempted to beam propaganda messages to Japan over a short-wave radio station in Sonjin but that station went off the air soon afterwards as the result of air-raids by the UN Forces.

Radio Seoul (HLKA). On its frequencies of 970 and 2510 kc programs beamed to the population of South Korea, including Seoul, and especially to areas not yet occupied and to the ROKA. On its three frequencies, propaganda broadcasts to the non-Korean elements of the UN Forces in Korea; propaganda to the world, most of the foreign language programs (except those in Russian) are reported to have originated in Seoul.

Both Radio Pyongyang and HLKA (Seoul) relayed the daily broadcasts beamed to Koreans from abroad, i. e., the USSR and China. Also, both stations used some radio time for relaying orders to remote elements of the Peoples Army and otherwise keeping in touch with outlying components of the administration, including liaison to guerilla bands operating behind South Korean lines. As the war progresses the big broadcasting stations, however, are not used as much for communicating with guerillas as are small, well-powered, and possibly mobile transmitters. It is also known that small transmitters, all of Soviet make, have been smuggled to some of the NK guerilla bands and were widely used in the subsequent stages of the war.

Radio Programming. When the NK appropriated Radio Seoul, the first major station captured south of the 38th parallel, they brought with them large quantities of prepared programming material, especially recordings. This included music, speeches and interviews and vast quantities of script material in rough as well as in finished form.

However, the NK made an effort to utilize local talent for the production of many of their programs. The administration of Radio Seoul reports that after the first week of occupation a large number of locally produced radio programs were already on the air, under the strictest NK supervision, of course. Some art ensembles such as the National Symphony Orchestra, were drafted into the effort and local talent was given a token opportunity to participate in the functioning of the "liberated" Radio Seoul.

It is interesting to observe how the programming pattern of the station has changed during and after NK occupation. Prior to the war, Radio Seoul was operating with US technical and programming advice. This makes it difficult to estimate what programming pattern would have been normally presented to the home audience had the station been run policy- and program-wise by the Koreans themselves purely on the basis of their knowledge of the preferences to program types that their domestic audience might have. Although the station had developed a US-type programming pattern its artistic production and programming remained Korean to a large extent. The station has never possessed any substantial amount of suitable recorded material and was, therefore, largely dependent on the local USIS record library for such material. Thus, a large portion of all musical programs featuring US music and Korean ensembles because of production difficulties were in second place.

The US presence made itself felt even more strongly after the liberation of Seoul by the UN Forces. US military advisers took over the policy control of the station and supplied the bulk of all programming material used, including news. Gradually, however, the production control was relinquished and the station returned at least in this phase, to South Korean control. Radio Seoul once again began to use home grown talent for certain of its programs and is reported to have given more attention to the domestic audience's tastes and preferences. This may have also been a result of the ROKA participation in the programming in the post-liberation weeks. The PIO Section of the ROKA produced and broadcast regular programs primarily for the consumption of their own troops in liberated South Korea.

The NK invaders brought with them a programming pattern fashioned largely after the Soviet example. Mass tastes were played up to in the non-political and non-education programs with a view to capture a large audience for the programs deemed important. Of course, the North Korean programming pattern is not as refined in this as the Soviet seems to be and lacks many of those technical elements that make the Soviet radio a powerful medium within the country.

NOTE: A separate ORO study entitled "The Programming Pattern of the Soviet Domestic Radio" (ORO-T-1 (EUSAK) is presently in production.

The NK Forces brought large supplies of program material with them, consisting mostly of recorded music, interviews, speeches and raw material for "enlightenment" programs. Most of the music imported was Soviet music supplied in basically the same fashion as the USIS supplied programming material to Radio Seoul.

Yet it is interesting to note that despite all the differences between North and South Korean procedures, philosophies and goals, the programming pattern of Radio Seoul was basically the same before and after occupation. Content-wise, of course, these ideological differences are immediately apparent. But the over-all program-pattern shows only minor differences. The explanation may be that either the NK saw the natural limitation of radio as a propaganda medium in South Korea and did not spend too much effort to make a radical overhaul of the programming pattern; or, the basic programming patterns of both regimes coincided more or less making it apparent that neither party ascribed any special importance to certain program types that are standard diet in the programming pattern of Western World radio stations.

Radio Seoul Programming Prior to NK Occupation. Before NK occupation Radio Seoul broadcast 7-hr and 3-min daily. This included seven features (15-30 min each), interspersed with classical, folk, popular and jazz music. News commentaries (15 min each) were heard six times daily. One hour was devoted to an interchange of news from Japan (UN, VOA, AFRS). Two daily features (30 min each) consisted of drama and short stories. Two features (15 min each) were given over to children's programs, and political programs (speeches) were given 30 min.

Radio Seoul Programming After NK Occupation. Following invasion of Seoul by the NK Forces, daily broadcasting time was cut to five hours. Music, of Soviet origin (folk, patriotic and martial music) was given 30 percent of the total output. News commentaries were given the same time but altered to suit the purposes of the NK propagandists. One hour was devoted to the

relaying of daily news from the USSR. Entertainment consisted, in the main, of the reading of short stories. There were no literary or theater programs. Children's programs were eliminated. Political programs (with the usual NK slant) were also allowed 30 min daily.

The lack of entertainment programs over occupied Radio Seoul may be explained by the fact that Radio Pyongyang with its 15-10 kw transmitters never ceased to present a rather well-balanced program and Radio Seoul fulfilled essentially the function of a wartime captured propaganda instrument, the main purpose of which was to do straight wartime rather than consolidation propaganda holding anxious listeners in the embattled zones of the south.

Effectiveness. It is beyond question that the radio had considerable effectiveness in that it held those who could listen at their receiving sets and prompted them to pass on the information thus obtained to news-hungry masses that were full of panic; as the number of receiving sets decreased or listening facilities became unavailable because of lack of current, more interest appeared in this medium which was, at certain times, the only medium through which some sort of news could be received.

The NK propagandists tried to bring radio closer to the masses and used it to a considerable extent in their consolidation propaganda effort. They installed loudspeakers in public places and mounted public address systems on trucks and other vehicles and circulated through the streets relaying to the population speeches and proceedings of popular meetings. Loudspeakers were mounted on street-cars and blared at the audience not only prepared propaganda messages but pep talks and statements by officials. In addition, they also relayed the news from the radio, ostensibly as a public service, to those who could not listen to news on their own radio. A reproduction of one of such communist "propaganda streetcars" that circulated in Seoul, is shown in Figure 66.

However, partly because of the general lack of listening facilities and of the limited period of the day during which the radio was active, radio does not seem to have constituted the primary propaganda medium used by the NK machine in their psychological warfare effort to South Koreans. It would have been easy for them to import and distribute small receiving sets to the population and thereby increase the number of regular listeners. Actually, small receiving sets distributed by the NKs were found in two instances on captured guerilla leaders. In this case, however, the sets were given out as a means of communication between the partisans and the Peoples Army command and not as an instrument of propaganda. Instead, the enemy confiscated a number of receiving sets from the

"liberated" population. The maintenance of a major station over which only five hours a day was programmed, is a further indication of the somewhat secondary importance that the NKs attributed to radio in South Korea.

It is repeatedly stated herein that radio formed a minor part of the propaganda warfare waged by NKs. This statement is to be understood as a conclusion regarding this medium in relation to the use of other media by the enemy in his propaganda war. A study of his output over all media shows distinctly that radio was used to a lesser extent and with less intensity than leaflets, propaganda literature and agitation.

Other Uses of Radio. Radio has become an important medium of communication as well as propaganda, especially in a war such as is being waged in Korea where the enemy is maintaining guerilla bands in the rear of the UN-ROK Forces to harrass them and demoralize the population by occasional incursions, sabotage, and the like.

The enemy has used radio to beam information and guidance to his agitators among the South Korean masses, also. By this means, radio, as a propaganda instrument can be controlled, informed, enlightened and, if need be, propagandized.

NOTE: The general reaction of the population and the ostensible lack of emphasis on radio by the enemy seem to support the contention that radio has not been one of the major media used for the dissemination of enemy propaganda in and to South Korea.

PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS

The enemy has made very ample use of leaflets in his propaganda effort directed at his foes. During the period covered in this report (i. e., up to the Chinese intervention and the fall of Seoul in January, 1951) the NK propagandists seem to have directed most of their leaflets to South Koreans (civilian and military) rather than to elements of the UN Forces of non-Korean nationality. Of the leaflets thus far collected or reviewed by ROK and US military authorities, only about 25 percent were directed exclusively to the US Forces in Korea and thus written in English alone; 15 percent were directed at both local and foreign elements and thus written in English and Korean and roughly 60 percent were written solely in Korean. No leaflets have been reported in languages other than English and Korean.

As far as type and general presentation are concerned, the NK leaflets thus far seen do not offer any basic innovations over the

type of leaflets used by other belligerents in the last 20 years. They fall roughly into the following categories:

1. Leaflets with emotional appeal to the reader. For example, the majority of appeals to the ROK soldier carry messages to certain named individuals from their dear ones at home. These appeals are presented not as political exhortations but as normal appeals from loving parents to their faraway sons; from wives to husbands, and from sisters to brothers.
2. Leaflets carrying promises or threats to those called upon to surrender. They often list the benefits to be expected from a surrender. Into this category belong also the "safe conduct passes" although only a few of these have been found in Korea (see Figure 64).
3. Leaflets with news of current events; reports of new instances of atrocities, quotations from speeches of prominent enemy leaders, etc.
4. Leaflets with a visual message. These bear cartoons, pictorial accounts of happenings, pictures of leaders and caricatures of leaders of the target population.

Distribution of Leaflets. Whenever possible, leaflets were dropped from the air but due to the air superiority of the UN Forces this was a relatively infrequent occurrence in areas held or co-defended by components of the UN Forces. However, in areas which contained no concentrations of UN troops and which lay close to the operating bases of the enemy, leaflet air-drop activity was considerably more intense. For example, Uijongbu and vicinity was exposed to enemy leaflet drops three times within 36 hours on June 27-28; Chingju experienced a relatively heavy leaflet drop during the NK advance southward.

According to the Political Evaluation Branch of National Police, Seoul, a more usual way of distributing leaflets was by smuggling them in to enemy territory. A variety of carriers were used: refugees who were actually NK soldiers infiltrating UN lines; NK intelligence agents who smuggled leaflets to local agitation-propagandists in the different South Korean communities; undercover couriers who maintained contact with guerilla groups and transmitted to them either bulks of leaflets or, when this became dangerous and impractical, cliches and texts for the preparation of leaflets.

As the pressure of UN Forces became greater shortly before and concurrently with the Chinese intervention, partisans ordered to disseminate leaflets among the population of future military targets and lacking printing facilities, resorted to a very original way of preparing and distributing leaflets. They had the leaflets

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handwritten, on any kind of available paper. The guerillas either wrote a few original leaflets and sent them to supporters with a request that a letter-pyramid be started or invaded the homes of local residents and forced them to write copies of the sample presented by the intruder. In many instances the guerillas also carted off certain members of each family and forced them to attend organization and propaganda meetings, after which they returned them to their families appealing to them to make common cause with the "liberators" of South Korea from the "yoke" of Rhee and the US. Figure 68 is a reproduction (and translation) of such a leaflet distributed north of Kaesong on 4 December 1950 and captured in Tai Wong Ri.

Guerilla bands operating north of Kaesong have resorted to this technique repeatedly. For example, in the case of Lee Myung Cho of Kyung Nam Myon, Tar Won Ki, these female inhabitants were forced, at the point of a gun, to copy a leaflet, while the male members of the family were carted off to an underground Communist Party (cell) meeting. There they were forced to listen to the speeches but were later returned to their homes unharmed.

Although these leaflets are very crude, they appear to be quite effective because they take the form of personal letters from "mothers and fathers" or "wives of loving husbands" and plead for the soldiers to:

1. Lay down their arms, or desert and fight, actively or passively for the good of the country, on the side of NK;
2. Commit overt acts of sabotage or nuisance against the US Forces; and
3. Through passive resistance, prove, for their own families' benefit, where their hearts lie.

Quality and Presentation. The NK propaganda leaflets found and studied are clearly of domestic manufacture. They do not employ as a rule, striking color schemes; frequently used are pictures of persons purportedly voicing a certain appeal to the target; on the whole they do not reveal much artistic preoccupation with graphic layout. Rather than use the force of one or more symbols in lieu of elaborate texts, they are intended primarily as reading material. Therefore, more often than not, they feature reproductions of more or less lengthy speeches, letters, or quite elaborate articles. US leaflets, on the other hand, quite often convey their message in the form of rather short and pungent slogans the effectiveness of which is underlined by the use of color and often artistic graphic presentation.

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The quality of paper used for NK leaflets varies from newsprint to very bad. But due to the very level of sophistication of the audiences, it is doubtful whether the quality of the paper is a factor strong enough to deter the recipient from reading it. In fact, the majority of South Koreans who were exposed to enemy leaflets, dropped or otherwise disseminated, seem to have been mostly in a state of acute anxiety, brought about by the highly traumatic experience of the various phases of the present war. PIO Division of ROKA reported in a report (25 October 1950) that, according to their evaluation, enemy leaflets were picked up and read in large numbers and often widely circulated in all areas where they had appeared. This is quite logical because it is a result of natural human curiosity to see what the enemy has to say. This is doubtless more true in Korea, where a poorly informed and often very frightened population sought to obtain some information about their own situation and acted accordingly.

According to all indications, therefore it should be computed that enemy leaflets were effective on the South Koreans, insofar as attention was given them. This does not necessarily imply that their effectiveness was equally great in terms of reactions to the target population.

Leaflet Content. The lack of a full file of enemy leaflets directed at South Korean targets and the impossibilities of preparing full translation of all those on hand, make it impossible to attempt a systematic content analysis of these enemy leaflets in this preliminary report.

A preliminary and rather perfunctory study of the contents of enemy leaflets addressed to the local target audience reveals two distinct lines: (1) The rational approach; and (2) the sentimental approach.

The Rational Approach. This includes appeals to the population to lay down their arms; appeals from parents to fighting sons to turn and fight against Rhee and the US; to shy away from any participation in the war; appeals for desertion and resistance; explanation of communist ideals and goals; reiteration of common ideals such as unification of Korea; vehement denouncement of the Rhee Regime.

The following are quotations from an enemy propaganda leaflet intercepted in the 34 RCT area in September and October 1950.

"... Turn your guns on your enemies. Fellow soldiers of the National Defense Army: think hard. Who is your enemy? Could you believe that the Korean Peoples Army be your enemy? Could the Peoples Army, which is organized by sons and brothers of farmers and who fight for freedom and liberation of farmers be your enemy?... No, then who is your enemy?"

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"... Your enemies are the US imperialists and their stooge, Syngman Rhee and his followers." (PWB collection, ROK No. 27).

"... This is the reason why more than 600,000 Korean youths are racing into the volunteer army to throw the whole army of our enemy out of our land."

"The soldiers of the National Defense Army! Imagine the righteous sound of march those Korean youths are making and think of the days when we lost our fatherland under the Japanese regime. Then turn your guns to your real enemy."

"... Be brave enough to come over to the Peoples Army. Only those who do hesitate to turn their guns to their enemies will be survivors who can find splendid future in liberated land of our country."

"Hesitation brings you nothing but your death. Be brave enough to follow the way your fatherland and your people want you to take!"

Another example is the following quotation from a leaflet distributed in the vicinity Kaesong during December 1950:

"Dear mothers and fathers... no patriotic citizens of Korea want to see the US imperialists conquer and exploit their fatherland. In order to annihilate the enemy to the last man and for the ultimate victory of the fatherland, we issue the following orders: (1) Our government is still alive. Protect the constitution and principles of the Republic to the last; and (2) Farmers, the US imperialists are going to take land away from you, the rightful owners of the land, in order to give them to the landlords. Don't give the enemy even a grain of rice or a cup of oil or a piece of meat."

The Sentimental Approach. Leaflets in the form of letters to mothers and fathers; the horrors of unnecessary fratricide for the benefit of strangers; horrors of war; historic suffering of Korean nationals and glory of Korea; the right, justice, and glory of participating in this historic development of a new-born nation.

A leaflet distributed at the beginning of September to members of the ROK forces in the vicinity of Chinhae, near Pusan is quoted as one of the many examples in point.

"Father of Ch'unsik: Why are you still cooperating and working for Americans and Syngman Rhee, traitor, and being dragged by them?"

"After liberation of Seoul, we have been getting along nicely under the able guidance of the Peoples Army and the Peoples Committee for the last two months, and now, I accuse Syngman Rhee and his gang for their lies and what we have suffered under them.

"What a surprise it is that you are shooting against the real people of our fatherland while I, your wife, enjoy all the privileges as a member of the Women's League under a unified Korea.

"My dear, why are you still staying with the traitorous army while all other members of the National Defense Army surrendered and returned to their homes and now enjoy their family life once again? Have you forgotten your old mother who is spending her time only weeping? Wouldn't you like to see your son, Ch'unsik?

"Dearie, leave the enemy column who is suffering with final defeat and return to the glorious Peoples Army immediately.

"Hoping that you will come back to us and escape from unwanted death and do not make us an infamous family of traitors."
(From PWB Collection, ROK No. 28.)

It is interesting to observe two approaches commonly used by both the Allies and the Axis in the last war have not been taken in NK leaflets.

The NK leaflets have never, so far as is known, given practical advice in personal matters and general rules of conduct to the population of South Korea. Instructions to the population to desert a certain place so as not to be caught in the midst of a fight, or to hide food or their personal belongings, etc., have never been given.

Second, they have never played up specifically one special instance that lends itself well to propaganda, e. g., the case of Lidice in the last war or the Taejon massacres in Korea. In all instances, the enemy's leaflets deal with the "horrors" and "disgrace" of the South Koreans in general terms without alluding to or exploitation of a specific instance.

Emphasis seems to be to bring into high gear, elements of patriotic sentiment, sadness about a national tragedy, etc., rather than give a rational documentation of the reasons why the liberation of South Korea is necessary.

Effectiveness of Leaflets. No data are available regarding the number of surrenderers who acted as a result of their reading of enemy leaflets and it is improbable that there will be any such data in the future.

Only certain isolated elements of what could well be called "circumstantial evidence" as well as the observation of individuals who, by virtue of their profession are in a position to give a picture of phenomena which they have reason to believe is the result of a drop of enemy leaflets, can serve at this point as an aid in tracing signs of effectiveness of such leaflets.

While arrests of political "enemies" in South Korea did not increase perceptibly after the drop of enemy leaflets which attacked the Rhee Government, the US and UN intervention, but which did not incite overt inimical acts, the ROK Home Ministry (National Police) reports that political arrests increased considerably after leaflets were distributed in which the target was exhorted to sabotage the ROKA, the UN Forces and the ROK Government machine. After the air-drop of enemy leaflets on Pyongyang (see Appendix I) political arrests in that city are reported to have increased 33 percent in the first 48 hours after the drop. In Chinan'po, an area that was politically very quiet, arrests for suspicion of political unreliability increased 17 percent between November 27-28, 1950.

The figures of political arrests closely after the appearance of enemy leaflets in an area are not to be understood to be an assessment of the effectiveness of such leaflets. Up to this time there is not enough statistical material available to give any theory relating the effectiveness of a leaflet to the increase in political arrests. However, the daily police reports of arrests are deemed interesting enough to warrant a special investigation into this matter when more documentary material becomes available for future research.

It may be significant that political arrests increased also in nearby areas which in themselves were not targets for leaflets. However, these arrests limp, in terms of time, from 24 to 72 hours behind the time of the leaflet drop over Pyongyang. This raises the question as to whether it was not necessary for copies of these leaflets or information about them to reach those areas before unrest was stirred up.

NOTE: The following increase in political arrests were reported: Sariwon - 14%; Harju - 20%; Uijongbu - 10%; In the latter two cases there is a possibility that these arrests are in connection with the ROKA operations directed toward the liberation of Chonchon in the central part of the Korean Peninsula which, up to December of 1950, was held by partisans,

The leaflets dropped on Pyongyang found their way to Seoul about two to three days later and their content was well known to the population in the streets. Unrest increased, but the hard fact of Chinese intervention may have been the prime reason for this in-

crease in unrest. At any rate, all this is reflected in the police records and the records of the ROKA military police which show comparative figures of political arrests for every week. See Appendix J showing samples of such weekly reports from various police jurisdictions compiled by the National Police Headquarters in Seoul.

The ROK Joint Intelligence Staff which functions under the joint chairmanship of Colonel Kim and Oh Jae Do, former Chief Prosecutor of the National Court and one of the founding members of the Boto Yon Maeng is another source of information regarding the population's reaction to enemy propaganda. This body avails itself of the services of the ROK-CIC elements as well as the Secret Police and engages in activities which are similar to a sampling of public opinion in the US. However, this organization has not yet done any statistical work and all data furnished by it are in their raw form.

NOTE: Due to the writer's hasty evacuation from Seoul and the pressure exerted upon this organization by the events of the second week of December 1950, much of the work promised by them was not complete. Some documents of great value for this research have been destroyed possibly in pursuance of ROK orders at a time when it seemed that a flight from the city of Seoul would be but a matter of days.

Interviews with senior members of the Joint Intelligence Staff reveal that they considered leaflets to having the following effects on the civilian population.

During the first stage of the war, leaflets were relatively ineffective. The consensus is that the only effectiveness of enemy leaflets during the first stages of the war was to impress on the minds of the South Korean population the physical nearness of the NK Forces. After the Inchon landings and the subsequent retreat of the remnants of the NK Forces across the 38th Parallel, the enemy did not have any real opportunity to use leaflets. In the few instances in which propaganda material of this type was found, it appeared to be somewhat passive limiting itself to a "we shall return" theme and to an effort to impress upon the South Koreans that there remained in this territory groups of organized "partisans" who will go on fighting the UN Forces and who should be helped by the local population.

Leaflets after Chinese Intervention. The Joint Intelligence and Evaluation Staff, and some officials of the Intelligence Section, National Police, believe that the effectiveness of enemy leaflets increased sharply after 1 December 1950. The most likely reason for this would be the reversed war situation. However, it should be noted that, on the whole, enemy leaflets show a marked change in

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tone. With the strong NK-Chinese drive South, the leaflets now begin to incite acts against the enemies of NK (i. e. the UN Forces and ROKA). This does not mean that appeals for other underground activities become a new feature of enemy propaganda, rather, at this point, these only become more marked. Their effectiveness cannot be measured at this moment by scientific criteria.

However a presumption seems to exist that they were quite effective indeed due to the fact that the South Korean population had been kept aware at all times, including the period after the liberation of Seoul by the UN Forces, of the existence and power of the well organized guerilla group and a network of agents who (1) remained in existence and manifested themselves to a greater or lesser extent throughout the UN occupation of South Korea despite great persecution, and (2) could be presumed to keep a close tab on South Korean individuals and groups, who might "collaborate" too extensively with the "enemies of the people" and who could be reported and punished accordingly--when and if the communists again take those portions of South Korea.

A large portion of the population is extremely bitter against the NK for ravaging their land and their atrocities against South Koreans. However, communist propaganda has constantly played up the theme that the devastation of their cities and the loss of their houses has been almost entirely due to allied bombings, flame-throwers, etc. As time went by, the wrath of the local population against the NK became lessened to a certain extent. This resulted from enemy propaganda to the effect that the UN Forces are ready and actually planning to desert the South Koreans in their hour of trial, pulling out of Korea whenever they think that their position has become untenable. The US behavior toward Chiang-kai-shek's China is cited as a precedent in point.

Of 24 prisoners interrogated in the ROK State Penitentiary, who had all been long time communists and many of whom had been active pre-war agitators, all stated that this argument was used with great intensity. At any rate, the communists from NK have begun to use the "bandwagon" approach, claiming that if the South Koreans fail to cooperate with their brothers from the North it will be too late to recant to please the NK liberators when they have been deserted by those who claim to be their allies today.

The timing of this approach is well planned. The population of NK has undergone tremendous strain during the latter part of 1950. Many thousands have been killed, or have starved. Others have been persecuted by NK invaders. Others who remained passive at home have been caught in the middle of house-to-house

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fighting in Seoul and have lost all they had at the hands of both friend and foe. With winter approaching the chances for survival for most refugees were worse than they were five months ago. Thousands were physically unable to flee south. It is natural that those who had to face the invaders did the best they could to survive under that regime. The only way to achieve this was to be "well inscribed" with them, i. e., to help in some way in "liberating" Korea from Syngman Rhee, the US and the UN Forces. Thus enemy leaflets appealing to the population to commit minor or major acts against the allies do probably not fall on deaf ears.

In conclusion, it may be restated that the effectiveness of the enemy's leaflets directed at the population of South Korea has increased in proportion to the change in style of the text; direct appeal for sabotage or passive resistance has shown signs of being carried out. National police records show a marked increase in arson, smuggling of pistols and other weapons and political and propaganda agitation among the population of Seoul and even areas as far south as Kunsan. Texts of speeches and other lofty or ideological material seems to have been relatively ineffective against the local population.

There are indications that the enemy is aware of the increased effectiveness of leaflets. Since the beginning of the joint NK-Chinese offensive, the number of leaflets has increased. So have the ways of disseminating them to the native population. Smuggling of leaflets has become a common practice and the police files (Office of the US Adviser to the National Police, Home Ministry, Seoul) bear evidence thereof.

PROPAGANDA LITERATURE

General. A clever and varied use of all types of literature is generally recognized as one of the strong points of communist propaganda and indoctrination. The NK propagandists have followed this in their wide distribution of printed material ranging from school books and magazines to dictionaries and technical works.

NK-printed propaganda seems to follow closely the pattern of Soviet propaganda publications and their circulation among the masses is governed by essentially the same rules and methodology as is the case in the Soviet Union. The basic idea is to penetrate as many segments of the local population as possible appealing to them with convincing arguments and "intellectual public service" (which reaches into the technical aspects of most professions) that the new philosophy is concerned with the problems of the various class segments of the population.

Classification. This literature can be divided into five main types:

1. Ideological writings (e. g., translation of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, reports of International communist meetings, trade union reports, etc.).
2. Professional and technical writings (e. g., technical manuals, school books, historical treatises, labor magazines, popular science monthlies, etc);
3. "Planned entertainment" (e. g., song books, political satires, classical, belletristic and humorous literature which though present as entertainment still follows a rigorous plan of communist indoctrination);
4. Literature for the education and "enlightenment" of the masses (e. g., magazines, theater plays, short stories, novels, regional or group newspapers, the local press, concerned with accounts of progress in other "People's Democracies" and signs of decadence in the "bourgeois-imperialistic countries).
5. Communist action literature, mostly with a limited circulation to Party members and Party workers, who, by virtue of their standing and activities, are to be trained further in techniques for the conduct of Party work, literature representative of this sub-section, are the propaganda manuals for agitators, data for public lecturers, organizational handbooks.

NOTE: A cursory analysis was made of all printed propaganda material found in NK which had been circulated as part of the Soviet plan to permeate the NK peoples with their intellectual propaganda. A full collection of this literature was sent to the US Department of the Army. It comprises some 350 books, pamphlets, manuals, and magazines which the NK propagandists used in their efforts against South Korea.

It is of course difficult to draw clearly defined lines between these categories but the general pattern of propaganda literature (other than leaflets and posters) follows this grouping.

Content Analysis. A general, and preliminary check of the titles and subjects treated reveals that a large portion of this material is very similar, in form and content, to Soviet propaganda publications and represents straight translations of Soviet books and booklets, many of which have been analyzed by various US government agencies concerned with this matter. Other publications, especially magazines, while not printed in the USSR, are patterned very closely after those that appear in Soviet Russia (such as Ogoniok, Rabotnitsa, Bloknot Agitatora, etc.).

Two principal leitmotifs become apparent in analyzing NK printed propaganda material destined for the consumption of South Koreans: (1) A representation of the "Great Soviet Union" as a friend and brilliant example of success worthy of imitation; and (2) A representation of "purely self-grown Korean thought and philosophy" under a guise of nationalism, without allusion to the USSR, accentuating thereby the total independence of thought of the country. Examples of this are the book "On National Literature" by Han Hyo, published by the Cultural Front Co.; a treatise on the significance of the NK flag by Kim Du Pong, and many others.

The reason for this dual approach is obvious. First, it is necessary to create sympathy for the system which has sired the current trend that is trying to be superimposed. Second, propaganda must play up to the nationalism of the target people, especially in the case of a nation that looks back with pride on a history of several milleniums. NK propaganda has to play up to this desire for independence and a place in the society of free nations as well as instill greater nationalistic enthusiasm among the people. On the other hand, an independent nation cannot live in seclusion but needs friends and allies. This is where the Soviet theme enters the picture. The USSR is presented not only as the powerful ally, but also as the well-organized example of a state which has achieved the unification and universal progress for all through the system by which it is governed.

Thus, there will no longer be any isolation of United Korea. She will be in the family of friends, have international intercourse and at the same time be under the wing of powerful allies who are in a position to guarantee her independence and help prevent further, unnecessary bloodshed or exploitation of the country. But, this adherence and alliance, will not impair in any way, the total independence of Korea and the freedom of the people to choose their government in the manner they feel is best for them.

The interrogation of 120 PWs, 26 of whom had been cultural officers in the NK Army, and of 60 political prisoners questioned, indicated that the NK Labor Party, though patterned exactly after the Soviet Communist Party, has largely avoided (except in the case of workers' unions) letting the people know that their political organization is identical with that found in the USSR. Not one of the NK soldiers captured (all of whom had had courses in political indoctrination and some of whom studied Russian language in their schools) was familiar with the Soviet terms of communist organization such as Komsomol, Kilkhoz, Sovkhoz, etc.

Yet, the same type of organizations exist in NK but are presented as uniquely NK groups. Thus, the Komsomol has its counterpart in the NK Min Ju Dong Maeng (Young Peoples Democratic League). This group published many books under its league name but did not allude to its original derivation.

During the latter part of November, 1950, there was a tendency to emphasize China as an ally in NK publications, a number of which were circulated as magazines by guerillas in South Korea.

So far as the "entertainment" literature is concerned, there seems to have been a concentrated attempt to bring gems of Soviet Russian literature to the people. Editions of Turgenev, Chekhov, and especially the contemporaries have been printed in the Korean language both in the USSR as well as in Pyongyang. Song books featuring Korean patriotic and Soviet military songs were distributed privately among the population as well as in schools, and the invading NK propagandists put special emphasis on the learning and singing of such music. Korean patriotic poetry, verse, novels, and short stories, as well as new school textbooks have been standard features of NK printed propaganda.

Distribution Methods. In their efforts to secure as wide distribution as possible of propaganda literature among the population, the NK leaders have followed standard communist procedure. A major portion of the material was distributed free, in the streets, or from house to house, and during forced mass meetings. Book stores and stands were issued, as a rule, large quantities of red propaganda material and could sell it for extremely low prices or had to distribute it together with the rest of their stock. The Party Headquarters in every town and village of occupied South Korea became a sort of exhibition hall, displaying prominently the pictures of communist leaders in Korea, the USSR, and China, and exhibiting titles of books and pamphlets which could be readily obtained for free by the populace.

The NK invaders brought with them large quantities of all types of propaganda literature and immediately took over the printing facilities in occupied areas. They sponsored new magazines which in some cases only appeared for two or three numbers.

The city schools were swamped with propaganda literature, mostly in the form of children's stories and song books. The teachers were issued ideological manuals, together with "gift" books of serious literature. Technical literature for a number of professions was imported from NK, though largely translations of Soviet Russian books, and distributed freely among the members of the various trades, crafts, and professions. A rash of new

libraries appeared. Although exact data are unavailable, the ROK Intelligence agencies put the number of public and semi-public libraries, of political literature in pure or disguised form, at 36 in the city of Seoul alone—three weeks after occupation of that Capital City by the NK Forces.

The South Korean press together with privately or government owned publishing establishments was totally nationalized and used for the production of communist publications. Staffs were re-vamped, NK executive personnel substituted, and the press turned out copies of imported presentation cliches. However, the appearance of the domestic press, The Shimbo and other Seoul newspapers, did not change perceptibly during the time of NK occupation, according to interviews with Park Seung Oh and other South Korean newspapermen.

About one-half of NK propaganda publications, though much of it was a translation from the Soviet writings, had been printed in the Peoples Republic of NK. The other half, roughly came from the USSR, usually the Foreign Language Publishing House, and some few magazines and pamphlets were printed in China.

Foreign Influences in NK Propaganda Publications. A study of Soviet Propaganda in the Koreas is not within the scope of this paper, but it seems advisable to review a few facts about Soviet propaganda to the people of NK and, through them, the people of South Korea.

The Soviets have maintained in NK a very elaborated propaganda setup. At the Soviet Mission in Pyongyang a large arsenal of Soviet propaganda publications in many languages were found upon the liberation of that capital by UN Forces. They consisted of a variety of texts seldom seen. They ranged from luxury editions of Lenin to products in many foreign languages by the Foreign Language Publishing House in Moscow.

NOTE: Copies of most of this material have been sent to the US government through the Documents Collection Centers in Pyongyang (Eighth Army) and in Hamhung (X Corps). A small collection of Soviet publications of special interest for several projects underway have been obtained for the ORO Library.

As in the case of film, there is strong reason to believe that a considerable part of the NK propaganda literature, though printed largely in NK, was edited by Soviet personnel and possibly in the USSR itself. Also, the distribution of propaganda literature and the methods employed by the NK in occupied localities invite the conclusion that there was ever present a strong Soviet influence or at least the Soviet example. Certain magazines printed in

Pyongyang gave a copy (however bad) of a Soviet example. Most significant, however, is the fact that the NK agitators were, and are, supplied with agitators' manuals which are literal translations of the famed Soviet series, "bloknot agitatora."

NOTE: UN Forces found in Pyongyang, NK money and stamps as well as several posters and propaganda tableaux which showed that they had been prepared and produced in the Soviet Union.

Style and Presentation of Propaganda Publications. Books, in appearance, resemble the publications of the more popular book editions in the USSR (Uchpedgiz, Glavlit, etc.), are paper bound and, for the most part, not illustrated. They are primarily pocket size and printed on paper that is very crude, being somewhat worse than the paper that is used in most popular Soviet editions.

However, some "luxury editions" consisting mostly of translations of important Soviet authors and texts (Gorki, Tolstoy, History of Communism, International Law, etc.) are also in circulation and have been distributed primarily to Korean schools, libraries and to public figures. Of the three communist book stores in Seoul, investigation shows that they did practically no business and ultimately their stock was used by the communist city government who distributed their literature in schools in and around Seoul.

Magazines. NK magazines, as a rule, are printed on very poor quality paper and the pictures are more often than not indistinguishable. In style and presentation, they are patterned after certain Soviet publications. For example, the NK "Worker" has the identical format, division of text, title and rubrics as the Soviet magazine "Rabotnitsa;" the NK "Arrow" seems to be patterned after the Soviet Krokodyl. Figure 69 shows a title page of an issue of this magazine.

Soviet and Chinese "luxury magazines," with multi-color print on good paper, have been circulated throughout North and occupied South Korea and seem to have had a sizable circulation. It is reported that schools were forced to display such magazines in their classrooms while some newspapers displayed them in open form on their bulletin boards.

Ambulant Libraries. Following the example of other communist dominated countries and particularly Soviet Russia, the NK authorities maintained a limited number of "ambulant libraries" for the "instruction and enlightenment" of the population. These libraries were not supervised by the NK propagandists but were run by what

might be termed a counterpart of the US Army's Special Service Division. As a rule, each ambulant library was accompanied by one or more communist agitators, who would try to organize a small rally whenever the truck made a stop. It was the agitator's job to explain the good that comes from the spiritual care of the population by the communist government.

They seem to have been very small in number, as only four have been reported, and it is the unanimous opinion of those who have seen them that they failed in terms of mass appeal.

It may be concluded that the NK propaganda apparatus used publications much the same as the communist propaganda setup does in other such dominated areas. In terms of quality of paper, print, and graphic presentation, though not always, the NK propaganda machine publications appear immensely inferior to those appearing in the USSR or other "Peoples Democracies." However, since the paper used in publishing printed matter in Korea was never of high quality, this had little to do with the effectiveness of the NK propaganda literature.

Outstanding NK propaganda publications are: the Nationalistic tinged "Heroic Struggle Waged by the Youth of the Southern Half," released by the NK Min Ju Dong Maeng (Komsomol); Professional and trade magazines such as "Science and Education," organs of various ministries, and the like; works by Soviet authors, i. e., Lenin's "On the Right of Racial Self Determination;" peasant novels; one-act plays; stories of hero lore; and children's books which include songs and stories.

Korean-Soviet textbooks and dictionaries have been distributed in large quantities due to the fact that the school curriculum of the NK state requires all students to study the Russian language for several years and this requirement was applicable to "liberated South Korean schools" as well.

Inquiry reveals that relatively few South Koreans have made use of the free offers for new books and magazines. Very few South Koreans were found with NK propaganda literature in their possession. The few who had much of it, in many instances stocks of the same publication, were mostly communist agitators.

Among the more effective and widely read propaganda publications are those of communist newspapers and magazines from NK, China and Soviet Russia, which were displayed on bulletin boards of publishing houses, in windows of government and store buildings. (The Japanese and Korean governments had long maintained this latter display method, but under the name of "Public Information Bulletins.")

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**LOUDSPEAKERS**

While the enemy used loudspeakers primarily in his consolidation propaganda, the (NK) role of this instrument does not seem to have been much larger than that given it by the South Korean government. Before the communist occupation of certain South Korean areas, the Rhee government maintained public address systems in certain South Korean towns. Some loudspeakers were operated by the PIO of the ROK government for news broadcasting and others were operated by the ROK National Police to broadcast regulations and orders to the population. One such system was maintained by the USIS in the main square of Seoul.

The enemy did not reportedly use, to any considerable extent, loudspeakers during military operations. It would be fallacious however to conclude on the basis of this fact alone that the use for purposes of tactical psychological warfare is considered minimal at all times. There may not have been always a sufficient quantity of loudspeakers available, or power generators handy. During the enemy's first drive south, as well as after, the UN Forces' push north towards the Parallel, there were occasions when the use of loudspeakers by the enemy were evident. Some attempts to use this medium in combat propaganda were reported by elements of both the 2nd ROK Division in the west, and the 1st ROK Corps on the east coast of Korea.

Upon invading a South Korean town, the enemy found the loudspeaker a very desirable and effective means of conveying orders, information and especially propaganda to the population which, in many cases, had been deprived of radio, newspapers or any other news source.

Immediately after the occupation of Seoul, the NK Forces rigged public address systems in the main streets and squares of the city and broadcast a constant stream of appeals, messages, patriotic speeches, war news and martial music. Especially frequent were messages to the population from North and South Korean communists and the patriotic replies of the leaders of certain "peoples committees" which had either been hastily organized or had existed underground during the Rhee regime.

Armed vehicles with loudspeakers mounted on them cruised through the city streets broadcasting propaganda messages, slogans, police orders and military orders along with mandates from their new mayor, Lee Sung Yo, a South Korean trained and in NK and Soviet Russia and who assumed the position of president of the Interim Peoples City Government.

An invocation of the NK authorities for consolidation propaganda purposes was the mounting of powerful loudspeakers on the streetcars. Eyewitnesses of the installation of the "liberating Peoples Government" report a number of Seoul streetcars so equipped.

No trace of fixed loudspeakers was found in small towns although vehicles with mounted loudspeakers were reported active in most urban and rural areas during the first days of the NK occupation.

Effectiveness. No data are available by which to gauge the effectiveness of the loudspeakers in the enemy's propaganda warfare against South Korea. In the opinion of responsible South Korean officials, the Joint Intelligence Staff, the ROK Government PIO Office and the PIO Section, ROKA, loudspeakers are generally useful instruments for influencing the South Korean man in the street, usually of a lower social class, who:

1. Listens to anything that comes to him in unconventional manner and in loud tones, and especially with music.
2. Has been kept without proper information for a long time and who relishes the opportunity to listen to "news."
3. Almost certainly will be prone to believe what he is being told through the loudspeaker because he is not the only one to whom the message goes, and if so many other people are listening to it, it is directed to all, therefore the message must be true.

It may be worthwhile to restate the elements which in the writer's opinion have contributed most to the population's anxiety to listen to "news" and "information" regardless of from whence it emanates. As the communist forces (Chinese and NK) were approaching and crossing Parallel 38, and it became apparent that Seoul might be in a perilous position for the second time in a year, little if anything was done by the ROK government to take into account the basic anxieties. The UN Forces were retreating and the most uneducated South Korean could see that the endless convoys were moving south. Meanwhile, the Seoulians were speaking in no uncertain terms about the heroic stand they would take to defend the capital and the impossibility of Seoul being taken by the enemy. At the same time, however, preparations were in full swing for the evacuation of members of the ROK government and their families and for evacuation of dependents of ROKA officers.

The news releases of the ROK government consisted of patriotic appeals rather than news. Despite repeated pleas by many persons and full agreement on the part of US experts in the area, to install immediately a series of loudspeakers at frequented intersections

and rebroadcast hourly news bulletins, this was never done. (The ROKA-PIO had in storage at that time, eight new loudspeakers.) Instead, the National Police, operating two or three loudspeakers, conveyed police orders and appeals to calm the people. Other loudspeakers, particularly one mounted on top of the City Hall, were used to broadcast the usual patriotic speeches with little, if any, allusion to the general situation. Whether we consider the situation as of July or December, 1950, in Seoul, the fact remains that at the time of the approaching enemy, the people of the South Korean capital were aware of the impending danger but were kept without a well-functioning news service and were swayed by reassuring statements on the part of the government. The result is that the South Korean information agencies (PIO, ROKA-PIO, etc.) seem to have lost much of their credibility.

When the NK Forces first invaded Seoul, they found a population which was largely disappointed and bewildered by the flight of the Rhee government that had failed to warn the citizens of Seoul that the NK invaders were approaching, and themselves fled the city under cover of darkness.

Thus, for the first weeks of the NK occupation at least, the invaders seemed to have a good chance of reaching a news-hungry population. Their information could afford to be factually correct since the UN Forces were in retreat.

For this reason, it appears plausible to believe (as South Korean officials do) that loudspeakers used by the invading NK Forces had, initially at least, their desired effectiveness; namely, they kept people listening to the messages conveyed over them. There was no special reason during the first two or three weeks of occupation to doubt the general credibility of their news.

There is no material available to show to what extent and how quickly the credibility of the NK propaganda line vanished or diminished in enemy-held Seoul or elsewhere in occupied South Korea, as well as how many others willingly listened to their loudspeaker and radio propaganda. However, it is established that a general passive attitude was observed on the part of the Seoulians toward loudspeakers installed by the Rhee government following liberation of that capital from the NK.

It is suggested that a public opinion organization conduct a study of the effectiveness of loudspeakers (propaganda-wise) in other Asiatic areas in potential danger of communist aggression. The loudspeakers should be affixed in strategic points relaying news "spots," propaganda messages, patriotic speeches, and other selected material. A survey should then be made of the following three factors.

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ORO-T-10 (EUSAK)

NK Propaganda Media

1. The number of persons who come to that area expressly to listen to 10 or more minutes of a program.
2. The number of persons who stop on their way to listen to a message conveyed on the loudspeaker.
3. The number of persons who leave the place before the message has terminated.

The findings should be of great value for the US propaganda planner as a pre-test of the expected effectiveness of his loudspeaker propaganda.

POSTERS AND OTHER VISUAL MEANS OF PROPAGANDA

This section deals with visual propaganda material and includes in addition to conventional posters, photographic tableaux—enlarged newsphotos with captions—cartoons, placards, banners, wall placards, bulletins, arm-bands, buttons, and kindred material.

Posters. The communists have widely used posters of all kinds in Korea. They have been used in basically the same fashion as the Soviets are known to employ them and as the Italians did under Mussolini's regime. Posters have been found everywhere, from isolated farm houses in the hills, to frequented thoroughfares in Seoul. Many texts found on posters are straight translations from Soviet posters or close adaptations. A rough clarification of poster types found in Korea follows.

Posters of Eulogy. This type placard usually carries a picture of Kim Il Song or other communist leaders of the NK or Soviet Russia, and is often captioned with a "thank you" message "from the people." (See Figure 70.)

Such a poster is oftentimes also printed on linen or silk, made into a standard to be carried in processions and rallies, as was the case in occupied South Korea.

While not of the same skill in manufacture, this type of NK posters is almost identical in substance and make-up as those used in the USSR to glorify Stalin. (See Figure 71.) This same type of poster is used also extensively in China, Bulgaria, Poland and other communist countries.

A variation of this poster-type is the reproduction of speeches and appeals from the "leader," with his picture dominating the text. Such posters appear very frequently in South Korea. A sample is presented in Figure 72.

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Because of the size, methods of distribution, as well as general appearance, this material is classified "posters." However, the length of text qualify it to be actually "wall newspapers" or news bulletins. They are usually displayed in public places and have become more or less an accepted practice for the ROK government, the communists, and were used as such by the Japanese in Korea.

Patriotic Posters. Using largely Soviet "socialist realist" techniques NK invaders have attempted to stir up patriotic feeling through posters with rather crude drawings accentuating color contrasts. A poster typical of this group is reproduced in Figure 73. The patriotic theme is also typified in scores of cartoons, one of which is presented in Figure 74.

According to the ROK National Police and the Combined Intelligence Staff, "socialist realist style" posters were used to the full. After the NK invaders fled Seoul, National Police discovered these posters in abundance on collaborators and other communist "plants" working for the "unification of Korea."

Posters of US Bombings and Exploitation. Posters portraying Korea as the victim of US cruelties, imperialism, and ravaged by "unwarranted" bombings and anti-Rhee-theme placards were prevalent throughout the entire period covered in this paper.

Appeals to the Population. Figure 75 shows the soliciting of cooperation and volunteers for the "Reconstruction Brigades;" Figure 76 is a reproduction of a handbill carrying an appeal by Kim Il Song.

Posters for Unification. Another widely-used theme for posters is the "Unification of Korea." Into this category fall also certain Soviet posters found in Korea which glorify the achievements of other communist peoples. Figure 77 depicts Soviet compliments to a united Chinese nation. Other Soviet posters show pictures of Stalin and Kim Il Song together, while still others show the "unity of socialist peoples in their fight for freedom against hated capitalists."

Symbols. While this material seems to be used largely by the NK propagandists for home consumption (NK) it has been also found in South Korea very frequently; slogans are superimposed on such pictures with joined hands, falling bombs, an attacking soldier, etc., (see Figures 78 and 79).

Such material lends itself also admirably for the implementation of the propaganda line of ridicule, i. e. the satirical approach. Here the enemy could give vent to his attacks on Syngman Rhee, and on

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the hated US Forces who, NK propaganda claims or implies, are the root of all evil and should not be trusted, or better yet, should be thrown out or annihilated, by the South Koreans themselves. Figure 80 presents a reproduction of a Soviet cartoon featured in the Magazine "Arrow." Two well informed ROK sources (from the Joint Intelligence Staff in Seoul) claimed that the identical picture appeared on a NK handbill that the enemy distributed in the occupied Capital and in other nearby localities, on his advance toward Taejon. However, none of such handbills was apparently captured by either the ROKA or the UN Forces.

It is also worth while to note that there is no known instance of an NK poster directed against troops of the UN Forces of a nationality other than US. Few posters are directed against the UN Forces as an instrument of the UN. The object of attack is the US soldier and, occasionally, the ROK soldier as the lackey of the US soldier.

Placards, Banners, and Handbills. Closely related to posters, are wall placards, propaganda "news bulletins," and banners. Except for isolated instances when some were smuggled into South Korea and clandestinely distributed, this class of material was primarily for consumption by NK and by South Koreans only after their towns and villages had been occupied.

Wall placards appear in a rectangular form, are smaller than the standard type of poster and consist of a text or slogan only. A few samples of both NK and Soviet production (the latter found in Korea) are shown in Figure 20. Two more samples are reproduced in Figures 81 and 82.

After the UN push north and the liberation of Seoul, the guerilla bands that had remained in the central part of the Korean peninsula used wall placards and handbills with great frequency. The areas of Chunchon, Hongchon and Yoju were centers of such activity. This type of placard-display follows, as a rule, two kinds of subjects.

1. Information about advances of the Peoples Army; patriotic slogans and exhortations.
2. Messages pertaining to tangible and practical interests of the citizens' daily life, such as appeals to give food to guerillas; to hide ROKA deserters; to press for the collectivization of land. Figures 83-86 present samples of these types of NK visual propaganda material.

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News bulletins for display on walls and bulletin boards or in shop windows also received wide application. They can be classed in three categories: (1) messages by the communist leaders; (2) war and world news in a slanted way; (3) photo reportages and pictures from the front in the fashion of illustrated news bulletins circulated by the USIE in Korea and other world areas.

All three types are said to have a natural appeal to the Koreans who avidly gather around such bulletins whenever they appear. This is confirmed by eye witnesses as well as from the writer's experience in newly liberated NK and South Korean areas. When the first UN on ROK news bulletins appeared in the same places where, a few days or even hours ago the NK material had been hanging, the native population invariably gathered around with interest or curiosity. Figure 87 is the reproduction of a photograph taken in Seoul shortly before the evacuation of EUSAK Headquarters in December, 1950 and shows such an instance.

The NK Army often brought with them insignias bearing the coat of arms of NK as well as immense supplies of NK flags. Thousands of small and large NK flags were brought into Seoul and other occupied towns of South Korea, handed to the population and displayed from windows, roofs, on public squares—everywhere a flag could be displayed. The participants of rallies were required to wear the NK colors in their lapels or hand-carry small NK flags. The newly occupied South Korean towns were littered with small paper wall placards bearing no message, no slogan, just showing the colors of the flag. And, naturally, the Seoul Capitol displayed prominently the flag of NK which was represented to all as a symbol of a united Korea.

In no known instance did the NK propaganda display their flag as the flag of the Peoples Democratic Republic of NK. It was and always remained the flag of Korea, the one country that was united by its own people. The flag was presented. It represented a symbol of peace and unity and the national flag of Korea, not the flag of a victor flying over the capital of the vanquished.

In addition to the buttons and insignias, arm bands bearing the clasped-hand symbol were distributed. This was to evidence the fact that the unification of Korea was nearly completed, that brother had found brother.

Photographic Tableaux. True to communist tradition, the NK propaganda apparatus used in great quantities photographic enlargements of war pictures showing destroyed US military equipment, dead enemy soldiers, the joy of the South Korean population over the liberation from the Rhee regime, and other relatively standard propaganda items. Such materials was usually mounted on large

sheets of paper and displayed with hand-written captions in store windows and on the bulletin boards of Korean factories, newspaper buildings and official government buildings (Figures 88-89).

Cartoons and Comic Books. A very popular visual means of NK propaganda was the many cartoons caricaturing leading personalities of the South Korean government and the US, the latter with particular delight. During the first stages of the conflict, the NK propagandists seem to have concentrated on cartoons caricaturing Syngman Rhee and some of his top men. Soon, however, the butt for the caricatures became and remained the US. This was probably because it would be less offensive to the Korean national who could in due time become a good communist and a clever caricature of the US in his defeat might be palatable to those segments of the population who could not be reached by theoretical argumentation. The US subject is presented as an ugly, thin, and unhealthy creature while the Korean liberator is the ruddy, stock, and determined fellow who will boot the enemy out of Korea.

The cartoon got its widest application in the enemy's propaganda publications—magazines, books and comic books, the latter distributed primarily among elements of the ROKA.

The NK published in Pyongyang and imported into occupied areas, a satirical political magazine called, "Arrow" which consisted entirely of anti-Rhee and anti-US cartoons. Its general format was similar to that of the Soviet magazine "Krokodyl" but short stories were generally omitted.

North and South Korean newspapers were required to carry such cartoons, many of which were identical with those found in enemy leaflets. Cartoons can be broken down roughly into the following categories:

1. Caricatures of leading US and ROK personalities.
2. Cartoons portraying in a ridiculing fashion, the defeat or retreat of weak and corrupted US Forces before the advancing Koreans as exemplified in Figures 90 and 91.
3. Cartoons ridiculing the "dominating class" of Koreans and playing up their exploitation of the poor South Korean worker.
4. A non-humorous, educational and informational cartoon designed to accentuate the story told in captions. This type of cartoon received wide circulation among both NK and ROK troops and in the daily press of occupied South Korean towns. Cartoons might actually be a misnomer and "drawings" might be a more

accurate appellation. A few samples of such serious narrative cartoons which were extracted from NK front line publications: "News from the Front" and "For Victory" are given in Figures 92, 93, and 94. It will be noticed that all the captions follow a line of "propaganda of enlightenment."

NOTE: Such cartoon captions emphasize: (1) the cooperation of the civilian population with their army; (2) the strength and successes of the various arms of the NK Forces—navy, air corps, army, et cetera; (3) righteous complaints about the sufferings of the people caused by the US who had no business in Korea as shown in Figures 83 - 86.

Other stereotyped symbols include the broken chain of slavery, and the clenched fist of the communist salute. (No cartoons are known to have appeared on enemy leaflets dropped on South Koreans.)

PROPAGANDA AGITATION

The enemy has used agitation propaganda extensively. It can be said that agitation constitutes a major, if not the major medium of communist propaganda in NK.

Traditionally, agitation propaganda is a major weapon of communist political indoctrination. The writings of leading communists such as Kowrow, Shapiro, Stalin and the many statements of purposes presented in communist literature for agitators, gives ample evidence that in communist dialectics the function of propaganda is identified with indoctrination and enlightenment. The communist-dominated countries are so far the only ones that have developed this weapon to a major extent, and utilized it in a multitude of forms, degrees and intensities.

In the Korean war, propaganda agitation has had a major place in the enemy's propaganda setup. A study of the activities of such agitators deserves major study especially because the psychological warfare apparatus of the US (and other Western powers) thus far has disregarded this very powerful medium of propaganda.

In the Korean war at the time of this writing, no specific instance of enemy agitation propaganda directed specifically at the US (or UN) soldier can be reported. In other words there has been no direct NK agitation propaganda directed to the UN soldier. But, it is well established that the NK Forces used agitation propaganda against the South Korean civilian population as well as ROKA elements with great frequency and intensity.

Agitation Propaganda Methods. The agitator is a standard propaganda (or indoctrination) instrument of the communists, for propaganda work against communist civilian populations and against the enemy. Thus, we find NK agitators being used at home as morale boosters, teachers, undercover agents and policemen. NK agitators are attached to almost all groups of segments of the population—professional, national, political, factory and rural groups and the armed forces—down to the smallest units.

Propaganda agitation is carried out, in most instances, against the enemy by planting agitators behind the lines, i. e., within given target groups and attached to specific professional, vocational or social groups. Propaganda agitators operating in enemy territory include intelligence agents, provocateurs and saboteurs assigned to commit overt acts to break the target's morale by inciting fear, panic, etc. and general agitators assigned to incite groups of the population against their own government (amply used by the Nazi propaganda machine and called "Raedelfuehrer"). Also, "undercover agitators" distribute clandestine propaganda literature and work most inconspicuously doing propaganda spade work in the ranks of the target population itself.

The agitator should not be confused with the guerilla or partisan whose classical function is to wage nuisance warfare in back of the enemy and who is considered by the communists to be a member of their regular armed forces and, as such, is entitled to all the benefits and honors due to the regular soldier. However, in the Korean war, instances were recorded in which guerilla bands in isolated areas were instructed to cease, temporarily at least, their violent activities and engage in agitation propaganda among the more or less demoralized masses of the South Koreans in towns and villages exposed to impending attacks.

A clear example of this occurred in the area north of Kaesong in the first week of December, 1950, after Pyongyang had been occupied by the enemy and UN Forces were retreating below Parallel 38. According to statements of captured guerillas Kim Byong Chan and Chu Ju Hyon and the findings of the ROKA-CIC of Kaesong, guerilla bands operating in the area had been instructed to organize pro-communist (anti-Rhee) mass meetings, and distribute and produce posters and leaflets. As a result, at least seven instances were reported on 3-4 December of guerilla incursions on villages and hamlets north of Kaesong in the area of Tangyong-ni.

Houses of villages were invaded and the male inhabitants carted off into the woods and forced to attend meetings at which guerilla agitators lectured on the NK political platform distributing leaflets

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among those who had sons in the ROKA to prevail upon them to desert and join the "Forces of Liberation" or to commit acts of sabotage against the UN Forces. Since no printing facilities were available for the production of leaflets and probably smuggling facilities for such material from the north were few, the guerillas were instructed to produce propaganda literature locally as best they could. As a result, the procedure was that guerilla bands invaded South Korean houses under cover of darkness. The inhabitants were forced at gun point to make hand-written copies of prepared texts.

No instances have been reported of communist agitators in the ROKA who, in battle, through expressed pleas or personal leadership, attempted to bring about mass desertion of the fighting men. But, since the beginning of the combined NK-Chinese drive southward, enemy propaganda, spread mostly as rumor, has let it be known that communist elements within ROK territory are keeping a close watch on those who will not listen to their appeals to lay down their arms and stop the fratricide and that upon the "liberation" by the "Peoples Forces" the hour of reckoning will have come.

NOTE: Members of the 2nd ROK Division reported receiving letters, many signed by communist functionaries, relating their past history and threatening their families with punishment for the traitorous acts of the soldiers.

Several persons in Seoul obtained letters of similar content smuggled to them during the first week of December, 1950, coinciding with a rumor that appeared in the capital at the same time to the effect that all those who would not actively participate in the fight against the US Forces would be killed when the communists captured them. Of course, this line of approach stands in violent contrast to the platform of humanity and brotherly love formerly stressed in the propaganda output of the NK.

In a leaflet dropped in August, addressed to the South Korean population at large and widely circulated throughout South Korea (ATIS No. 200921) the warning is given that "now is the time for you to fight for the glory, freedom and independence of your fatherland!" The note ended with this ominous ring: "Time will not wait for you; there will be no suspense in the advance of the Peoples Army!"

Similarly, rumor had it at various times in most areas that enemy agents were compiling "black lists" of South Korean supporters and anti-communists. At least four such lists were actually intercepted by ROK authorities.

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A study of enemy propaganda methods used by the NK during various stages of the war, reveals that propaganda agitation followed two major lines: (1) That within NK and to the North Koreans; and (2) agitation in occupied (South Korean) territory.

1. Within NK and to North Koreans. Agitators as component parts of citizens groups in factories, school, among peasants—all working for greatest possible support by the home front for over-production of set quotas. Agitators among general population soliciting enlistments for the Peoples Army volunteers. Agitators as parts of the army units under the direction of the cultural officers, for the distribution of news and spying on political conduct of the soldiers.

2. Agitation in Occupied Territory. Agitators as provocateurs, saboteurs (with arson as a useful weapon), guerillas, communist cell (underground) organizers, and rumor mongers.

Working Techniques of NK Agitators. The agitator working within NK, operates largely with the help of two special publications: the "Agitator's Manual," a replica of the famed Soviet "Bloknot Agitatora," and which contains many straight translations from this Soviet publication; and the "Discussion Themes for Agitators" which is also patterned after the Soviet example. Both are periodicals appearing monthly, and sometimes more frequently. The "Agitator's Manual" gives both desired themes for discussion and directions for the agitator as to how and why to treat certain subjects and what the agitator's role should be. "Discussion Topics" prints texts of lectures that the agitator is directed to give and discussions that are to be led by him subsequent to the lecture.

NOTE: A considerable number of Soviet agitators' handbooks were studied and several of these NK publications are in the ORO collection of enemy property material. They contain guidance for choice of topics to be treated at certain times. These topics range from appeals to modernize agricultural production to strictly political themes.

The role of the agitator in his education and enlightenment work has been clearly stated in the NK Propaganda Handbook of February 28 (this was published by the Propaganda Bureau, a part of the Ministry of Culture and Propaganda in Pyongyang):

"The task facing the agitator is to develop a mass propaganda agitation campaign designed to lead the current drive to success by inoculating in the workers the political significance which it carries. The point to be especially emphasized in that (our) drive is basically different in nature from the bourgeois concept of competition and interest; this is a duel in which one capitalist comes out victorious

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ORO-T-10 (EUSAK)

NK Propaganda Media

trampling on the body of the defeated. Our (production) drive means comradely assistance and aid rendered by the advanced group to the groups lagging behind for the purpose of winning common improvement and victory in the interests of each producer, the fatherland and the people. It is up to the agitators to enlist every worker's effort in this vigorous campaign for... national salvation."

The role and function of the agitator on the home front is clearly outlined in another issue of the "Agitators Manual" which appeared in June, 1950. Among a series of articles for the agitator "to insure a fruitful fulfillment of the Peoples Economy Plan for 1950, despite the war," the following quoted passages cast light on the style used in this type of publication. They give a good restatement of typical duties and functions to be expected from the agitator operating among the various segments of the home population.

"...In view of the complicated and intensified situation which has now been created in our fatherland, the fatherland and the people demand of each agitator to carry out his task more faithfully. What, then, is required of each agitator and how is he to do it?

"Each agitator is to keep the entire laboring people informed of the current situation at home and abroad, policies, laws, decisions of the government, thus inspiring them into a lofty feeling of responsibility as masters of the State and patriotic fervor. Along with this, each agitator has to correct various inadequate points raised by General Kim Il Song in his speech reviewing the development of industrial economy, and carry out agitation and organization works. If agitators' work cannot be conducted in alliance with the production struggle for carrying out the people's national economy plan, it will only turn out to be a speech rehearsal benefiting no one.

"The main points which each agitator has to strive to solve are: he has to see that all workers fully comply with existing rules and regulations, fulfill their duties, bring home to them the idea that all the factories now belong to them and to the State and, therefore, they are working for the good of themselves, as well as of the State.

"Therefore, it is the agitator's lot to strengthen the drive for increased production, to participate in each enterprise, each place of work, and with the various brigades. Close scrutiny must be made of the working conditions, the capacities of the plants before any productions pledges are resolved. Then, the individual worker, each brigade, is to make constant checking of the progress by criticizing and discussing each others efforts. Any and all deviations from this line of procedure must be stamped out."

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ORO-T-10 (EUSAK)

NK Propaganda Media

"Further, the agitators are required to be prompt in awarding model workers, thus heightening their social honor and offer incentive for stepped-up production. An agitator has to mingle with the masses in his everyday life so as to train new agitator-candidates.

"An agitator's work is an essential factor in politically insuring victorious fulfillment of various industrial assignments. Therefore, they must analyze the domestic situation and keep the workers informed. They must expose the desperate plots of the domestic reaction to provoke an internecine war in opposition to peaceful unification of the fatherland, analyze and explain to the workers the policies of the Republic.

"Further, they must consolidate the broad masses of people in a place of work around the Republican government and its premier, General Kim Il Song, and mobilize them in a struggle for rapid realization of the fatherland's peaceful unification and complete independence."

"How important is the work of agitators in contributing to over-fulfilling production plans is to be seen in the case of the Hungnam Fertilizer Plant where the workers set an example in exceeding their quotas. Here is what agitators in that plant did:

"In the democratic propaganda rooms of the club, and on the conspicuous spots from the entrance to the various sections of the plant, they set up bulletin boards for pictures of model workers along with brief notes on their experience in industrial struggle.

"Competition bulletin boards were installed to give timely reports on competitions for increased output in active progress, on which brigade is leading others, which ones are lagging behind schedules. This enables the masses (in the plant) to criticize in time about inferior products, absenteeism, all other phenomena disrupting industrial production.

"On the principles and along these lines, the agitators proceed with their work, giving it a new high level through thorough and feasible plans and fervent patriotism, thereby accomplishing their honorable task of helping over-fulfill the production plan for 1950."

NK AGITATION IN SOUTH KOREA

For some time prior to the outbreak of hostilities there had been reported an active communist cell-organization in South Korea. When the NK Forces entered the capital, as well as other towns in the south, a well organized network of communists was there to welcome them and help organize the new local government.

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(Conferences with the prosecution staff of the ROK National Court, with interrogators of the Intelligence Section of the National Police (ROK) and with approximately 40 picked civilian prisoners who had been condemned to long prison terms for their active long-time participation in the Communist Party, show that ever since 1948 there has been an active Party organization and communist agitation throughout South Korea.)

Prior to the outbreak of the war, no special anti-democratic agitation was apparent, partly because circumstances required an all-out effort to organize a Communist Party apparatus in ROK first, and because the first aim, in terms of attack, had to be the Rhee regime. Anti-US propaganda could only be expected as emphasis underlying the anti-Rhee platform. The second aim has to be the bringing about of an appreciation of Kim Il Song and the plans and ambitions of NK in order to reinforce the argument for a unification of the country.

After the outbreak of the war, and the occupation of certain areas of South Korea the main emphasis was for the agitator to infiltrate various segments of the civilian population spreading NK propaganda.

After the breakthrough of UN Forces and the liberation of South Korea from communist rule, communist agitation behind the lines not only remained, but became better organized and had its goals clearly delineated (as analyzed by the National Police Evaluation Section).

After the UN Forces entered Seoul after a street-to-street and house-to-house fight during which a large portion of the city was destroyed, stock and property damaged, and thousands of people killed, there was great bitterness among the population against the communists who had exploited them during the occupation and killed so many of them before their inglorious retreat. But, it is established beyond any doubt, that the retreating NK Forces left behind in the formerly occupied towns, a considerable number of agents who were assigned particular tasks but who were primarily held in readiness for future underground work.

While the South Korean revenge was taking place, during which probably more Koreans rightly or wrongly were killed than during the NK occupation, extensive underground propaganda activity was almost impossible. The only manifestation of the existence of enemy propaganda agitation during the first four weeks following the liberation of Seoul were attempts by obscure citizens to place the blame for all the destruction on the US who, under the pretext of liberating the capital actually destroyed it.

(Probably all such agitation amounted to nothing more than loose talk among the people, but even this was enough for the National and local police of the ROK, prosecute and often execute those who were found, even on hearsay and circumstantial evidence, to be spreaders of such "subversive talk.")

A communist directive, dealing with propaganda and agitation behind the lines, giving a clear picture of the planning along these lines by the NK war machine, was found in Seoul on 28 October 1950. It was reported captured in the home of Oh Min Song, purportedly an active member of long standing of the Korean Communist Party who, though not an official of the local communist-led city government of Seoul during the NK occupation, was recognized, on incontrovertible evidence, to be a major Party organizer. The ROK Joint Intelligence Staff in Seoul had possession of it.

The directive, written in form of a letter, called for the propaganda setup to carry out the following five activities.

1. To organize and revive communist cells within the city with meetings for four participating members only. Larger assemblies were forbidden. Enlistment was sought of neighbors, ROKA deserters, etc.
2. To set up channels through which arms, propaganda material, and other equipment could be smuggled to partisans in South Korea. Too, to organize a channel for funneling information to and from intelligence agents of the Peoples Republic.
3. To keep close check on the attitudes of the population within the precinct of the individual agitators, and to record all South Korean civilian cooperation with the US Forces.
4. To organize a distribution group for posters, leaflets and other propaganda data. To direct the writing and displaying of slogans and appeals in public places during at nighttime.
5. To direct the distribution of Soviet-made small arms for saboteurs and other underground workers.

NOTE: The influx of Soviet-manufactured weapons was begun in Seoul in November of 1950. During a police (ROK) raid on suspected communist agents in Seoul at which the writer was present, 30 to 56 arrested possessed Soviet-made pistols. The military tribunal sentenced each of the Soviet-pistol holders to death.

The directive under consideration further suggested methods of approaching and enlisting the sympathies of potential future adherents to the cause. This is generally accompanied by such detailed advice, as:

1. Don't speak openly in favor of the NK, but point out that they did not destroy citizens' homes, bomb their children or kill their cattle.

2. The NK did not pursue exploitation of South Koreans. There is little left in South Korea except corruption, so, how could the NK exploit poor South Korea? The common goal: unification of the country.

3. In your drive to set up cells look for Seoulians who either have lost all they own or have received no help from their government, or see those who are poor and have been rejected for a job by the US and now are hopeless in their sufferings.

4. Help sick neighbors. If they have sons fighting with the ROKA offer help to hide the sons when they desert. Remember that the voice of the mother or the father is the most powerful voice for the son to follow.

5. Utilize the war situation to invent or to help spread rumors tending to upset the people, frighten them, instill hate in them against Syngman Rhee and the US and bring about confusion.

This guidance letter contains, furthermore, many paragraphs giving professional advice to cell leaders in ROK-held South Korea. It is significant to note, however, that in no place did this directive give advice as to how to organize channels of communications from the individual organizers to their superiors, or even among themselves. According to ROK police and a statement by the Home Minister, Dr. Cho, the communists in Seoul had at all times open channels to NK despite the draconic measures taken against them by the national security organs.

Communist agitation behind the lines must be evaluated under two criteria, namely: agitation in recaptured South Korean territory, and agitation in UN-occupied NK territory such as Pyongyang, Wonsan, Nanamg, and others. In the first case, NK agitation during the time of ROK-UN tenure was almost imperceptible except for the appearance during the latter part, of weapons and possibly the spread of rumors and the organization of a very restricted number of political meetings. Within NK, however, communist agitation never ceased and was active in all its usual forms from the day of UN-ROK occupation to the time of the NK-Chinese recapture,

This propaganda was almost exclusively directed against the ROK occupation personnel and the native population rather than the UN (US-British) occupation personnel. Therefore, there are few reports bearing on agitation propaganda in NK in US military files. The bulk of this information can be found in the files of the ROK-CIC and in the cases of Pyongyang and Kaesong in the files of the local police organization, which, although under the jurisdiction of the ROK National Police, is a municipal organization and maintains its files apart from the center files that are kept in Seoul.

As the NK Forces made their comeback with the help of the Chinese Forces, agitation propaganda in all parts of Korea was perceptibly stepped up. Channels of communications were wide open, for, despite the lesson learned during the withdrawal of the UN (and ROK) Forces in June-July, 1950, it was still impossible to prevent the enemy from infiltrating into South Korea disguised as refugees.

NOTE: A brave attempt to prevent just this had been made with the erection of a refugee-screening camp in the city of Kaesong where all Koreans fleeing from the north were interned and allowed to proceed south only after clearance was given for them. This attempt had to be abandoned in a few days because the camp had only a capacity of 5,000, which was far less than the huge influx of refugees.

However, up to the time of the recapture of Seoul by the communists very little slogan pasting had been observed nor had there been an attempt at a "popular uprising" even after the bulk of the National Police had evacuated the town and most of the forces had left Seoul. The only evidence of communist agitation propaganda in Seoul, three days before its fall, was a quantity of posters prepared for wall placards, a large number of paper flags destined to fly when "liberation" came and, according to the police, a well organized but very small corps of communist cells which existed separately and had not yet been linked together to form an integrated Party apparatus.

Assessment of NK Agitation Propaganda. Communist agitation was confined to the Korean elements in the country. The anti-foreign elements drive in Korea was aimed to incite the local population against all UN Forces. Anti-US propaganda seems to have been spread mainly by leaflets and posters traceable directly to the enemy and not to his hidden forces within South Korea.

Whether this apparent inactivity of the underground agitation propaganda apparatus is a sign of failure cannot be said at this moment. However, it was established that the existence and the work of this apparatus, no matter how loosely organized, contributed

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in great measure to the early deterioration of the morale of the population in Seoul and other South Korean towns. This was due both to the many rumors that were masterfully spread and kept alive, and the implied threats which made the population so fearful that they either fled in panic or tried to think of ways and means of jumping on the communist bandwagon in order to be spared reprisals under a government of the Peoples Republic.

In the time available, the writer attempted to survey those persons (captured) who had become agitators for the NK Forces. Although 60 captured agitators were interviewed, no firm conclusions were made. These agitators belong to all kinds of social classes and professions. The only common denominator seemed to be that about 80 percent had graduated from a Korean middle school and, therefore, had had at least 10 years schooling.

The enemy's propaganda agitation was very effective in the sphere of guerilla and sabotage activities. No attempt will be made in this study to deal with the guerilla problem as such. But it should be said that the frequent incursions of guerilla bands into towns of "liberated" Korea are said to have driven home, quite convincingly, the nearness of the enemy and the feasibility of everyone being under constant surveillance as to his activities against the NK Forces.

The guerillas were used for the production and distribution of propaganda material. The police stations in Kaesong and Uijongbu reported that most of the villagers who had been visited by guerilla bands did not dare report such incursions to the ROK authorities for fear of reprisals. So far as sabotage is concerned, arson was the most frequent manifestation. A considerable number of returning South Korean functionaries have been assassinated and their houses (or those of their friends) set on fire.

It appears plausible to believe that the main reason for agitation propaganda, is to remind the population of the surveillance of NK sympathizers who have never given up their expectation of "liberating" South Korea and who will take due notice of those who are sabotaging the legitimate desire of the people for a peaceful unification of Korea.

This thesis is by the concensus of ROK officials and the findings not only of the police during the time of the ROK tenure of Seoul but also as a result of studies made on the subject by ostensibly qualified South Korean officials such as Oh Jai Do and Sun Woo Chong Won, both former prosecutors trained in intelligence methods who were actively engaged in planning ROK countermeasures.

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A statistical report on arrests (Appendix J) reveals that underground agitation in both violent and non-violent form has existed throughout South Korea at all times during the present conflict.

The actual effectiveness of such agitation is and will remain, questionable because there has never appeared a "popular uprising" or "spontaneous awakening" of the local population which, by precedent, is the desired and ideal result of skillfully and effectively conducted agitation propaganda.

At the time of "liberation" only a more or less well-organized communist cell apparatus appeared which, subsequent to the occupation, furnished the manpower for the more or less subordinate posts that have to be filled in the local administration. In almost all cases, the executive personnel of town and county and naturally Provincial government consisted of "imported" officials from NK.

PROPAGANDA BY WORD OF MOUTH (RUMORS)

Probably the most effective and flexible propaganda weapon of the enemy, closely related to agitation propaganda (not necessarily always a product thereof), is the enemy's word-of-mouth propaganda. A scientific evaluation of rumors and their effects on the South Koreans could be given only had it been possible to concentrate on such rumors, tracing them to their originator back through their long, devious path. Such work was, however, impossible due to the lack of time, suitable personnel and proper facilities. Nevertheless, within the limits of the time available, an attempt was made to evaluate the effectiveness of this propaganda weapon.

This type of enemy propaganda was studied in Seoul for two weeks at a time which is generally considered a critical period because it coincided with the first tangible effects of NK-Chinese advances, the capture of Pyongyang, the recapture of most of NK and the beginning of an acute threat to the security of Seoul itself.

Six undercover workers—three from the Joint Intelligence Staff, two from I&E Division of the ROK Ministry, and the writer's interpreter—were assigned to collect information about rumors circulating throughout Seoul. An attempt was made to tally the gist of such rumors with the propaganda lines of the enemy at the time and also with the UN propaganda line. Wherever possible an attempt was made to trace such rumors to their origin. Since this could not be done too satisfactorily, the reader is cautioned that a considerable portion of the interpretation of rumors given herein is based largely on conjecture. The findings are not conclusive

although prepared with the aid of competent analysts of the subject.

Basically the enemy used two main techniques in his propaganda by rumors: (1) the creation and dissemination of rumor among the target population, and (2) the exploiting of such rumors that have appeared among the target population but have not necessarily been planted by the enemy's propaganda machine.

A third possible method, i. e., rumors circulating among the target population, which are contrary to the enemy's interests, seems not to have been applied, largely because UN propaganda has not resorted to such methods of "grey psychological warfare" as is rumor-spreading. Nor did US propaganda try, to any major extent, to explode rumors obviously planted among the Koreans tending to bring panic among them and to poison them against their sympathies (if any) for the US and the effort of the UN to help South Korea to remain a sovereign state.

Any consideration of rumor as a medium of propaganda will depend entirely on the target's attitudes toward rumor and loose talk. In the case of Korea, and especially the South Koreans of 1950, conditions were such that almost any kind of rumor fell on highly fertile soil, and spread fast among the population. The degree of its credibility will be the higher, the lower the degree of credibility of local news becomes.

NOTE: And if there is almost no news-reporting to the domestic population at all, as was the case when the Chinese Forces had arrived at Parallel 38 and streams of refugees were passing through Seoul, it will be quite natural for the population to believe any kind of news that comes their way.

Thus, with the absence of information on developments from a domestic source, a higher credibility is bound to be received of rumors spreading through the news-hungry, unassured and (in the case of the Seoulians at the time of the investigation) fear-filled population. News was never totally absent in Seoul. Yet it was often formulated in such a way as to ignore questions which were most on the people's minds at that moment.

Another factor lending good auspices to rumors in Seoul is the fact that by the time the danger of a renewed occupation of Seoul became apparent or imminent, the credibility of the ROK news apparatus had been seriously impaired. Little confidence in the veracity of the South Korean government's reports on the situation could be found among the population of Seoul due to blunders committed on them prior to the capture and invasion of South Korean localities by the NK Forces in the summer of 1950. At that time

the Rhee government sounded false reports of assurance to the people; loudspeakers mounted on jeeps cruised through the streets of Seoul and assured the citizens that their government would keep them posted on future developments, regardless of whether they be good or bad, and that they would be told what to do when the critical time came. As it turned out, one morning the citizens of Seoul found their government gone and the enemy already in town.

This is the most common reproach voiced against the news machine of the ROK government by the people in the street, and this appears to be the most important reason for the non-acceptance of the ROK information on the situation given to the public. In view of this, the population of Seoul eagerly picked up any bits of information not given on the government bulletin boards and attempted to interpret them in comparison with the posted news bulletins in an often more pessimistic way than the actual events may have warranted.

The ROK officials again committed such a blunder in the handling of their information service. While most elements of the Eighth US Army were on the move southward, during the first week of December, 1950, the enemy forces were arriving or had already arrived at Parallel 38 and stood poised to push south. The Eighth Army then openly prepared for a withdrawal of its headquarters from Seoul to Taegu and, at this time the National Government of the Republic of Korea boastfully announced that it would organize a great stand for Seoul and that under no circumstances would Seoul fall as masses of heroic soldiers would defend the capital.

At the same time crates of office material were being moved out of the buildings housing parts of the ROK Ministry of Defense, the PX sold its stock, and an almost continuous stream of military vehicles moved through the city southward. High government officials and military personnel began to evacuate their dependents and masses of refugees from the north came to Seoul on their flight farther south—not to seek sanctuary in the city itself which they considered unsafe.

It is not surprising that under such circumstances the credibility of the ROK-PIO releases must have been seriously impaired and the desperate, fearful population not only absorbed all rumors that came their way but actively sought more information than was available in newspapers and on bulletin boards. Thus ground was prepared for the origination of rumors from within the population based partly on misrepresentation of the official news and wishful thinking.

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An example of this is the rumor that appeared 7 December 1950 to the effect that 250,000 Japanese troops had landed at Inchon and had been sent north to encounter the Chinese. Within 48 hours, a large portion of the population was convinced of the "truth" of this.

Two days later it was common knowledge in the Bang Chon area of Seoul (the commercial center) that the Japanese officers were billeted in the Il Shim Primary School. Suspecting that Siamese officers present in the area at that time may have been confounded with Japanese, the writer investigated personally and found that there had never been any billet for any troops in the Il Shim School. But of approximately 50 people asked by six investigators during the day, over 30 reported that the school was a Japanese billet; 9 reported having actually seen Japanese officers and two reported having seen Japanese troops. On 12 December it was rumored that the main body of the Japanese forces were actively engaged in a fight against Chinese troops in the area of Chongdan and Jaeju, north of Inchon. This particular rumor was, however, not especially exploited by the enemy propagandists.

An example of how the enemy exploited rumors from within, originating in South Korea and being primarily a symptom of the peoples' insecurity in view of the lack of news is given here.

A rumor about the possibility of the UN Forces pulling out of Korea altogether appeared in Seoul shortly after it had been known that British Prime Minister Clement Attlee had made a statement to the effect that the UK would seriously consider recalling its forces fighting in Korea if the US decided to use the atom bomb in the fighting. The nervousness among the population was further intensified by a report, which turned out to be false and was traced to an error of the PIO, ROKA and a war correspondent attached to this body, that the Chinese Forces had already crossed Parallel 38 and were well on their way toward Seoul on the morning of 8 December 1950. On the evening of the same day, the enemy radio presented the Attlee story in the most dramatic terms. Later, refugees who were interrogated as far as 12 kilometers north of Seoul told the interrogators that they had definite information of fleets of transports massed at the ports Pusan, Mokpo, Kunsan and Inchon, ready to evacuate the UN Forces from Korea. The Koreans will be left to themselves and when the atom bomb explodes, only Koreans would die. At the same time the enemy radio and even Radio Peiping the following morning affirmed that the communist forces had not crossed the parallel.

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Meanwhile, neither the ROK-PIO nor any US authorities in Seoul made any statements whatsoever as to the future plans of the UN Forces under pressure from the Chinese. For the Seoulians this was a case of "no confirmation, no denial," which meant that "no answer is also an answer" and thus served the enemy well.

This resulted in greater confusion in the minds of the Seoulians. It provoked definite resentment against the US and its feared atom bomb. Further, it gave some credence, however untrue, to the enemy's reiteration that the US Forces would leave the South Koreans in the lurch in the face of danger.

The confusion made an inroad on the local economy. On the morning of 10 December the Bang Chon market was one of many markets to reduce prices. A bottle of US vitamin pills which the previous day sold for 1,700 whan (4,000 whan is the equivalent of one US dollar) was reduced to 1,000 whan. One mal of rice, previously quoted at 5,500 whan, was cut to 4,500 whan. With it all the gold was reevaluated upward; one done (3.75 g) gold rose from 11,000 to 17,000 whan.

A single rumor was traced with certainty to the enemy. An arrested NK fifth columnist, posing as a refugee, confessed that he had been instructed to spread the news that the US Forces north of Kaesong had given an order to kill all ROKA personnel necessary to make room in the withdrawing vehicles for the US soldiers.

That rumors did find fertile ground in South Korea is evident. Naturally, the South Koreans were curious and this, coupled with their sad experiences during the NK occupation and their flight south, destruction of their homes, and the false information given them prior to the NK invasion, made them all the more susceptible to rumors circulated by the NK Forces. All this seems to have produced the desired effects for the workings of the NK propaganda machine.

PROPAGANDA THROUGH ACTION

Propaganda need not necessarily be waged with words and audio-visual media alone. Actions, if properly timed and representing the implementation of a previously enunciated principle, may serve as very effective propaganda.

NOTE: If, for example, the invasion of Pantelleria during World War II had little strategic importance, it had tremendous propaganda value due to the fact that the Allies had gained a foothold on the continent of Europe. Similarly, the US landings on Luzon, regardless of the success of the purely military operation involved, represented a remarkable piece of propaganda designed to strengthen the morale of the local population for the promise given by General MacArthur, "I shall return," had been kept.

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Propaganda actions are not a new instrument of propaganda: the Germans, the Italians and the Soviet communists have often resorted to it and in a sense, the US with such things as the Freedom Train, the Marshall Plan, governmental loans to other nations has practiced propaganda through action. All these actions on the part of the US have, in addition to their primary purpose, also brought good will towards the US.

So, also, in the course of the Korean war, the enemy resorted to actions which were designed to bring them a measure of goodwill. Actions by the NK which might be classed as propaganda can be fairly well summed up by: (1) pre-combat and combat propaganda actions; and (2) propaganda actions after occupation.

1. Pre-Combat and Combat Propaganda Actions. This type of propaganda warfare is an attempt primarily to show the target population the value and rightness of the ideals the NK Forces represent. Love of home and country were themes dramatically presented. Brutalities of the Syngman Rhee regime also received a fair share of publicity. Occasionally a wounded South Korean soldier was aided and returned home by the NK troops in an effort to show the home population the love the NK men and women hold for South Koreans.

Such actions of befriending wounded ROKA soldiers was generally followed by a deluge of leaflets telling of the humanitarian treatment accorded the ROK servicemen.

A variation of this type leaflet is the "father to son" message. One such leaflet was found in the Chunju area. In part, it read:

"We believed we would be killed when the Peoples Army came to our village, but the things we experienced were quite different from what we had expected. The Peoples Army is so kind, and they do not treat with discrimination the family members of the ROKA."

Similarly, the Chinese communists like the theme, "We do not go out and kill and annihilate; our fight is for justice to all." This is some of the dogma with which the Chinese tried to indoctrinate many captured GIs.

Generally, however, propaganda actions during combat are difficult to isolate because only the leaflets and radio broadcasts reach the target population which, due to its remoteness from front-line action, is unwilling to accept the propaganda messages.

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2. Propaganda Actions After Occupation. Once the enemy occupies a locality it can more convincingly stage actions which, although apparently directed for civic and humanitarian betterment, may be designed primarily for hidden propaganda purposes.

Nevertheless, many acts of good will were practiced. Sometimes the invaders offered free food to the overrun city—this was true in Seoul, Chungju, Uijongbu and Taejon. This is a standard communist practice in many instances of invasion in order to stress upon the people the thought that all will profit who work jointly for the reconstruction and development of the fatherland. Too, the NK Forces tendered military medical facilities for treatment of wounded civilians.

Orders were issued to the effect that the occupied town had to have open within "24 hours after liberation," all stores and schools—a Soviet practice of long-standing which is called a "back to normalcy drive."

Manpower was immediately drafted for all kinds of jobs. Special committees were set up, thus, factories, schools and governmental offices were functioning in quick time. With this action the communist slogan of "plenty of work for all" became an actuality.

A typical instance, of a propaganda action, stressing the concern for cultural matters was the re-establishment of the Seoul Symphony Orchestra within 48 hours after "liberation." Musicians were drafted, given special uniforms and set wages and organized into the Peoples National Symphony.

Token release of prisoners of war of the area tended to show that the war was over. However, few cases of returned ex-ROKA prisoners of war was noted throughout South Korea. Combined efforts of the ROKA and the PIO turned up only 14 returned ex-prisoners of war. The Political Police found only four.

In this vein, also, the NK invaders stage industrial and agricultural exhibitions, sports competitions, sanctuaries for orphans, political organizations for the youth, and public festivals for the populace as a whole.

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of such propaganda. Eye-witnesses who spent their time in the communist occupied parts of South Korea, felt that the majority of people exposed to this treatment accepted it rather passively and on the whole were uncooperative.

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Not a single poster was distributed by the NK propagandist workers show South Koreans "eagerly at work." Whether this is due to the lack of importance attached by the NK to this propaganda technique, or to South Korean non-cooperation, cannot be determined at this point.

It is reported that the communist sponsored public kitchens were not frequented by the local population who had relatively good supplies of food (as distinguished from the winter of 1950-1951). It has been established also that about 40 percent of all South Koreans imprisoned by the NK Forces during their occupation, were charged with sabotaging Red-sponsored work plans and with general absenteeism.

RESUME

The NK propaganda machine has employed in its campaigns directed at South Koreans, a variety of media for the dissemination of the many and varied propaganda themes used in the war. However, due to the social and cultural setup of the target population, and a valid presumption to the effect that the NK propagandists know much better than "foreign elements" what the most common tastes, preferences, likes and dislikes of the average South Koreans are; what the level of his cultural and intellectual sophistication is; and through what media he is most likely to be reached. The choice of the media for the dissemination of NK propaganda may be assumed to have been made with this most practical criterion in mind.

As a result, NK propaganda employed against the South Koreans (in all phases except consolidation propaganda) the generally accepted mass media (radio, press, and film) to a lesser extent than the US psychological warfare production is used to employ, and concentrate more on the media of agitation propaganda, rumor spreading, and poster-dropping.

This shows clearly that the NK propagandists are aware of the shortcomings of radio and the press for the mass consumption in South Korean areas (particularly rural areas) where the existence of listening facilities, in the case of radio, and the rate of illiteracy among the population, is such as to give those media that require such knowledge or the existence of technical facilities, a low rate of probability to ever become effective in affecting the largest amount possible of the target population.

Technically, the enemy could have used radio much more than he did; he could have dropped (or smuggled into South Korea) many more leaflets than he did; he could have dropped and smuggled

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ORO-T-10 (EUSAK)

NK Propaganda Media

propaganda films; and he could have given still greater emphasis to the circulation of daily newspapers and fliers. The fact that this has not been done seems to represent the result of the enemy's considered opinion to the effect that other media will be more effective and will spread the propaganda message quicker and among the largest possible masses of the target population.

The media of the enemy's consolidation propaganda most commonly and most frequently used on the South Koreans were at all times (and in this order of importance): (1) propaganda publications (books, magazines, newspapers); (2) loudspeakers; (3) propaganda actions; (4) posters, placards, banners, etc.; and (5) radio.

The enemy has resorted to grey and black propaganda and, as could be observed from the behavior of the population in South Korean localities threatened by a new invasion, with considerable success. The reason for the effectiveness of such propaganda lies primarily in the fact that the enemy's well-organized and well-functioning underground (organizational and intelligence) apparatus and his utilization of the mistakes and shortcomings of the ROK administration and ROKA-PIO (as well as the lack of any propaganda to the South Koreans by the US elements in Korea) in its favor, in close connection with the events. The enemy has constantly exploited the play of fantasy of the frightened local population, and through threats, intimidation, agitation, has directed them from one desired state of mind to another.

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Figure 69. This front cover from the April (1950) NK magazine "Arrow," is merely a sample of the typical anti-US cartoons to be found therein.

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조선 민주주의 인민공화국
내각수상 김일성 장군



ORO 11-70-71 APR 51

Иосиф Виссарионович СТАЛИН

Figure 70. One of many posters found in the Korea displaying the portrait of Kim Il Song, NK Premier.

Figure 71. This and other Stalin posters were found in abundance throughout NK. A stock of these posters was captured in Seoul (September of 1950) when the UN Forces liberated that City.

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조선민주주의 인민공화국 군사위원회 위원장 김일성 조선인민군 최고사령관이자 조선인민군 최고사령관



... (The text in this block is extremely faint and largely illegible, appearing to be a transcription of a speech or message.) ...

ORO 11-12 APR 51

... (Small vertical text, possibly a reference or classification code.) ...

Figure 72. A poster featuring Kim Il Song and giving text of the dictator's message to the people 9 July 1950.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



ORO 11-73 APR 51

Figure 73. One of a series of posters used in both Koreas to incite the people to "enthusiasm for the NK cause."

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



ORO 11-74 APR 51
조선의 권력 조선인민은 미제를 구축할데 대한 조국통일 민주주의권선 호소문에

Figure 74. The caption: "The entire people in North and South Korea have signed the appeal of the Democratic Front for Fatherland Unification calling for the expulsion of the US imperialists."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ORO 11-75 APR 51
 후방에서는 수천수만의 청년들이 의용군에 참가하며 귀신으로 나가고있다

Figure 75. At left is a poster (NK) calling for volunteers for service in the Armed Forces of their country. Below is a cartoon (for handbills and newspapers). The caption: "In the rear, tens of thousands of youths are volunteering for service at the front."

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**전체조선인민군과 해군들은 미국간섭자들의 군대와
리승만괴뢰군 패잔부대들을 종국적으로 격멸소탕하고
1950년 8월을 우리조국강토의 완전한 해방을 위한
달로 되게하라 ! (김 일 성)**

Figure 76. This handbill, signed by Kim Il Song, was found in the 34th RTC area and in the Seoul vicinity. It reads: "I call upon the Korean Peoples Army and the Naval Forces to rout completely the troops of the US invaders and the remaining units of the Syngman Rhee puppet army—thus making August of 1950 a month for the completed liberation of our Fatherland."



**СЛАВА ВЕЛИКОМУ КИТАЙСКОМУ НАРОДУ,
ЗАВОЕВАВШЕМУ СВОБОДУ, НЕЗАВИСИМОСТЬ И СЧАСТЬЕ!**

ORO 11-76-77 APR 51

Figure 77. This Soviet-produced poster to the Peoples of China was displayed primarily in NK, however, copies of it were found in Ujongbu. The caption hails the "Great Chinese Nation" that fought for freedom and independence.




Figure 78. This NK cartoon attempts to show how the US-South Korean domination of the Republic of Korea has crumbled. The "falling fragments" represent: (1) Liberation of Mokpo; (2) Yosu; (3) Liberation of Taejon; (4) Taeju; (5) Pusan; and (6) Gen Douglas MacArthur.



ORO 11-78-79 APR 51

Figure 79. This cartoon is taken from a newspaper (NK) which was distributed to students of middle schools and the University of Seoul. The caption: "Korean Peoples' Democratic Republic."

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쏘련만화

미국정부는 국민당회파정부들 가일층원호 하기로 결정하였다



내작신이 심어 놓은 나무에 내작신이 물을 부어야지
ORO 11-80 APR 51 15

Figure 80. Purportedly from the Soviet press, this NK cartoon attempts to show the US attitude toward South Korea. It reiterates the "Rhee regime is a puppet government," theme. The caption: "I planted this tree, so I have to water it now."

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Figure 81. This NK wall banner reads: "Long live the Peoples' Committees, agencies of a truly popular regime."



ORO 11-81-82 APR 51

Figure 82. This poster appeals to the people to: "Devote all your forces to aiding the glorious Peoples Army and the Homefront."

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

적들의 폭격으로부터 자기를 엄호 할줄알며 군수기재를 엄호할줄알라!



Figure 83. This affiche (top) advises the people to take the necessary precautions, in view of the enemy bombings, to safeguard the (NK) military equipment. Such appeals are usually accompanied by the "Heroes of the Republic" insignia (bottom).

1
함창이 완전히 해방되었습니다!

2
미공전 15개사단과 전투대들과
미해방군들이 헤아려지지 않아요!

3
행군 외출시간에
전사 박용식

4
완전한 해방을 위하여 8월 12일
1950년 8월 12일은 민족강국의
완전한 해방을 위하여 8월 12일

ORO 11-83-84 APR 51

1

2

3

4

5

Figure 84. This series of handbills was found by the advancing UN troops in liberated parts of South Korea. The translations: (1) On the first, Hamch'ang completely liberated; (2) The defense lines of the US 25th Division were defeated units and the US Marine units were broken through; (3) During breaks between Marches, Pak Yong Sik; (4) Let August of 1950 be the month for the complete liberation of our territory; (5) On 12th, Hyonp'ung liberated completely.

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가축증식은

건초증산으로부터!

Figure 85. The NK poster-message at left reads: "Let's increase the cattle by increased hay production."




Figure 86. Below is a Soviet appeal to collective farm workers and veterinarians to increase animal husbandry in order to obtain more heads of cattle for the good of society. (Note the similarity of subject matter treatment in these two "peoples' messages.")

КОЛХОЗНИКИ И КОЛХОЗНИЦЫ, РАБОЧИЕ И РАБОТНИЦЫ СОВХОЗОВ,
ЗООТЕХНИКИ И ВЕТЕРИНАРНЫЕ РАБОТНИКИ!
ВСЕМЕРНО РАЗВИВАЙТЕ ОБЩЕСТВЕННОЕ ЖИВОТНОВОДСТВО,
УВЕЛИЧИВАЙТЕ РОСТ ПОГОЛОВЬЯ СКОТА
ПРИ ОДНОВРЕМЕННОМ ПОВЫШЕНИИ ПРОДУКТИВНОСТИ ЖИВОТНОВОДСТВА!

(Из Призывов ЦК ВКП(б) к 1 мая 1949 г.)
ORO 11-85-86 APR 51



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ORO II-87 APR 51

Figure 87. A close-up view of a UNCURK bulletin board (upper picture) which provided up-to-the-minute news for passersby in the streets of Seoul (see lower picture). These photographs were taken prior to the NK invasion of that city.

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배반백중맹사격 울 퍼붓는 인민군 조격수들



개성시로 계속 진주하는 무척 인민군 대원사들

폐주하는 적에게 승선 시에도
중지 않고 쳐주하는 인민군 용사들



저도지가 큰 점령하고 만세를 부르는
이민군 용사들


ORO 11-38 APR 51



적진을 육박하여 돌격하는 보병부대들



Figure 88. A typical photographic propaganda tableaux edited in the form of a pictorial news bulletin. The pictures and captions are paste-up presentations. One picture here (bottom center) shows a UN soldier during battle.



우리의 영웅한 인민유격대에의하여전부된
덕군용 열차



저를 섬멸하며 전진하는 종기관출부대의
행군



덕을 함하여 맹사격하는 인민군 종기관출사수들



저의로제가 불폭파하러시러를 준비하는 인민군
총사들



우군과 열락을 마주기위하여 결사적으로 자임
하는 공화국 동산병용사



결렬한 전투후에 온 후사의 의환군대
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Figure 89. This paste-up presentation in the form of a news bulletin devoted entire make-up to "heroic fighters of the Peoples Army."

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


Figure 90. This MacArthur caricature series originated in the editorial offices of the NK Propaganda Ministry, however, it is not established whether the cartoon was published. The heading (note editorial changes) reads: "At every step the stupid MacArthur is thwarted." The captions: (1) Proclamation of MacArthur; and (2) MacArthur yelling for help.





Figure 91. This cartoon (used in newspapers and as poster material) depicts the "big guns" of the Peoples Army driving the US Forces out of Pusan.

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우리 공화국의 맹렬한 항공부대는 적들의 귀퉁이까지의 군사물자를 폭격하여 파괴하고 있다.
적의 후방에서 동태안에서 시해안에서 우리 항공기들은 공중의 적매물을 장악하고 있다.



적의 수송로를 파괴하여 적의 군사물자를 진척시켜서 강변
ORO II-92 APR 51



적 후방에서 활약하는 빨치산들은 적의 관보부를 공격하며 군사물 창고와 수송로를
몰 파괴하여 적들의 차관물자를 파탄시키며 우리 인민군대의 진격을 보장하여 주고 있다.

Figure 92. These NK drawings show the fruits of the combined sabotage-frontline efforts. In general, the captions (top): "...our eagles of the sky are wreaking havoc on the enemy;" (lower left) "Partisans to the rear of the enemy's lines are securing the NK advances;" (lower right) "...enemy supplies are being destroyed completely."

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인민군대의 진격에 호응할기한 농민들은 적의 후방에서 농들의 보급로를 차단하고 그들의 창고를 불사르는데 영웅한 투쟁을 하고있다

Figure 93. A cartoon from a (NK) newspaper. The caption: "Doomed by the advance of the Peoples Army the people in the enemy's rear are cutting supply lines and destroying enemy warehouses. Heroic campaign is underway to destroy the enemy."



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위대한 사회주의국가 소련을 위수로해서 강대한 중화인민공화국을 비롯한 인민 민주주의 제 국가 인민들과 평화를 애호하는 칸 세계 인민들은 조국의 통일과 독립을 위한 우리의 투쟁을 열렬히 성원하고있다

Figure 94. A cartoon attempting to show the sympathy of the "peace-loving nations" for the NK cause. The caption: "Headed by the Soviet Union...peoples from the peoples' democracy as well as the people of the Chinese Peoples Republic...are extending their encouragement and support to the Korean people in the war for unification and independence of the fatherland."

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PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF TECHNIQUES AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NORTH KOREAN PROPAGANDA

NOTE: The following assessment deals with NK propaganda only—not Chinese—as directed at the various South Korean groups between July (1950) and January (1951).

Choice and Utilization of Themes. The NK propaganda machine employed a variety of themes carrying a strong nationalistic appeal with topics capable of striking close to the hearts of the majority of the South Koreans, regardless of their political creed. The "unification of the fatherland," the resulting equal status with other nations, freedom from exploitation by foreign elements, abolition of poverty at home and promises of everlasting peace and progress—all of these themes served well the NK propagandists in their appeals to the bulk of the population.

In the general approach to his various South Korean target groups, the enemy seems to have emphasized definitely the sentimental over the rational line of argumentation. The NK propagandists have largely refrained from drawn out political-theoretical discussions that so often permeate communist propaganda in, and to other world areas, and have seemingly concentrated on topics that are not only plausible but may be also of practical interest or consequences to a large segment of the target population; or preferably, that may bring the various groups propagandized into a desired emotional state. Thus, in preference to arguing the NK cause on a political plane, enemy propaganda tends to emphasize the material benefits resulting from adherence to the communist principles that have formed Kim Il Song's state and attempts to use them as morale and sympathy building instruments favorable to the communists.

In the emotional approach, especially to elements of the ROKA, paternal or filial love and a variety of appeals, purportedly resulting from these tender sentiments, are given full play.

The NK propaganda plays heaviest on the emotions of its South Korean target groups. Observers agree that the emotional approach is the widest used in the enemy's propaganda argumentation. It falls into several classes, depending on the reactions sought to be obtained.

Thus the "patriotic" sentimental line, employed in NK propaganda to military and civilian groups alike, dramatically emphasizes and condemns the fratricide of the Korean people which is represented as but a sad and unnecessary consequence of foreign designs on Korea; good sons and daughters of Korea are mourned as dying at the hands of each other; the result will not benefit Korea; it will destroy Koreans; it is just the implementation of the age-old maxim of divide and conquer applied by the US imperialists.

The communists utilize frequently, and with emphasis, a sensational approach in their propaganda. Into this category falls the continuous play of atrocities and other crimes purportedly perpetrated by the ROKA-UN Forces, both military and police. The communists blame a system of professional denunciators (on the side of the Rhee regime) as the cause of thousands of deaths of "innocent and peace-loving sons of the fatherland" who were executed. This approach is clearly discernible in the many appeals by parents to their sons with the ROKA to "desert and return home."

At the same time the communists had an effective way of using threats, both open and concealed, to either underline the force of their current propaganda arguments or to affect those persons not already swayed by the force of the standard propaganda themes alone. This method gains in importance if it is remembered that such threats were directed to, and often fell upon the ears of, a more or less acutely panicky population that had relatively little guidance from its own government during the crisis. The threats could, therefore, perform a triple function: they could induce those to listen who normally would not listen; they could actively contribute to a general demoralization; and they could contribute to preventing South Koreans from collaboration with the Rhee elements of the UN Forces. This seems likely because during all phases of the war, there was manifest the physical existence of communist agitators in South Korea that the ROK authorities never succeeded in eliminating.

It is therefore safe to assume that, in view of the presence of communist elements in a locality and the uncertainty of the outcome of the war, the population remained apprehensive as to its own position. Thus, threats and ultimata at such times must be considered a propaganda element of very considerable importance.

Finally, the NK waged a full-fledged covert propaganda war. This was never effectively countered by the UN propaganda machine. Up to the fall of Seoul (January of 1951) only overt psychological warfare was conducted against the NK target groups both by the UN military and the Voice of America. Thus, the enemy could combat one type of propaganda by the UN elements with two kinds of propaganda of his own.

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Gray or black propaganda contains elements which are prima facie capable of affecting the target much more quickly in terms of traumatic shock than overt propaganda. This does not imply that the target will always and necessarily react in the desired manner more quickly as a result of the impact of covert psychological warfare. Yet, it seems established that, in terms of mental shock, black propaganda can act more quickly than does white propaganda, and will bring out fear, panic, or terror, which effects are extremely hard to achieve through white propagandists only.

Thus, if the impact (however crude) of the NK propaganda upon the South Koreans was intended to create fear and, in turn, demoralization, black propaganda has a definite advantage. And, the UN propaganda machine does not appear to have been in position to counter effectively such propaganda.

The form in which the enemy propaganda themes are expressed, whether for civilian or military consumption, show definite traces of the communist "realist" line of thought expression. The customary spoken language of the people is duplicated as closely and as often as possible in both radio and written propaganda messages. As in most countries of the world, the average vocabulary of everyday language in Korea is limited and often employs, especially in the language of the lower social strata, rather vulgar or crude expressions. Strong, though not necessarily profane language is, however, definitely popular among the masses. By using such language, the communists create the impression of speaking the "peoples language."

NOTE: The Nazis thoroughly exploited this approach. Goebbels, in particular, gained much popularity through his repeated (ofttimes vulgar) outbursts cleverly spaced throughout his major speeches.

Plain, and often trite terminology is frequently used. Repetition is constantly resorted to. The slogans and patriotic exhortations are largely stereotyped and so are the many undocumented statements about UN-ROK reverses or NK achievements played constantly by the NK propaganda machine.

By contrast to the rather polished radio appeal and posters employed by Nazi Germany during World War II, the general tone of the NK propaganda is that of a highly charged emotional message filled with accusations and insults.

Insofar as presentation is concerned, the various leaflets and other printed matter of the enemy propaganda machine are at best, crude by US standards.

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ORO-T-10 (EUSAK)

Assessment of NK Propaganda

It is significant to note that the NKs had established channels for the voicing of their propaganda to South Koreans already long before the present conflict broke out in full force. NK elements maintained an elaborate, well-organized and intensively active propaganda setup throughout the Republic of Korea; they had trained agents conducting propaganda activities and preparing facilities for the best possible dissemination of communist propaganda in South Korea; they conducted a very intensive anti-Rhee propaganda campaign for at least one and one-half years preceding the outbreak of the war. Thus, in June of 1950, the war found an already established, organized and more or less smoothly functioning NK propaganda machine.

As a rule, enemy argumentation in propaganda is not conducted on a high intellectual plane. This approach by the NK propagandists tended to counteract greatly the abstract and often muddled ROK propaganda argumentation to its military groups and civilians.

Enemy propaganda had, especially during the initial phases of the war, a potential advantage over that of the South Korean government. The credibility of the ROK appeals and information programs was largely impaired almost from the beginning, because they lacked the information the people sought.

As a consequence of the bad timing of the information of the ROK propaganda system, many lives and much personal property were lost in the wild stampede out of Seoul in June of 1950. What little esteem the people heretofore had for their government's propaganda was all the more lessened. This reproach was voiced almost universally by those in Seoul who had the courage to make the critical statements against the Rhee regime.

During the second evacuation of that capital city (December of 1950) the Korean government, knowingly or otherwise, released an avalanche of conflicting news, communiques, appeals, and orders. During this time, however, the PIO apparatus withheld from both the military and the civilians news of the withdrawals of the UN Forces in the north. On the other hand it was common knowledge in Seoul that the 2nd ROKA Division had been practically annihilated north of Parallel 38.

Even after thousands of refugees had fled into Seoul in face of the onrushing NK Forces in the north, the ROK-PIO office still maintained that all was well. On 11-12 December 1950, shortly before the EUSAK (8th US Army) departed Seoul for Taegu, the Chinese Forces were massed along Parallel 38 and reports began to filter into the Capital that Kaesong was about to fall to the invaders. Too, this was followed by dispatches that armed guerillas were about to descend on the city.

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At this time it was obvious to the population that the ROK government was about to leave the city. The PX was selling its stock and the US Embassy moved parts of its archives out of Seoul. But the ROK authorities decreed, in the face of all this, that no Seoulians would be allowed to leave. The decree did not reach many ears, however, as many had thronged the roadways out of the doomed city.

Thus it happened that those refugees who had fled, arrived at the banks of the Han River and were confronted with a harmonica barbed wire barricade. Traffic was slowed until it took several hours to make the four-mile trip from Seoul to Yongdungp'o. Meanwhile, the population of Seoul (those who remained) became panicky. After approximately 36 hours the ROK authorities allowed the refugees to proceed south except all men under 40 years of age who would remain for conscription to defend the city.

But at the same time the evacuation of the families of ROKA officers had been almost completed. Between 11-14 December 1950, the ROK government issued a series of contradictory orders regarding the problems of refugees that showed unmistakable signs of acute administrative confusion. Yet to the people, in their fear and uncertainty, only pep-talks and much inconsequential news from the front was given. It follows the population would be, under such circumstances, at least partially receptive to anything the enemy's propaganda machine might tell them about general development at a time when this topic was of prime interest to all concerned and they were getting so little from their own government.

It should be noted that the enemy's propaganda so far as his news broadcasts were concerned, preserved his matter-of-fact, down-to-earth approach in the rather crude, simple and pugnacious language he customarily used. Although the enemy often indulged in vain statements as to his aims and achievements, he gave consistently more or less correct information on his progress at the front. Very few instances of promises to have Korea liberated by a certain date, or predictions as to future developments can be discovered. Information about successes achieved, such as the capture of certain important localities by advancing Red columns, has been given in a rather terse curt style, as can be seen in Figure 87 small "news-flysheets" and monitoring reports of NK news broadcasts. The enemy did tend, however, to indulge, almost to a point of ridiculousness, in the use of honorifics and glorifications when speaking about the Peoples Army. He also overemphasized the degree and seriousness of the UN Forces' reverses, but this is characteristic of all propaganda during the past 20 years.

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ORO-T-10 (EUSAK)

Assessment of NK Propaganda

On occasion the enemy has admitted that he was retreating. After EUSAK advance elements had pushed the NK Forces north of Sinanju, a leaflet dropped in the vicinity of Kunu-Ri said in part:

"Withdrawal of the Peoples Army is only for the temporary. The troops of the Peoples Army you so love, will soon rescue you from the diabolical hands of the enemy."

While this is standard procedure and is usually not taken too seriously or believed with any degree of conviction, the enemy, as this is being written, has made good on his promise: He had returned, and he had "liberated" Seoul and other South Korean localities. This tends, of course, to increase the credibility of his propaganda and decrease the credibility of the South Korean propaganda to its own peoples.

As this report is being written a shift of emphasis in the employment of propaganda themes is noticeable. The cruel treatment which the retreating communist forces had accorded the civilian population of occupied South Korea produced a fanatical wave of hatred on the part of South Koreans (ROKA men and civilians alike) as well as a great lust for vengeance on the part of the majority of the population. Now, the NK propagandists are attempting to make these people believe that they can thank their allies (the UN Forces) for this misery. The anti-US theme, laying the blame for the wholesale destruction of South Korean localities squarely on the heads of the US Forces, has received new emphasis with the populace being asked to stop the US participation in this war to save innocent lives. It should be remembered, however, that the memory of NK brutality is equally a means of persuasion to the South Korean who may consider subversive activities in the form of collaboration with the ROK-UN Forces and may serve to encourage him to cooperate rather with the NK if he wishes to insure his own survival. This memory of NK brutality directed against "enemies of the People" may well make adherents to the communist cause of many who are basically unsympathetic toward it and unwilling to accept the communist arguments and live by them.

The enemy clearly pursued two main goals in his propaganda: To bring about dissatisfaction, disloyalty, hatred, and distrust, vis-a-vis the Rhee regime, and preferably to rise or otherwise help to bring Rhee to fall; and to antagonize and poison his South Korean target audience against the US Forces in the Country, with a view to bring about acts of nuisance and sabotage against the US Forces on the part of the South Koreans.

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The latter aim is of special importance in any consideration of NK propaganda. For, here is the case of the enemy propagandizing allies of US troops against the US. Any success of such anti-US propaganda directed to South Koreans could present itself in the form of more or less important, but always highly disquieting acts directed against the UN elements in Korea. Of these, and has been stated before, any propaganda is focused primarily against the US elements. The significance of the fact that the enemy propaganda machine has never attacked through other non-US components of the UN Forces in Korea (such as the French, Turkish or Greek battalions) and that the leaflets and posters were only in English, in addition to Korean, drives home quite clearly the attitude of the communists to the effect that "UN Forces" actually means "US Forces," a theme that has been played over and over again by the NKs.

Several other anti-US themes have been constantly directed to the South Korean target groups. These themes have been discussed in other parts of this report; however, they are noted here once more because they are characteristic of the communist propaganda strategy in Korea (and elsewhere in the world) which attempts to turn the primary target population against its own allies. This may have serious implications in other world areas where conflagrations may erupt.

The anti-US themes which are considered most serious because they may easily be understandable and palatable to the local population, are: (1) the "UN equals the US" theme; (2) the theme playing heartless exploitation of South Korea and South Koreans by greed and merciless imperialists who have no concern about preserving happiness and Korean human lives; (3) the theme to the effect that the US Forces let the ROKA personnel do all the "dirty work" i. e. difficult fighting, while they sit back and reap the fruits that have been obtained by the blood of South Korean patriots; (4) the US has designs to colonize the South Koreans and to deprive the Koreans of their independence; (5) the US does not intend to sacrifice more than a certain limited quantity of personnel and material in the defense of Korea. They will do what they did to Chiang Kai Shek—that is when the time comes and communist pressure will mount, they will desert the South Koreans and leave them in the lurch.

CHOICE OF MEDIA

The enemy in his propaganda warfare has employed a variety of media to disseminate his various and often the very same themes. Certain themes were preferentially used over a given medium. There are instances where one medium was consistently chosen,

where several others would appear to be equally effective. Why this is so is impossible to determine at this time.

The study of the enemy's propaganda output with relation to the media used seems to indicate that the enemy has given definite thought in his propaganda planning to the choice of media that would be best for the dissemination of a given propaganda "line" or theme. Two distinct criteria in the choice of media become apparent.

1. Suitability of the medium to reach the bulk of the target most effectively (e. g., the decision to diffuse a propaganda theme over the radio governed by the number of receiving sets in working condition and the capabilities or incapacities of the target audience to listen to enemy broadcasts).

2. Suitability of the theme for a particular medium (e. g., atrocity stories are more convincing and thus more effective on posters than on the radio).

The media least acceptable to the majority of a South Korean target group are least employed. This supports the existing evidence to the effect that the NK propagandists maintain a well-organized intelligence machine throughout the territory of South Korea with a view to establishing and maintaining the best possible markets for its outputs. The NK undercover apparatus was trained and directed to selected prospective areas where facilities, such as radio receiving sets, printing plants, etc., existed; they were assigned to maintain a close watch on these areas and to inform the communists of the availability of receiving facilities for enemy propaganda during the various stages of the war and especially after a given locality had suffered destruction. Thus, the enemy could count, in most instances, on workers in South Korean territory; as a result of their work it was possible to predict more or less accurately what the situation was in terms of dissemination and receiving facilities in a given area.

The undercover workers of the NK propaganda machine (special agents as well as guerillas, saboteurs, and cell organizers) conducted at all times what might well be termed "psychological intelligence" activities in addition to standard intelligence work. Enemy documents captured by ROK authorities show that a system was set up to relay to the NK Ministry of Culture and Propaganda, on a continuous basis, general and special information about attitudes of certain groups in given areas of the Republic of Korea and about any such elements as might be of importance for sound propaganda planning. It has been established, for example, that there was a continuous flow of information into NK about such matters as reading habits of the local population, editorial policies of local South Korean

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ORO-T-10 (EUSAK)

Assessment of NK Propaganda

newspapers, conversations overheard in tea houses, and activities of local teachers, in the various communities where the schools had been closed as a result of the war.

Visual means of propaganda, such as books, posters, pamphlets, leaflets, handbills and tableaux, were employed in great quantities throughout the war. While literary output was used most profusely in the course of the enemy's consolidation propaganda, all propaganda messages graphically presented were an important supplement to NK covert propaganda in South Korea. Thus, most of the enemy leaflets were distributed more or less clandestinely rather than air-dropped; posters went up under the cover of darkness and the population of South Korean localities found them in the morning without knowing who exactly had affixed them; the same is still more true of handbills, clandestine newspapers and other such products.

The elements of uncertainty, fear, and doubt existing among the population of South Korean communities, constituted a natural weapon for NK propaganda; communist agitators and other underground workers made the best of it and utilized it with great skill. Also the widespread superstitiousness of the local population was exploited considerably by the enemy.

The NK propaganda machine used its force behind the ROK lines not only for the dissemination of NK propaganda, but also for the production of propaganda material. Proof of this are the hand-written leaflets distributed by the communist underground in certain ROK areas, and the various types of posters, widely employed by the communists.

Finally, the NK agitators and other underground workers were the primary instruments for spreading rumors (distorted or otherwise), frontline reports and other news, and were thus instrumental in creating or maintaining fear and panic among their target groups.

NK psychological warfare to the military has been observed to employ generally fewer media for the dissemination of a more limited number of themes. Yet, propaganda to both civilians and soldiers employs to a large extent, visual media of propaganda. But, while enemy psychological warfare tends to concentrate primarily on cartoons of a serious or amusing nature and comic books for the enjoyment and enlightenment of the soldier, their propaganda to the civilian population seems to employ to a greater extent, posters, placards, photographic tableaux, banners, and vast quantities of propaganda literature, ranging from children's song and story books to technical manuals and translation of the political writings of Lenin, or horror stories told on the radio and, wherever possible, "documented" by film.

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Both types of propaganda use symbols and slogans profusely. A comparison of these shows that NK psychological warfare (directed at the soldier) places greater emphasis on slogans exhorting its military target to a fight against their "true enemy;" to "desert and come over to the side of the people;" and to remember that this is a fratricidal war. It points out that a good Korean should stop shooting at the chests of his fathers and brothers. This contention is borne out amply in the most casual glance over the documentary material featured in this paper; whereas similar appeals directed to the civilian population (which is largely unarmed) primarily seem to call mainly for assistance to guerillas and other NK elements; implying that it is understood that it may be hard for a South Korean civilian to actually take up arms and actively fight.

Propaganda directed to the population in general—the civilian element mainly—seems to place much greater emphasis on slogans and symbols extolling the theme of the unification of the fatherland and on the popular support of the NK "patriotic" cause. Figure 95 illustrates this point. Of course, more than ever, slogans and symbolic talk are used in the radio as well as in the newsprint (including propaganda literature) driving home this very point.

Propaganda directed primarily at the civilian population emphasizes, in a down-to-earth manner and more extensively than in the output directed to the ROKA soldier, the moral and material support extended to the Peoples Republic in its fight for the high ideals of other "great democratic nations of the world." (From a Kim Il Song speech quoted by Radio Peiping on 2 November 1950.) This is a very important theme of NK propaganda and has been implemented by repeated quotations from radio, press, and posters of the Chinese, Soviet, and of other satellite nations.

Finally, NK propaganda does not seem to copy, as much as it could, the tactics of the Soviet propaganda machine. This is probably partly because facilities for both the transmission and the reception are not as readily and generally available as in other parts of the world, and certainly because there is no apparent spot, in this particular conflict, for arguments of communist theory, a standard method of Soviet propaganda. As a matter of fact, communism as an ideology, has been largely left out of the propaganda argumentation by NK; their professed goal is that of the unification of the country, obviously a patriotic and nationalistic ideal. Theirs is a fight against the "corrupt clique of Syngman Rhee" and the machinations of "US imperialism" in the fatherland. Not once, during the first six months of the war, in which many changes occurred, does the element of communism as ideology appear, overtly and covertly, as the major factor of the war.

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Figure 95. The anti-US theme is featured here. The translation: "Away with US imperialists, encroaching upon the freedom and independence of our fatherland, from our shores."



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Figure 96. Much publicity is accorded the (NK) Peoples' Court activities. Here a milling crowd looks on while the Court decides the fate of South Korean "traitors" whose crimes were "working for or with the notorious Rheeites or the UN Forces."

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MESSAGE TO UN FORCES

DEAR AMERICANS
DEAR SOLDIERS OF THE FREE NATIONS!

WE HAD NOT ENOUGH TIME DESTINED TO HAVE
CLOSE RELATIONS WITH YOU. THOUGH WE WOULD NEVER
HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF CONTACTS WITH YOU WERE
THROUGH BOOKS OF HISTORY SEVERAL AGES AGO YOUR FATHERS
CAME IN BIG SHIPS TO MEET OUR EMPERORS. HOWEVER, THIS
WAS CHIEFLY FOR COMMERCIAL TRADING.

BUT, THANK GOD, KOREA IS NO LONGER ISOLATED FROM THE
WORLD. IN THE YEAR 1948, SHE MADE HER OWN CONTRIBUTION


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Figure 97. This "Message to UN Forces," was affixed to a UNCURK bulletin board and belies any dissension among the ROK government and the UN Forces as often propagandized by the NK elements.

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INTENSITIES OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA PLAY

Figure 98.



- | ZONE I
COMBAT | ZONE II
COMBAT | ZONE III
REAR |
|---|---|--|
| 1. TERROR
Sabotage
Agitation for active resistance
Rumor
Underground activities
2. POSTERS AND/OR LOUDSPEAKERS
3. LEAFLETS
4. UPRISINGS
5. MASS MEDIA | 1. AGITATION LEADING TO
CONFUSION + PASSIVE RESISTANCE
2. GUERILLA ACTIVITY (harassment)
3. DESERTIONS
4. MASS MEDIA
5. ACCOUNTS BY REFUGEES | 1. PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS - POSTERS
2. MASS MEDIA
3. ORGANIZATION OF PARTY
APPARATUS |

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Of course, communism is always implied, for the NK form of government is presented and pressed as the cure-all for the ailment of South Korea. Content-wise, however, NK propaganda strictly follows the line of the first two elements of the former Nazi slogan "Ein Reich, ein Volk, ein Fuehrer." The third component, the "Fuehrer," is implied and, with him, the ideology he stands for. Yet, communism as an ideology does not make its overt appearance in the propaganda play.

In brief, a few salient observations regarding enemy propaganda media and their uses are indicated. Few heart-to-heart appeals to the South Koreans (such as exhortations for them to rise and overthrow their government or sabotage the US) has been made over the radio. This medium has been used primarily for the dissemination of news, speeches by leaders such as Kim Il Song, propaganda broadcasts directed to the non-Korean elements of the UN Forces, cultural programs for home consumption and possibly for rebroadcasting of propaganda programs from the USSR and China.

The NK propagandists, however, used radio to a great extent in their consolidation propaganda effort, as they relayed many of their programs over loudspeaker systems installed in the streets, whereby it becomes immaterial how many people do or do not have their own listening facilities. Relatively few slogans were used thus far on the enemy's radio in programs directed at a Korean target audience. The medium of radio is largely unsuitable as a medium for the mass dissemination of messages because most receiving sets were destroyed by fighting and bombing and the non-existence of electric current. Thus, radio was and remains a relatively unimportant medium in the NK propaganda campaign directed to South Koreans.

The bulk of the enemy's propaganda directed to the ROK troops has been disseminated by way of leaflets through local distribution and, to a limited extent, in an overt manner through airdrops. Posters and cartoons also were used to a considerable extent as were several front newspapers which, however, seem to have been for the mutual consumption of both elements of the Peoples Army as well as ROKA. Almost no propaganda effort, directed to the South Korean soldier was made by way of radio, as listening facilities for this target group were virtually non-existent.

At all times, the enemy took advantage of the bad state of morale of the local population by spreading his demoralizing propaganda themes in the very same way as the population had received news of the impending danger—by way of rumor and hearsay.

The enemy has always employed, in his visual media, a number of short slogans, all of them making an emotional-patriotic appeal for a fight against the true enemy (Rhee and the US) and, in his efforts to emphasize his themes, used a limited number of stereotypes (sentence constructions, adjectives, pictures, etc.) which appear, in basically the same form, in all propaganda media and at all times.

After the recapture of Seoul by the UN Forces the ROKA found and destroyed approximately 45 tons of propaganda publications left behind by the fleeing NK Forces. Later it was established that the enemy had carted off or otherwise destroyed the bulk of its propaganda stock.

NOTE: The material collected for the ORO Library has been taken from the remaining stock of these propaganda publications. About 400 titles were in stock, all in quantities. An accession list of the NK book-distribution center in Seoul formerly in possession of the ROK authorities and later lost in a more recent retreat, shows that the NK propaganda office sent to Seoul alone 25,000 copies of Korean translations of Lenin and other books and magazines ranging from 2,000 to 20,000 copies of each publication.

Posters, banners, placards, and flags were displayed en masse at the time of the NK occupation. These, however, had been in the locality under the occupation already and their distribution was handled by resident agents and agitators.

Fearing that newspaper-printing facilities would be lacking in beleaguered Taejon, the NK propagandists moved into that city with a printing press hurriedly appropriated from Seoul. The press was set up and in operation within four hours of occupation of that city.

Finally, the NK propaganda machine had the exact plans as to the functions to be delegated to local friendly elements in the conduct of the NK consolidation propaganda.

In line with the NK "back to normalcy" program, the invaders enlisted and drafted the help of local elements immediately available.

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ENEMY PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES AND TACTICS

Through analysis of the enemy's propaganda apparatus, and the themes and media used in this war, an attempt has been made to recognize some of the principles governing the preparation and the output of that propaganda. Further, it was sought to determine, if possible, some of the more important tactics employed by the NK propagandists to bring their messages to the desired target groups.

The relatively short time of study in the field (Korea) and the great diversity of situations encountered in the combat zone do not permit the formulation of many firm conclusions. However, investigation of the enemy's propaganda to date does allow for a limited number of findings to be stated at this point, and rather conclusively.

A study of the themes used, at the various release times, shows that the enemy was fully aware of the local situation at a given time, and informed of capabilities and shortcomings and tensions among the bulk of his target. Thus, the enemy could make as a rule, an assessment of the relative usefulness of one medium as compared with another, and of the themes that might best affect the target group propagandized at that time.

The NK propaganda machine was in position to supply its planning echelons with the latest information about the morale of the population, the extent of the material losses of the South Korean territory, etc.

Preparation of Propaganda Material and Operating Tactics. The NK propagandists have proven well-equipped to conduct activities in occupied territory without loss of time.

They imported into occupied territory large quantities of ready-made radio programs as well as raw material (record libraries, reference manuals, etc.) along with technical material and expert personnel for the operation of radio stations.

After occupying Seoul (July of 1950) the enemy moved in with a fully outfitted broadcasting setup and was able to operate Radio Seoul in quick time. The program material brought into the city

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is said to have been sufficient to allow the NK authorities to keep the station operating on a daily basis for two months. This function was exclusive of the use of any local talent.

NOTE: Similarly, the Soviets were found to have had stored in Pyongyang, a sizable stock of program material which was used to great extent by the NK propagandists in their consolidation propaganda effort.

The NKs also imported into occupied areas a staff of professional propagandists and agitators who worked with minutely prepared material and could, therefore, begin work without loss of time.

On the heels of the invading Peoples Army, tremendous quantities of printed propaganda material of all sorts were brought into the "liberated" areas. Such material served largely as handouts to the population. However, a good many of propaganda publications were also sold, or displayed, for use in the numerous public and ambulant libraries—a characteristic of communist occupation. Copies of communist literature, political (satire) magazines printed in Pyongyang, were later captured by the South Koreans.

Also, the communists had a list of a number of outstanding musicians including voice teachers who were drafted to teach patriotic army songs to new recruits and "volunteers."

NOTE: This was a personal experience of Miss Ahn Oktong of Seoul, who was a member of the National Sympony Orchestra and also a teacher at the Ewha School of Music.

The NK authorities "reorganized" within three days following capture of Seoul, the National Symphony Orchestra. The same personnel remained but the communists provided a new leader. The orchestra members were issued special uniforms and assigned the task of "bringing culture" by presenting at least two public concerts weekly.

The NK invaders enlisted the participation of local elements to run mass meetings, organize appeals for contributions for national defense and, especially, agitate for the recruitment of young citizens of the area to serve in the Peoples Army.

The enemy's propaganda, while adhering to predetermined lines and directives, has, nevertheless, adjusted the intensity of approach according to the momentary state of general morale in the various localities in which propaganda was conducted. There was observed no uniformity of the same propaganda themes in localities which had either undergone a different "softening process" through rumors spread and other factors bringing about fear and

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panic, or which had different lines of precedent to cite in their pre-occupation history. Thus, in the case of Seoul, (which was then occupied for the second time within seven months, a threat referring to the predicament of the people during the last crisis is designed to bring about a sharper reaction than would be the case in Pusan which has not yet undergone the traumatic experience of formerly occupied and liberated, or simply embattled South Korean localities. As a result, we observe that the propaganda line of the enemy to such places is now much more clearly defined than it was four months ago. When fear is attempted to be instilled, precedents are cited; when sympathy is sought, equally the precedent can be cited (in the latter case, stories of atrocities and murders by the ROKA and US elements). It is too early, at this point to state any conclusions, but the development and utilization of the enemy's propaganda themes in a tactical way at this time, when he is on his advance southward, seem to confirm this thesis, which can be formulated by saying that the enemy coordinates his propaganda tactics with the element of precedent from the point of view of the different target groups.

The enemy's grey and black propaganda warfare, and his operation of a well-organized underground network, both for sabotage as well as agitation purposes, are active elements of propaganda and tend to bring about the feeling of insecurity and fear in the minds of the target population. By the operation of the enemy's underground, the population always has been aware that the enemy is present and that not even the most ruthless persecutions have been able to eliminate him. Many South Koreans are said to have fled their homes expressly out of fear of denunciation by communist agents and agitators who, hidden in their localities, have been observing and reporting on the movements and behavior of the local population.

The enemy has maintained a very active, and quite effective smuggling network throughout South Korea. Not only weapons have been smuggled into the hands of resident saboteurs and agents, but propaganda material as well. The Korean authorities have confiscated, on several occasions, radio receiving sets of Soviet manufacture and, in two cases, hidden transmitters in the possession of private citizens in the Seoul area. Similarly, it was reported that several transmitters were supplied to guerilla bands since the NK withdrawal from South Korea.

Several public address systems, seven hidden printing presses, five of which were the portable type, were confiscated by the ROK authorities.

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Thus, by way of all types of infiltration, the enemy has sought to distribute and prepare propaganda media throughout the target areas even before his actual arrival. At the same time he achieved, partly at least, an impact of fear and insecurity on the part of the local population who never could believe and be convinced that the UN and ROK Forces would be capable of coping with the clandestine activities of the enemy in the peoples' midst.

Intensity of Propaganda Action With Relation to Areas under Attack.
An attempt was made to formulate a picture as to the propaganda by themes and media used with the greatest frequency and intensity at a given time, and during a given propaganda campaign, to various areas propagandized by the NK. The purpose of such inquiry was to ascertain, if possible, the rationale of the enemy's apparatus for determining the over-all strategy of such propaganda attack and its intensity in different target areas, in view of the fact that the waging of psychological warfare is a strain on both the budget and on personnel, many of whom might be available for other work when not engaged on a full-time basis in the production of propaganda. Besides, in the case of NK certain standard propaganda activities, such as the dissemination of leaflets by air-drop, are a matter of serious consideration for an army that has not many airplanes at its disposition and is fighting an enemy who has almost unlimited air-superiority.

Yet, it is evident that propaganda is considered, especially by the communists, as a weapon in its own right, and that propaganda warfare, therefore, is ready to take calculated risks in its strategy, just like any other arm. On the basis of documentary material locally available and partly collected, the following four defined propaganda campaigns (accompanying armed action) of the enemy have been studied with special care.

1. Propaganda to South Korea (for a 30-day period) before outbreak of war.
2. Propaganda accompanying the enemy's advances toward Taejon (propaganda output for the time between the capture of Seoul and the fall of Taejon).
3. Enemy propaganda to South Koreans during the siege of the Pusan perimeter (propaganda output along west coast).
4. Enemy propaganda to South Korean areas (below Parallel 38) liberated by the ROK Forces, from time of the NK-Chinese recapture of Pyongyang up to the fall of Seoul.

The output through all media was scrutinized. It was noted that the emphasis on certain propaganda themes was greater than on others. At the same time, general information was collected as to the way the enemy conducted propaganda to his own home audience, and to the world in general.

Observations made after comparing the strategy and techniques employed during these clearly defined propaganda campaigns, suggest that the enemy's propaganda activity, in terms of intensity by themes and media, is the result of a carefully planned strategy.

These observations may be worthy of more complete study, for they point to a surprisingly uniform approach of communist propaganda activity in Korea. Whether such uniformity is a standard operational procedure with all communist propaganda remains to be seen.

A directive of the NK Propaganda Ministry, and signed by the Minister himself, (a copy of which was captured by ROKA Intelligence, when Pyongyang was occupied by the UN Forces) alludes to differences of propaganda "treatment" to be given different target groups in various areas at the same time. The document in reference directs the Propaganda Bureaus of the various provincial governments in NK itself and in "liberated areas of the Republic" to divide their operations staffs into three groups, each group to be concerned with all phases of a given propaganda operation to one of three enumerated target groups: (1) the local population within enemy-held close-by fighting zones; (2) the population in enemy held territory "beyond the immediate reach of our Forces;" and (3) the NK civilian elements within the "liberated areas and the home front."

The directive stipulates that "events to be exploited by the propagandists must be used in a form of presentation and content which will be found most applicable to, and most effective to the inhabitants of the zones to which such propaganda is directed or where such propaganda is to be disseminated."

Clearly, here is an indication of a rationale which advocates different nuances of propaganda played to areas in which different intensities seem justified.

An investigation into the intensity of propaganda themes employed and the frequency of the play given to them, as well as observations regarding the choice of media and dissemination techniques of propaganda messages in the various areas during the campaigns mentioned above, reveals three quite distinct "zones of intensity" for NK propaganda in and to South Korea; it yields also

interesting observations regarding the nuances of such propaganda when directed (a) to NK; (b) to the democratic world at large; (c) to the communist world; and (d) to friendly or unfriendly neutrals.

For the purposes of this paper, the observations regarding the varying intensity of enemy propaganda to the target country itself (in this case South Korea) are of prime importance.

First Zone of Intensity. That area closest to the core of the enemy's forces receives the most intensive propaganda attack. The general state of the target population is usually demoralization and fear. Too, the relative ease with which underground elements can enter and leave such areas (due to an overburdened police organization) are extremely conducive to a better, quicker, and more powerful impact of enemy propaganda themes—whether spread by rumor, agitation or otherwise.

The enemy has a chance to make his nearness manifest through a wider choice of media, all of which can reach a larger segment of the population which listens and reads because the events about to happen are of immediate interest. In Korean propaganda campaigns this zone of greatest intensity ranged from 30 to 60 miles distance from the main concentration of the advancing troops.

Second Zone of Intensity. The second zone of intensity in Korea is an area of approximately 40-50 miles originating within 50 miles of the enemy and reaching out to a distance of about 100 miles. This area, as regards organization, is still more or less intact. The local government continues to function. The local military and replacement and training centers are maintained as before. Aside from the fear of enemy air raids (to which by now the population is more or less resolved) there is little immediate threat.

In such an area enemy agitation generally is much more difficult to perform. The infiltrator has to pass through a larger and more concentrated "entry zone" than in the former case. Thus, the probability of his being detected before reaching his object is great. An immediate cause for panic is usually absent.

However, the existence of guerillas in the area may be a powerful and effective means of persuasion to a stubborn mass. Action against the ruling regime of the locale can be achieved through appeals for desertion from the army or the joining of partisan groups.

In this zone of intensity the enemy's propaganda uses the conventional mass media with a greater emphasis and, concurrently, as much agitation as circumstances permit. Here the enemy's propaganda seems to imply promises rather than threats.

Covert propaganda increases in intensity when the stream of refugees begins to flood this second zone of intensity. In Korea, the enemy skillfully infiltrated his own elements into enemy territory as refugees, and thus had an ideal medium not only to spread rumors among those refugees, but to insure also that the population in the second zone would receive those rumors from many sources, by which such rumors have a more authentic ring.

Third Zone of Intensity. The third zone comprises the rest of South Korea lying beyond the 100-mile radius from the core of the enemy's forces. The propaganda still is directed to the population of the same country, who may, in due course, experience the threat of an invasion (or "liberation") and go through the phases of the populations in the first and second zones. In this area little agitation other than cell-organizing and party organizing is apparent; enemy propaganda is disseminated primarily through the conventional media, and seldom through smuggling. Rational appeals and patriotic exhortations are the elements observed as most used. Appeals for non-obeyance and passive resistance are about the strongest arguments used.

In addition to the psychological warfare directed to the enemy, both Korean and non-Korean, the NK authorities conduct propaganda to at least three, clearly distinguishable areas other than the primary target. These "other" areas are the propagandists' own homeland, their allies, such as China, and the USSR and the world at large. The Chinese propaganda machine seems to employ similar tactics as well. They definitely wage psychological warfare against their South Korean and UN enemies. They propagandize their own homeland and their allies or sympathizers elsewhere in the world; and they wage a propaganda campaign beamed at the world at large.

The NK propaganda apparatus does this too; that its voice does not resound throughout the world as frequently or intensively as the propaganda of other, larger powers, is immaterial for the present discussion. Of importance is the realization that, in addition to psychological warfare against the enemy, other types of propaganda are conducted to targets other than the enemy, which may range from sympathizers and allies to neutrals or the allies of the enemy.

The propaganda argument presented to the various areas, during the same time, clearly assumes different shades. The same events are interpreted in different fashions, and the objectives sought to be attained clearly differ. Yet, all is part of a whole picture and possibly a delineable pattern.

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It is not the task of the present paper to consider this problem in detail; yet, the phenomenon exists and a preliminary study shows that there is a certain pattern in the integration of propaganda argumentation to different areas at a given time and dealing with one and the same subject. Possibly concentrated research on this subject might yield valuable findings regarding the over-all propaganda pattern of communist propaganda to its different target areas at given times and during given campaigns. If a definite theory could be extracted from such research, the findings would be invaluable for easier planning of the US propaganda argumentation as the latter could be based on a set of predictions relative to enemy military moves.

Apart from the importance of coping with the enemy's propaganda in a given combat zone and impairing or destroying its effectiveness by a more intensive propaganda play, US propaganda to the world will always fall upon ears and eyes that had been (and are) exposed to the arguments of enemy propaganda. A better knowledge of the enemy's tactics should enable US propaganda to employ more effective methods in order to make its propaganda themes reach the various target groups more pungently than the enemy has been able to do. World opinion is at stake and this is more important than may be thought at first. For the opinion and feelings, duly aroused through propaganda argumentation, may be the determining factor for the gain or loss of local sympathies for the US. This has, of course, serious military implications because the position of elements of the US Forces in foreign territory will be so much easier where the local population, or allied troops from that country are favorably disposed toward US and unaffected by enemy propaganda.

An attempt was made to present graphically a general picture of the communist propaganda play to different areas and in different intensities. Figure 98 purports to show the different areas of intensity to which communist countries in general seem committed to conduct propaganda, and how NK propaganda has been specifically observed to beam its propaganda. It will be seen that propaganda is waged, though in different degrees of intensity, and possibly with varying objectives, to all areas of the world and, naturally, particularly to specific enemy countries.

The implication of this thesis is that propaganda always has the task of combating enemy propaganda that has or has not affected a target group, and can seldom, if ever, afford the luxury of disregarding the tenor or enemy propaganda and play exclusively its own arguments, however arbitrarily chosen.

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Effectiveness of NK Propaganda upon South Korean Target Groups.
Since this is a preliminary report, similarly, only a preliminary assessment can be made at present of the effectiveness of the NK propaganda on the South Koreans.

The South Korean population was, even before the outbreak of the war, a likely target that might be termed of "good conductivity." At all times sizable segments of the South Korean population are said to have been ready to listen to—if not accept—at least certain parts of the enemy's standard arguments against the Rhee regime.

Along with the anti-Rhee themes directed to them through rumors and other methods of propaganda, the peoples of South Korea found themselves listening to still other pointed attacks on their government. Many of these dwell at length on the "humiliation arising from the peoples servility to foreign interests."

It is true, nevertheless, that many patriots were antagonized by the enemy's open attacks on the Rhee government, because, up to now, the Koreans have not known any other president of their own. To these loyal South Koreans, Rhee is the "Father of the Republic."

However, it was equally true that within South Korea the Rhee government does not enjoy the unqualified confidence, or even the normal amount of trust a nation should be expected to give its government. The distrust that is felt for the Rhee regime stems from a number of reasons. For example, Rhee is noted for his notorious favoritism in personnel policies; the institution of a rather ruthless police state; and, as the war went along, the failure of his government to consider the plight of the population threatened by enemy's advances and failure to keep them informed and aided up to the last minute. The majority of South Koreans will agree that the Rhee regime has at all times ignored greatly the "voice of the people."

Shortly before the election into the National Assembly in 1950, some of the candidates who had been critical of Rhee policies and thus disagreeable to the President, were jailed so that they would not be elected. However, the voters were not intimidated by such tactics and thus the final result of these elections which were unfavorable to Rhee is a healthy indication that the people are learning to take advantage of their democratic rights.

It is true that President Rhee is the "father of the Korean people" and the founder of the Republic of Korea. But he and his administration have not had enough time to make good on those elements in which they were open to criticism. Their behavior toward the people during the war brought about a general and deep

disillusionment, distrust, leading to unpopularity and, finally, largely to acute antagonism. The increase of police state methods only helped to make the Rhee Regime even more unpopular. Thus far no major effort was made to overthrow Rhee and substitute him with another President; the few revolutionary actions against him and his regime during the past 18 months have been quelled in a very ruthless manner.

A study of the subject indicates that there was definitely a willingness, if not eagerness on the part of South Koreans, to at least listen to or read the enemy's propaganda messages. This does not necessarily imply acceptance, however, curiosity is quite natural and applicable to masses, regardless of their location: One is always interested to hear the enemy or to see what he has distributed; it is something unusual and it may tend to confirm or dispel certain fears of doubts. The attention given to enemy propaganda, however, is not to be confused with the belief in such propaganda or a reaction as intended by the enemy. The attention given to NK propaganda material and messages in South Korea is said to be, in large measure, a consequence of the ROK government's failure to reassure and aid the suffering population under the threat of capture and occupation by a ruthless enemy. In the early stages of the conflict it happened often that NK propaganda alone gave the South Koreans some sort of daily information about the general situation. And, as the claims of NK victories were substantiated by events, more credibility was lent the NK propaganda statements.

After liberation of Seoul and the rest of NK by the UN Forces, and in the wake of unbelievable atrocities committed on the innocent population by the retreating communists, the ROK regime re-instituted its rule with an iron hand. Drastic measures certainly were necessary as there had existed considerable collaboration among the Seoulians under the NK occupation and because the enemy, before withdrawing, laid the foundations of a well-organized underground network which remained active up to the second occupation of Seoul in January, 1951. Whether such draconic measures as were instituted were necessary, or not, the ROK government's Information Office (headed by Dr. Helen Kim, and subsequently by Mr. Oh), and the public Information Office of the ROKA (headed by Brig Gen Lee Seun Keun) failed to keep the population sufficiently informed, not only as to the general developments of the war, but also as to the aims and ambitions of their own government and the necessity for weeding out dangerous elements from the midst of the population.

True, slogans and posters appeared everywhere; a "home guard" was formed; and volunteer labor battalions were organized for the reconstruction of war torn areas. But little concern was voiced, and still less constructive advice was given by the government, regarding

the predicament of the local population, a majority of whom had lost all they possessed during the fighting, and all of whom found themselves in the most miserable economic condition facing a cold winter.

In their actions, the ROK military tribunals and police courts seem to have been no less ruthless than the dreaded "Peoples Courts" of the communists. NK propagandists however, found ways and means to use this as an anti-ROKA theme in their consolidation and other propaganda as a new "proof" of "democratic achievement" on news tableaux (Figure 96).

In addition, there was, all over Korea, a large number of foreign soldiers (mostly in unmixed concentrations) who, as a mass, never succeeded in establishing good rapport with the ROKA men present in the area, of the population in general, largely because of an almost unbridgeable language barrier. This is, of course, nothing novel in Korea; there has been little mutual understanding on lower levels, ever since the Koreans were liberated from the Japanese rule. Thus, for example, the Report of the Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Civil Information Hq US Forces in Korea, prepared as early as 8 October 1947, deals already quite frankly with the problem. In part, the report reads:

"In a railway center in Cholla Pukto a group of enlisted men stationed there asked one of the members of the party to ask Korean children standing nearby what the children thought of them. The children replied that they did not like the enlisted men, because the enlisted men sometimes threw rocks at them. The men admitted the truth of the statement, saying that the children were too curious and bothersome.

"While the train was standing in the Pohan'g station during the operation, a Korean man came and begged for transportation to Yongju. He said his wife was desperately ill and in the hospital there and that he had been summoned by the doctor. Aside from the fact that nothing could be done to help him at that time, it became apparent that he was drunk. He had nothing to substantiate his story and he became rather demanding and abusive in manner. Finally, the railway police had to him and send him away. At the height of his anger, he said: 'I know how the US feels about Koreans. You treat us like dogs. It is just because I am a Korean that you won't help.'

"Under the circumstances, his complaint was unjustified, but it illustrates the widespread feeling of resentment, probably deliberately encouraged by unfriendly groups in extreme leftist centers like Pohan'g.

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"These incidents are typical of many. The Korean people appear to be extremely sensitive to the attitude of the US elements among them. They resent any discrimination, any mistreatment at the hands of the US soldiers, and even outspoken criticisms of Korea and Koreans.

"It is not reasonable to expect complete elimination of the poor relationships described here, for they in part represent a clash of two cultures, and two ways of thinking and living."

Despite great efforts by both sides, rapport between US (or other UN) Forces and Korean soldiers has been lacking very much throughout the fighting of the present war.

The ROK Public Relations apparatus, quite rightly, wooed constantly the elements of the UN Forces in Korea—and especially so the US components. In some instances this went quite far and, on several occasions, may have been decidedly useful to the enemy as a substantiation of some of his standard anti-US arguments; such as, for example, the UN Forces in Korea really were US Forces. Thus, for instance, shortly after the liberation of Seoul, the ROK government released a "Thank you" poster signed by the "People of Korea" and addressed to both the "Dear US Soldiers" and the "Dear Soldiers from all Free Nations." (See Figure 97.)

At the same time, however, the ROK-PIO seems to have failed to build up the morale of the South Korean troops who had done such hard fighting. Great tribute was paid to the ROK soldier in the world press, but little was done by ROK domestic propaganda in this respect. Still less was done by the Information Offices of the South Korean Government to inform their own population, and especially their soldiers, of the esteem in which ROKA Forces were held elsewhere; and, as stated before, only sporadic and inaccurate information of developments affecting the local population was given. There existed little cross-communication between the ROK-ROKA and UN components.

On the whole, domestic propaganda has given the South Koreans a rather meaningless and very weak domestic morale-building program of slogans and posters. This program was accompanied by ruthless procedures of the local police. A wave of mass arrests and executions ensued, the reason for which was never quite satisfactorily explained to the population. In short, the people were not lead properly after the liberation of formerly NK-held South Korean areas and were left in a deplorable state of uninformedness.

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Under such circumstances, it is understandable that the ROK public information program could not possibly regain public acceptance. No evidence was found by the writer or by those from whom information was obtained that the ROK domestic propaganda apparatus ever convincingly expressed its understanding concern for the welfare of the population that had so recently been plagued by the enemy's destruction and brutal occupation.

The public morale and, with it, the credibility of the ROK propaganda seems to have risen somewhat with the victories achieved in NK and the end of the war in sight. But morale was on the decline again after the general reverses of the UN Forces when the Chinese Communist Forces intervened in the conflict. As pointed out previously, the ROK information apparatus completely failed to give the population any official guidance as to what to do if the communists were to return to South Korea, even in view of the overt preparations for a general evacuation of South Korean localities such as Kaeson, Seoul, and others by the UN Forces. Instead of attempting to dispel the general atmosphere of panic, the South Korean government gave either none or very incomplete, cryptic information to the populace.

At the same time, the ROK regime stepped up its program of extermination of prisoners and crusade against potential enemies. Meanwhile, the government was making obvious preparations to evacuate Seoul. Meantime, while the privileged elements were leaving Seoul, the ROK government proclaimed with solemnity that there existed no plan or decision to evacuate the city. The police installed three or four public address systems in various sections of Seoul and broadcast to the panicky population, patriotism-saturated statements by ROK politicians and police orders.

It is no wonder that enemy propaganda found a target disposed to listen and read its arguments because even though the people might be totally out of sympathy with the enemy, at least they could hope to get some kind of information from him.

Also, the bulk of the urban South Korean population, though unsympathetic toward the NK cause, had been made so unhappy by the previous communist domination of their localities and were so frightened of a second occupation, that they were willing to listen to directives given by the enemy so that they might more likely survive a second occupation.

So the NKs could count at all times, but especially during the advance of the Peoples Army into South Korea, on a good "listening ear" and "reading eye." Due to the near panic and fear of those who would remain, a fertile field had been created for the spreading of rumors.

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All these factors should, in the writer's opinion, be borne in mind when attempting to assess the effectiveness of the enemy's propaganda since they determine to a large extent the "soil" on which the seeds disseminated by the enemy's propaganda apparatus will fall.

Very few good criteria are available at this time to evaluate the effectiveness of the enemy's propaganda media or themes. There is some indication that further and more detailed study of arrests in periods immediately following the drop of leaflets might prove to be a criterion of some weight, especially in conjunction with other phenomena flowing from the target population's behavior.

An assessment in full of the NK consolidation propaganda in "liberated" South Korea cannot be made presently because of the little time available for the writer to develop a suitable questionnaire and to make a sampling of the population. The tendency of South Koreans to condemn summarily everything bearing on the NK participation in the war in open conversation, deemed it unprofitable to follow the course of general interviews.

However, with regards to the enemy's consolidation propaganda, the following preliminary assessments have been made from that data already accumulated.

1. The NKs exploited greatly the elements of fear and terror on the part of the local population; employing threats and appeals in order to drive home the "right of the people to cooperate with the NK cause."

NOTE: Of 65 prisoners interviewed, all of whom had been convicted as enemy agitators, though of South Korean nationality, 42 admitted joining the communist agitation apparatus because they hoped to gain advantages for themselves and their families by precluding the NK occupants from suspecting them as former pro-Rheeites and applying sanctions against them.

2. The NKs used popular themes, many of which offered some tangible or plausible advantages or benefits; promises of assistance to the poor by gratuitous distribution of farm land; promises of a bright future in a unified and strong and rich Korea. Coupled with these promises were the arguments against the Rhee government.

3. The communist underground behind the ROK lines has been efficient. Arms and propaganda material of all kinds were constantly smuggled from North to South Korea; guerilla bands were supplied with

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material and even food; numerous acts of small scale sabotage were committed almost constantly despite the strict control of the ROK police. Interception of NK propaganda via radio showed that the enemy promptly broadcast incidents that happened in South Korea and that were never publicized by the local press and radio. It can therefore be assumed that the local population was at all times aware of the presence of enemy elements who could do both actual damage to them or mark them down as enemies of the NK regime.

NOTE: During allied tenure of re-occupied South Korea, it was never safe to remain on the streets after nightfall as small arms fire frequently broke out between police and underground forces.

4. The enemy's posters, cartoons and photographs are unanimously considered products of good art work. The penmanship of the artists who produced propaganda drawings in particular, has been evaluated as excellent.

5. The opinions expressed by 250-300 persons selected at random, including civilian prisoners of South Korean nationality, indicate that the NK posters and photographs representing appeal for a united Korea and those showing the misery of the Korean people as a consequence of the war were the most pungent and effective of the conventional propaganda media employed. Leaflets, on the other hand, except those distributed through clandestine methods were less effective.

6. ROKA intelligence reports show that public parades, rallies, speeches, and especially film showings staged by the occupying NK elements have been at all times reasonably popular in the various localities of South Korea, even where the population had not been forced to attend the NK sponsored functions.

7. The effectiveness of NK propaganda directed at the ROKA soldier could not be evaluated in terms of its effectiveness, during the work in the field, for lack of information which could be obtained only as a result of a definite plan of procedure worked out in advance.

From what little information and circumstantial evidence there is available on the subject it appears that, the effect of enemy propaganda on the South Korean fighting man was at no time even approximately as strong as it was on the average South Korean civilian in areas threatened by the communist forces or actually occupied by the NKs. There are indications that whatever effectiveness there was in enemy psychological warfare decreased considerably as the war went on, the ROK troops became organized, armed, clothed, and fed, and were given a chance to feel constantly that they were effectively aided by the components of the UN Forces in Korea, especially the USAF and partly also the airplanes from the UK.

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ORO-T-10 (EUSAK)

NK Propaganda Techniques and Tactics

Finally, as information began to reach the South Korean soldiers of communist atrocities in their occupied hometowns, and reports of the killings of their dear ones turned out to be largely true, their rage may have most effectively counteracted any concentrated attempt of enemy psychological warfare vis-a-vis the ROKA elements. It is general knowledge that the South Korean troops went into battle with great furor and have displayed great fighting courage against the troops of Kim Il Song.

Thus, generally speaking, the NK psychological warfare seems to have turned, in terms of its effectiveness, from a more or less promising campaign into a failure.

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Appendix A

ORGANIZATION OF A REPRESENTATIVE NK
INTELLIGENCE NET

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情報組織體

組織原則

1. 組織應以任務為目的而設
2. 組織應以效率為原則
3. 組織應以適應環境為原則
4. 組織應以統一為原則
5. 組織應以簡便為原則

組織方法

(組織程序)

1. 確定任務
2. 劃分區域
3. 任命人員
4. 建立關係

(組織形式)

組織形式應根據任務之需要而定，其形式有：

- 1. 直線制
- 2. 參謀制
- 3. 幕僚制
- 4. 混合制

工作方法

(組織程序)

1. 確定任務
2. 劃分區域
3. 任命人員
4. 建立關係

(組織形式)

組織形式應根據任務之需要而定，其形式有：

- 1. 直線制
- 2. 參謀制
- 3. 幕僚制
- 4. 混合制

連絡方法

(組織程序)

1. 確定任務
2. 劃分區域
3. 任命人員
4. 建立關係

(組織形式)

組織形式應根據任務之需要而定，其形式有：

- 1. 直線制
- 2. 參謀制
- 3. 幕僚制
- 4. 混合制

暗号

(原則)


1. 暗号應以任務為目的而設
2. 暗号應以效率為原則
3. 暗号應以適應環境為原則
4. 暗号應以統一為原則
5. 暗号應以簡便為原則

(種類)

1. 直線制
2. 參謀制
3. 幕僚制
4. 混合制

(其他)

其他注意事項...



網體系

(組織程序)

1. 確定任務
2. 劃分區域
3. 任命人員
4. 建立關係

(組織形式)

組織形式應根據任務之需要而定，其形式有：

- 1. 直線制
- 2. 參謀制
- 3. 幕僚制
- 4. 混合制




Figure 99. Organization chart of a representative NK Intelligence system.

Appendix A

ORGANIZATION OF A REPRESENTATIVE NK INTELLIGENCE NET

NOTE: This organization chart, applicable to Hawangahae - Do Province, was classified "Secret" by NK Security.

PRINCIPLE OF ORGANIZING

1. To be organized on a zonal basis throughout the northern half of the Republic.
2. Strict secrecy has to be maintained since this organization work involves international issues.
3. This intelligence net will be an underground organization of utmost importance for feeling the political pulse of South Korea in case of a temporary withdrawal from the northern half of the Republic.

METHOD OF ORGANIZATION

1. Selection of Personnel.
 - a. Enthusiasts in hiding. Persons who hold enthusiasm inwardly, though not appearing to be in active support of the politics of the northern half of the Republic.
 - b. Secret liaison agents (secret agent). Persons, though not regarded by the general public as liaison agents, holding a determination to actively take part in mopping up the reaction, i. e. political security work.
 - c. Persons, who satisfactorily meet these requirements, shall be selected under substantial screening.

ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE NET

1. A unit in the net shall consist of three members.
2. Three or more units in a Gun seat. (Myon levels excluded.)
Ten or more units in a Provincial seat.

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Appendix A

3. One person in charge and one liaison agent shall be appointed in each unit. (Organizing agent shall appoint them.)

DOCUMENTS REQUIRED:

One personal history statement; one photograph; one map showing places for contact; code book (these documents shall be kept by the organizing agent).

METHOD OF OPERATION

1. Each unit of the net shall pretend to be a reactionary group before the withdrawal from the northern half of the Republic; Members of the unit will go into the mountain areas, carrying documents showing the reactionary nature of the organization, Taekuk and American flags. (In case of an arrest by an agency of the Home Ministry, the Political Security Bureau will intercede for a secret release to have them continue operation).

2. Upon entering mountainous areas carrying above items, intelligence agents shall mingle with reactionary groups, Peoples Army deserters, or villagers of an area with strong, reactionary leanings and engage in reactionary activities so as to have the reactionary groups or the general public believe that these intelligence agents are really fighting against the politics of the Republic. (Let the people brand them as reactionaries).

3. When the Peoples Army retreat, they will be the first to come out with Taekuk flags and American flags and take part in welcoming.

4. They will then infiltrate into political parties, police forces and military units and develop intelligence operations.

TARGETS FOR INTELLIGENCE

1. Trend of public opinion? Public opinion regarding the South Korean government shall be analyzed as to social strata and sex.

2. Policy toward the general public. Gather data regarding the policy of each political party, social organization, and other government agencies toward the public, tabulating data under separate entry for each agency checked.

3. Check the name, address, age, political affiliation of individuals who unintentionally afforded favorable conditions to troops of the National Army, or the US Army.

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Appendix A

4. How about intelligence activities? Domestic intelligence operations; list of liaison agents; methods and procedures of dispatching international espionage agents. How about the measures for reactionary criminals? Lists of leading figures.

5. Obtaining lists of staff members? Finding out the names of various agencies (head, vice-head, down to section heads); attach importance to intelligence agencies and political parties.

6. Military information? Unit designation of troops stationed; number of troops (branch of service); number of weapons (type); tactical plans; ammunition dumps and air-fields (number and location).

7. Trade? Item and amount of imported commodities; goods exported from Korea—their amount—name of countries to which exported.

8. Any conflict in views between parties and between agencies? (Any other pertinent data.)

METHOD OF LIAISON

1. Accurate data collected should be written down.
2. Data should be written down on thin paper and sewn in small letters into western style suit.
3. When in danger in which one's identity might be revealed and be arrested, destroy the documents (or conceal them in adequate places).

PLACES FOR CONTACT

1. First - Pyongyang Political Security Bureau.
2. Second - Manchurian border (Legation). Two places have been designated so that in case the first point is evacuated, the second point can be used.
3. Person to be contacted: Hwang, Ch'ol (in case a person by this name is absent, call on Pang, Hak Se, Vice-Minister - Chief of Political Security Bureau. Use the code word, identifying oneself as a person wishing to contact Hwang, Ch'ol.
4. Make use of secret meeting places set by organizers at the time of organization of individuals units.

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5. No. 1, No. 2, No. 3 meeting places will be set (different meeting places for each unit).

6. Natural objects will be used (for example, trees, bridges, monuments, rocks, which are easy to find).

METHOD OF MEETING

1. Unit leader will visit the meeting place once in two days.

2. Persons dispatched will leave a note at the meeting place: "I have come."

3. Meetings will take place in manners as given here. When a person dispatched reaches the destination, he will leave a note saying "I have come." The following day, he will again come to the place and wait. While the unit leader will find the note left there during his routine visit once every two days. The two will meet the following day, identifying each other by code words, proceed to a quiet place and exchange information.

CODE WORDS

1. Principle. a. Code words will be formed by organizers.

b. In forming code words complicated phrases will be avoided and common, daily phrases will be used. (For example: "Say, friend, may I bother you for a light?" Or, even when the weather is fine, use such phrases as would sound normal to any casual listener but not relevant to the occasion: "Oh, it looks like rain.")

2. Type. a. Codes for unit leaders (ordinary and special).
When to use: use only when meeting persons dispatched.

b. Codes for liaison agents (ordinary and special). Codes are to be used in contacting the Political Security Section. Unit leaders will keep them to themselves to be given to liaison agents at the time of liaison.

c. Codes for persons dispatched (ordinary and special). Codes are to be used only when persons dispatched by the Political Security Bureau meet with unit leaders.

REMARKS: Interview may be refused when one does not know the code at the time of meeting or departure.

NOTES FOR UNIT LEADERS

1. Security. a. When encircled by the enemy during or immediately after the organizing of a unit, destroy all documents regarding organizing and drawn up plans for reorganizing at the Political Security Bureau. (Under no circumstances let the enemy get hold of the documents).

b. It is emphasized that, though documents have been destroyed, in case the place of operation is detected resulting in an arrest, there should be no divulging of the unit organization.

c. Party membership card and identification card should be concealed so as to be recovered later, when in danger of encirclement by the enemy.

MISCELLANEOUS

Political Security chief concerned will protect the family of each intelligence agent in full secrecy and without any knowledge of the agent himself. Thereby, ensuring that each intelligence agent will not compromise his principle on account of his family. (intimidating).

Prominent personages of the various ministries of the northern half of the Republic are reported to have assembled at the Manchurian legation.

LIST OF ORGANIZERS

Lee, Mi Yong. In charge of Hwanghae-Do, first level of the Political Security Bureau. Age 34; from Hamgyong Namdo.

Chong, Won Sob. In charge of Pyoksong, Ongjin, South Yonbaek, age 27, from Hwanghae Do, Pyoksong Gun Section Chief.

Kim, Si U. In charge of P'yongsan, Changp'ung, Yonbaek. Age 31, from Hamgyong Namdo, in charge of general affairs, Haeju city section.

Lee, Sung Su. In charge of Sohung, Singye, Kumch'on. Age 32, from Hwanghae Do, in charge of general affairs provincial administration.

Yun, Ki Yong. In charge of Songnim, Hwangju. Age 28, 1st section, provincial administration.

Kwow, T'ae Yong. In charge of Songhwa, Changyon, Chaeryong. Age 29, from Hwanghae Do Railroad Section, provincial administration.

Lee, Ch'ol. In charge of Ulyul, Anak, Sinch'on. Age 23, from Hwanghae Do, Chief of Haeju City section.

Pak, Chang Song. In charge of Koksan, Suan. Age 27, from Hwanghae Do General affairs team, provincial administration.

For Haeju and Sariwon. Person in charge of Hwanghae-Do renders assistance.

ORGANIZATION OF A UNIT

1. Ulyul Gun Unit. a. Unit leader—Kim, Nak Son. Age 29, occupation: head, Sangnok Insurance Co. Br. From Ulyul Gun, Hwanghae Do. (Full-time liaison agent operating under direction of Ulyul Gun Section chief). Political affiliation - Labor Party expelled.

b. Liaison agent—Lee, Kun T'ae, age 26. Occupation: Propaganda chief, Ulyul Gun Bu., Ch'ondokyo Friends' Party from Ulyulgun, Hwanghae Do. (Full-time liaison agent operating under direction of Ulyul Gun Section chief). Political affiliation: Ch'ondokyo Friends Party.

c. Member of Unit—Lee, Chong Sam. Age 49, Occupation: operating an orchard from Changkon Myon, Ulyul Gun, Hwanghae Do. (Full-time liaison agent operating under direction of Ulyul Gun Section chief.) Political affiliation - independent.

CODES

1. Codes for unit leaders.

Ordinary question: "Do you know a man by the name of Lee, Ch'ol U?"

Answer: "Yes, I do."

Special question: "Where do you live now?"

Answer: "In Seoul."

2. Codes for liaison agents.

Ordinary question: "Where are we now?"

Answer: "I don't know."

Special question: "Who are you?"
Answer: "I am Hwang, Ch'ol."

3. Codes for persons dispatched.

Ordinary question: "May I bother you for a light?"
Answer: "Let's see whether I have matches."

Special question: "What medicine will be good for a
stomach ache?"
Answer: "Plaster will do."

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Appendix B

NK CENTRAL COMMITTEE LEAFLET-APPEAL TO "KOREAN PEOPLES"
FOR HOMELAND UNIFICATION

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Appendix B

NK CENTRAL COMMITTEE LEAFLET-APPEAL TO "KOREAN PEOPLES" FOR HOMELAND UNIFICATION

NOTE: The following is a quotation from a leaflet distributed by the NKs in August of 1950. It is an appeal of the Central Committee, Democratic Front for Fatherland Unification of the Korean Peoples.

Dear Fellow-countrymen: The foreign intervention in Korea has been in continuation already for two months. The US interventionists' troops are killing our sons; US battleships are bombarding our coasts; US planes are daily conducting barbarous bombings on cities and rural areas of our country, killing peaceful inhabitants and destroying factories, enterprises, railroads and dwelling houses, which were created by the labor of the Korean people.

US imperialism, which long since strove to convert Korea into its colony and its military base in the Far East, assisted by the treacherous Syngman Rhee clique, has provoked a fratricidal war in Korea and is perpetrating an armed intervention against our people. The US imperialists, under the cloak of the illegal resolution by the (UN) Security Council on the Korean problem, are ruthlessly violating the right of our people for freedom and independence. The US imperialists are trying to cloak their aggression against Korea by alleging the defense of peace and freedom.

Had it not been for the aggressive policy of the US imperialists, who were obstructing a peaceful unification of the fatherland through the treacherous Syngman Rhee clique, the Korean people would now be engaged in their peaceful efforts. Had it not been for the US imperialists, who, having bound the South Korean people to the terrorist Syngman Rhee regime, instigated and provoked a fratricidal war in Korea, our people would not be shedding blood. Had the US invaders not violated our territory, the war which the treacherous Syngman Rhee clique provoked would already have been terminated. The US imperialists are the most vicious foe of the Korean people, the enemy of peace, the instigator of war. While destroying Korean cities and rural areas, they are pronouncing prevarication about freedom.

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Appendix B

Through their bitter experience over many years, the Korean people are well aware of what "freedom" means in the concept of Japanese, US, and other imperialists who enjoy their glory by cruelly exploiting peoples of their colonies and subordinate countries. We do not need the freedom of a US Negro which the US imperialists have cultivated on the white bones of Negroes. We do not need the "freedom" of South American peoples under colonial subordination of American imperialism, which sucks out the blood of the people like a spider, throwing them into utter poverty and lack of rights. We do not need such "freedom" as was imposed upon the South Korean people by the US occupation forces with the assistance of the Syngman Rhee traitors—"freedom" meaning to the South Korean people poverty, despair, lack of rights. This poverty and lack of rights surprised all inhabitants of North Korea who have just been to South Korea. We do not need the "freedom" of US- or Syngman Rhee-style which means a jail, torture, a prison, and execution to all advocates of democracy, the freedom and independence of the Korean people.

When the US imperialists talk about freedom of the Korean people, they have in mind the freedom of US capital to make money out of the sweat and blood of the Korean people, whom they do not consider to be humans out of their racial arrogance. We do not want any such freedom. The Korean people want true freedom: freedom without any interventions of foreign imperialists, freedom without the traitors, who aid the US interventionists bent upon subjugating the Korean people and fill their pockets with dollars given them as price for selling the interest of the Korean people.

By their heroic struggle against the US interventionists and the Syngman Rhee clique, our illustrious Peoples Army troops, our partisans, and the entire Korean people have shown not only that they want the freedom, unification and independence of their fatherland with all their heart and with all their mind, but that they are prepared to take up arms and defend their interests from the encroachment by the foreign interventionists and their Korean lackeys. The people of North Korea have shown that they are ready to defend, without sparing their lives, the democratic reforms, for which they have fought, and which have opened up a broad road to progress, prosperity and freedom ahead of them. The people of South Korea have shown that the five-year US occupation, the five-year rule of the Syngman Rhee police system involving persecution and the gallows have failed to weaken their will for freedom.

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Appendix C

SOVIET FOREIGN PROPAGANDA EMPLOYS "US-ATROCITIES
IN KOREA" THEME

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Appendix C

SOVIET FOREIGN PROPAGANDA EMPLOYS "US-ATROCITIES
IN KOREA" THEME

Headlined "American Atrocities in Korea," the following article was released by the New York Tass Bureau (for Pravda and Izvestia) 27 July 1950.

"In dispatches from Korea the press admits that the American forces are committing atrocities in burning down Korean villages in a vain attempt to halt the advance of the Peoples Army. Several days ago the papers reported that Gen Walker, commander of the American land forces in Korea, was boasting that he had invented a new 'secret' method of fighting the Korean guerrillas. It is clear from the press reports that this 'secret' method is to initiate the tactics of the Nazis who strafed, burned and destroyed defenseless villages and killed the civilian populace. An AP correspondent in Korea, reporting the order for evacuation of the entire civilian populace from the battle zone southeast of Taejon, wrote that henceforth anyone appearing in civilian dress may be shot. The correspondent admits that even before this monstrous order was issued American soldiers often fired at people in civilian dress. 'Many villages where the presence of enemy forces and artillery is suspected,' wrote the correspondent, 'have been burned. It is not known how many people have perished in their own straw-thatched houses.'

A follow-up to the preceding article was headlined "American Concentration Camps in Korea," and released 28 July 1950. Also Tass-authored, a brief summary of this article is:

"New York Times correspondent Johnston reports that 58 concentration camps have been established, into which 379,000 Koreans have been driven so far. Epidemic diseases are beginning in the camps."

While the USSR propagandists dwelt loud and long on the anti-US theme from Moscow, the NK propagandists were continuing their efforts to show that the US intervention in the Korean situation was anything but a neighborly gesture.

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In keeping with their all-out propaganda offensive against the US Forces, the NKs busied themselves with preparing cartoons portraying the US as a "merciless murderer of innocent men, women and children" in an effort to make the Koreans "another US Pacific outpost."

Figures 100-101 (which follow) are NK-styled anti-US cartoons, the master copies of which were found in the editors album in the NK Central Bureau for Propaganda, Pyongyang. Figure 102 is a touch-up picture which NK propagandists used to high-light their US atrocity theme.

Another rather typical example of the "atrocious-brutality" line of NK propaganda is clearly noted from the following leaflet which was distributed among both North and South Koreans early in November south of Pyongyang.

"Dear brothers: Unspeakable grief is in our hearts, righteous rage in our fists. Heroic sons of the fatherland, good and peace-loving brothers and sisters have been murdered by the treacherous gang of Syngman Rhee, the forerunning hound of the US imperialists. Death has come to our fatherland. Tortures and sufferings have befallen you, dear brothers and sisters. The enemy has devastated your land and wants now to impose slavery upon you, the proud people of Korea.

"What does the enemy want? Not the unification of the fatherland; not peace; not freedom. Syngman Rhee and his treacherous clique of murderers are the docile servants of UN imperialists who wish to enslave our country and enrich themselves. While the murder gangs of Syngman Rhee, the traitor, kill our peace loving citizens and plunder their homes, the bombers of the US imperialists constantly attack our hospitals and the homes of our people who only wish to live in peace and work for the good of the nation.

"But the hour of revenge will come: Our retreat is only temporary and soon the glorious Peoples Army will come again to your towns and you will rejoice at the sight of your brothers who have liberated you from tyranny.

"Rise, you people of the temporarily occupied areas! The glorious days of freedom and peace will come soon.

"Long live the glorious Peoples Army! Long live Kim Il Song, the respected leader of his People! Long live a victorious and unified Korea."

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미국의 허적들은 평화스러운 어촌과 농촌들을 무차별 함포사격을 감행하고 있다

Figure 100. A (NK) cartoon attempting to show the US Naval Forces bombing peaceful coastal villages.



미국 강도들의 항공기는 우리부모 형제 들을 무차별 폭격하여 학살하고있다
 논에서 김매는 농민과 부녀자들 학교에서 공부하는 어린이들 길가는 노인 심지어
 관두명에서 잤다가는 여기와 어머니 까지 기총소사하여 학살하였다
 조선인민은 그들의 만행을 영원히 잊어 않는다 ORO II-100-101 APR 51

Figure 101. The caption: "Planes of US bandits are killing our parents and brothers by indiscriminate bombings. They strafed farmers and women weeding rice paddies, children in school, old folks walking along the road. The Korean peoples will never forget these brutalities."



ORO 11-102 APR 51

Figure 102. According to NK propagandists, this picture shows "merciless killing of innocent South Korean men, women and children by the ROK-UN Forces."

The following is the translation of a (NK) leaflet found in considerable quantities on or about 20 Nov 1950 in the area of Sariwon, Sinmak and Pyongsan in the east, and by Ichon in the west. The entire area is located in NK, then occupied by the ROK-UN Forces. The leaflet does not appear to have been air-dropped, but, like so many others, distributed clandestinely among the local population. It is a "news-leaflet" and decries "atrocities" committed by the anti-NK forces within NK, in an area that has only recently experienced the brunt of enemy attacks.

This leaflet gains in interest if it is borne in mind that a Tass news release, appearing in the 17 November issue of the Soviet newspaper "Pravda" carries substantially the same text. Whether the NK leaflet is patterned after the Soviet text or vice versa is not established at this point.

"The intensification of the counterblows of the Korean Peoples Army against the UN interventionists has provoked frantic rage in MacArthur who planned to finish Korea in short time. MacArthur's staff has given orders to intensify barbaric mass raids on the peaceful towns and villages of NK and also to bomb the railroad bridges across the Yalu River.

"On 6 November more than 20 US planes in the course of one hour circled over the town of Kanggye dropping incendiary balloons. For three days the town was ringed with flames and shrouded in thick clouds of smoke. As a result of this monstrous atrocity, two-thirds of the town was completely destroyed. Where houses once stood and where long and straight streets lay always animated and full of people, there remained only chimneys, skeletons of stone buildings and wilderness of ashes and charcoal.

"Tens of thousands of civilian inhabitants had been deprived of shelter, clothing, and food. Hundreds of women, children and old people who did not succeed in escaping from the town, either died in the flames of the immense conflagration or received serious burns. This, however, seems small matter to the US gangsters. On 11 November the part of Kanggye which remained unharmed, was destroyed by 15 dive bombers. The town Sinuiju was subjected to a barbarous air-raid. For two days more than 300 US Flying Fortresses, dive bombers, attack planes and fighters destroyed the residential quarters of the town, killing the peaceful inhabitants, including children, old men and women. The town was completely destroyed by fire. The same fate befell the town of Momp'o where 90 percent of the residential quarters were turned to ruins."

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Appendix D

SOVIET PRESS EDITORIALS ATTACK UN DECISION ON
INTERVENTION IN KOREA

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Appendix D

SOVIET PRESS EDITORIALS ATTACK UN DECISION ON
INTERVENTION IN KOREA

The following article "American Aggression in Korea is International," is taken from Soviet Newspaper "Izvestia," 11 August 1950.

"In carrying out its armed aggression against the Korean people, American imperialism is striving to cover it up by the UN flag and give it an appearance of legality. With this in view, the US and its satellites managed to push several illegal resolutions through the Security Council June 25, 27, and July 7, resolutions designed to sanction the American intervention in Korea and to ensure its support by other states which are members of the UN.

"However, these resolutions are doubly illegal. They were made in the absence of two permanent members of the Security Council—the USSR and the Chinese Peoples Republic. The representative of the latter, up till now, has been unable to occupy his chair as a result of the scandalous arbitrariness of the US government and its satellites. This alone is sufficient to deprive the above-mentioned decisions of legal standing, since they were made in violation of the UN Charter, under which all Security Council resolutions, except those concerned with procedure, must be made with all its permanent members present.

"But, besides this, the above-mentioned resolutions are illegal also because they are based on the crudest falsification of facts, on a distorted presentation of the real situation in Korea and on a violation of the elementary and generally accepted standards of international law.

"It is incontestable that what is taking place in Korea is a civil war between the camp of the national liberation movement and the venal puppet regime of Syngman Rhee supported by the American government.

"The American imperialists and their Myrmidons vainly endeavor to represent the puppet government which they created in South as a 'state.' This is pure fiction, spread by the ignorant civil servants

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of the State Department, which aims to confuse world public opinion. Actually there is no South Korean government in existence at all.

"The establishment of one or another form of government within the frontiers of the Korean state is a matter to be settled by the Korean people themselves. No other state has the right to interfere in Korean internal affairs. This is one of the generally recognized principles of international law.

"The present American armed intervention in Korea is a violation of the basic principles of international law and an act of aggression. It has all the distinguishing marks of aggression, which was already defined, back in 1933, by the Soviet delegation in Geneva; the definition was, in the main, accepted by the representatives of 17 states.

"Such is the real situation in Korea, which the US ruling circles are powerless to conceal in spite of all their malicious intrigues and maneuvering.

"It is in vain that the gentlemen of the State Department and the Foreign Office strive to represent the puppet regime of Syngman Rhee as some sort of 'state.'

"The fictitious 'consolidation' of the Syngman Rhee puppet government in South Korea disclosed, in fact, a total disregard for international law and for the wishes of the Korean people, who have aspired to national unity and real independence.

"It should be pointed out here that the artificial partition of the territory of united nations according to the ancient bandit principle of 'divide and rule' was and still is applied on a broad scale by American imperialism in the pursuit of its expansionist projects and strategic plans.

"It is worth recalling the 'revolution' organized by American agents on the territory of the South American Republic of Colombia, when its government refused to hand over to the American imperialists exclusive control over the future Panama Canal which was to cross its territory. Washington ruling circles speedily obtained from the brand new Republic of Panama the concession of the zone administration to the Americans. The Panama Canal, as is well known, plays an exceptionally important role in the strategy of American imperialism.

"In their striving for world domination, the American imperialists are trying to apply the same method to the territories of larger nations.

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Appendix D

"The reactionary and adventurist policy of the American imperialists in Korea is suffering a fiasco before our eyes. The Korean people who for half a century suffered under the Japanese yoke but never accepted it, do not want new chains. After the defeat of imperialist Japan by the armed forces of the Soviet Union had cleared the road for the liberation of the Korean people, this people never ceased to aspire to restoration of its national unity and sovereignty on a democratic basis. They are successfully sweeping away and certainly will definitely sweep from their territory the venal Syngman Rhee clique and the foreign interventionists who support it.

"In this just struggle, historic truth and the generally recognized standards of international law are on the side of the Korean people."

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Appendix E

NK ORDINANCE FOR AGRARIAN REFORMS FOR SOUTH KOREA

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Appendix E

NK ORDNANCE FOR AGRARIAN REFORMS FOR SOUTH KOREA

NOTE: The following 11 articles were issued in leaflet and note form under the heading: "Ordinance of Permanent Committee, Supreme Peoples Assembly, Korean Democratic Peoples Republic." The ordinance was dated 4 July 1950, and directed to the people of the "Southern Half of the Republic."

- Art. I With a view to granting freedom and happiness to the farmers in the southern half of the Republic which has been liberated from the vicious and ruthless domination of American imperialism and Syngman Rhee's puppet government, and to a prompt development of backward rural economy, a land reform program shall be hereby implemented for the southern half of the Republic in accordance with the Art. VII of the constitution of the Korean Democratic People's Republic. This land reform program is based on the principle of forfeiting and redistributing gratuitously.
- Art. II All land in the ownership of American imperialists, Syngman Rhee's puppet government, and its agencies (including companies) shall be subject to confiscation. All land in the possession of Korean landowners and all land given continuously for tenancy either by an individual or corporate owner shall be forfeited regardless of the size of land involved. Tenancy system shall be discontinued once and for all. Land being cultivated by the owner shall not be confiscated, provided it does not exceed in size 5 to 20 chungbo. Land which has been purchased on annual installment from Syngman Rhee's government, its agencies or individual landowners and presently under cultivation by the purchaser shall not be confiscated.
- Art. III Confiscated land shall be distributed gratuitously to farmers who are in the employ of other farmers and capable of cultivating it independently, farmers owning insufficient amount of land, and farmers owning no land. No persons shall hold a title to land unless they are capable of independent cultivation. Land thus redistributed shall remain permanently in the possession of

the redistribution. A redistribution is not authorized to sell the land, give it for tenancy, or place it under mortgage. Title to land being cultivated by its owner and title to land redistributed under the provisions of this ordinance shall be guaranteed legally.

- Art. IV Redistribution of confiscated land. Size of land to be redistributed to individual farmers and the method for redistribution shall be decided upon before a general assembly in a given village of farmers in the employ of other farmers, of farmers owning insufficient amount of land and of farmers owning no land. A resolution adopted by this general assembly shall be implemented upon approval by the district Peoples Committee.
- Art. V All loans and debts relating to land shall be declared null and void. Payment shall be discontinued for land purchased on an annual installment basis. Any person who has a mortgage on land which he owns and cultivates independently shall be exempt from liquidating this debt.
- Art. VI Any and all taxes or dues heretofore levied on lands shall be discontinued. Farmers shall pay to the government taxes in kind at the same rate as enforced in the northern half of the Korean Democratic People's Republic. The rate for 1950 shall be reduced markedly with the objective of promptly improving the living of the farming population in the war-ravaged southern half, pending final review by the Cabinet of the Korean Democratic People's Republic.
- Art. VII Farmers shall be authorized to dispose of the farm produce upon payment of tax in kind. The grain collection program shall be hereby discontinued. The cabinet of the Korean Democratic People's Republic shall protect the interests of the laboring peasantry and give aid to it by such means as practicable under its economic policy.
- Art. VIII To facilitate the implementation of the land reform program an agrarian committee shall be established in each village. This committee shall be composed of 5 to 9 members to be elected in a general assembly of farmers in the employ of their farmers, farmers owning no land, and farmers owning insufficient amount of land. The agrarian committee shall investigate and tabulate land to be confiscated in accordance with Art. II, draft a plan for redistribution, to be referred to the general assembly for approval. Redistribution shall be implemented on the basis of this plan upon approval by the general assembly and with consent of the district People's Committee.

- Art. IX Redistribution of confiscated land shall be completed with the handing over of a certificate of title to land to a recipient farmer and a simultaneous registration of this transfer on the land ledger.
- Art. X The cabinet of the Korean Democratic People's Republic shall be entrusted with formulating detailed provisions relative to the implementation of this Ordinance.
- Art. XI This Ordinance shall go into full force on the day of promulgation.

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Appendix F

NK DIRECTIVE FOR ORGANIZING CULTURAL PROPAGANDA
ACTIVITIES IN LIBERATED AREAS

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Appendix F

NK DIRECTIVE FOR ORGANIZING CULTURAL PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN LIBERATED AREAS

NOTE: This document was issued by the Ministry of Culture and Propaganda of the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic. It was dated 1 August 1950.

DETAILS OF TASKS

Task of Propaganda Bureau. On forming the system of propaganda:

1. In the liberated areas, the system of administration, culture, and propaganda shall be established from the level of province, down to the city, county and township.

2. Propaganda sections shall be set up in the Peoples' Committees of all levels.

3. Assistance and supervision shall be given in matters of disposition of propaganda leaders.

4. A net of agitators shall be extensively organized in each place of work, village, on the streets, and in each school; also a net of instructors shall be organized.

a. Fundamental principles shall be established and nets of agitators will be established in places of work, rural districts, street-sides, and schools.

b. An agitation net in schools or in a place of work shall be organized and full control shall be exercised over it.

c. The task of instructors in the consolidation propaganda work shall be developed in each province, city, and county.

Execution of Actual Propaganda and Agitation Task. All propaganda and agitation work shall be organized and supervised on the basis of the foregoing fundamental principles.

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1. In each province, county, and city, competent staff members and instructors shall be mobilized to give speeches to the broad masses of the people.

2. An extensive mobilization shall be made of agitators from places of work, rural districts, schools to organize and continue public speeches and to hold discussion meetings. Various (one word unintelligible) and propaganda work now underway shall be broadened in scope and be continued.

3. Propaganda and agitation designed to insure successful implementation of agrarian reforms, elections, shall be extensively carried out.

4. Public opinion shall be surveyed; measures shall be worked out to counter malicious public opinion.

5. A united line shall be maintained with propaganda work of democratic political parties and social organizations.

6. Education and orientation work for propaganda workers shall be organized and carried out.

7. Directing and organizing of radio broadcasting work.

a. Guiding the organization work for operating a radio station.

b. Work of taking over local radio stations in the liberated districts.

c. Organizing the work of recruiting and of guiding the coordination work of Seoul broadcasts and that of district broadcasts.

Tasks of the Cultural Bureau.

1. Over-all supervision and organization of cultural works.

2. Supervising the works of Literature and Art Leagues.

3. Organizations of artists, of artists' groups and supervision of their work (theatrical groups, orchestras, choirs).

4. Promoting the work of individual artists under the Culture & Art League and ensuring repertories.

5. Educational work for writers, artists (academic courses, study self-study, organization).
6. Supervising the work of the Cultural Section of the Seoul People's Committee.
7. Reorganization and creation of cultural institutions for the masses and supervising their work (libraries, institutions in commemoration of the Liberation struggle, record plants, art shops, photographers' shops).
8. Supervising of cultural work for the masses in the liberated districts (drafting and presenting manuals, providing material and songs for cultural work for the masses).
9. Reorganizing and operating Seoul Central Library and other libraries.
10. Taking over and preparing for operating of record plants.
11. Collecting materials for the liberation struggle.
12. Taking over of material for art work and preparation for manufacturing it.
13. Taking over of material for photography and preparation for operating photoshops.
14. Supervising the work of photography for propaganda purposes.

Work of the Publication Bureau.

1. Supervising the work of the Korean Press (Chosun T'ongsin-- a news agency).
 - a. Supervising the policy of collecting news material and of editing for the Korean Press.
 - b. Supervising the reeducation work of editing workers of the Korean Press.
2. Supervising the work of the Korean People's Newspaper (Chosun Inminbo).
 - a. Supervising the editorial work of the Korean People's Newspaper.
 - b. Supervising reeducation course for the KPN staff.
 - c. Supervising distribution work of the KPN.
 - d. Supervising management of the KPN office.

- e. Supervising of printing of the Democratic Korea (Minju Chosun).
3. Supervising of compiling pictorials, leaflets, and all other publications under direct control of the Bureau.
 4. Supervising of re-publication of books at Seoul.
 5. Organizing a national publication agency. a. Procuring facilities for a national publication agency.
 - b. Making competent editing and printing personnel.
 6. Supervising of publication work of the Culture and Propaganda Section of each province.
 7. Supervising the distribution of publications by provincial agencies.
 8. Investigating and registering the capacity of all printing shops in Seoul; categorizing State, private and others (forms will be provided).
 9. Inventory of printing equipment and material for publication (paper, etc.).
 10. Inventory of the type and quality of paper; investigating the source of publication equipment and material (establishing an order of consumption).
 11. Collecting data regarding each publication agency's contribution towards the liberation war and organization of its work.
 12. Checking the background of workers engaged in publication; working out plans for reindoctrinating them.
 13. Collecting statistical and other data regarding reactionary publications.
 14. Taking stock of printing equipment and agencies throughout the liberated districts (for creating a people's press).
 15. Research as to organization and manpower required with a view towards bringing all printing and publication agencies in Seoul under control.

Movie Picture Work. Operating movie houses:

1. Organization. A central control agency shall be established, and a provincial control agency shall be established in each province.
2. Supervising of movie houses. Staff members shall be assigned to each movie house; management of each movie house shall be organized; and political propaganda of movie propaganda and organization.

Distribution of Movies. A central guiding agency shall be established for distribution of work:

1. (one word unintelligible) shall be established.
2. Movies shall be edited.

On Propaganda Work Through Movies.

1. All publications, all radio transmission either by cable by air shall be utilized.
2. Drafting propaganda articles; drafting movie themes.
3. Making and distributing of movie posters.

On the Work of Defending Movies.

1. Supervision of movie industry in the Southern Half (South Korea).
2. Organizing of the work of temporary movie studios in the Southern Half.
3. Making front-line news reels and documentary pictures.
4. Printing and reproducing of movies shall be carried out.

On the Work of Roving Projection Teams In the Southern Half.

1. Organization of work.
2. Organizing a central roving projection team.
3. Organizing a provincial roving projection team.

Work of the Planning Section.

1. Organizing and supervising the work of taking over and inventorying all cultural, propaganda agencies including their buildings, equipment, raw materials, literature, etc.
2. Collecting data pertinent to fulfillment of the Peoples Industrial Plan; summing up the progress of public performances of movies, plays and other artistic activities, and of publication of various literature during the third and fourth quarters.
3. Formulating an over-all plan for cultural and propaganda work in the liberated districts and summing-up its developments and operations.
4. Establishing rules and regulations concerning the appropriation of enemy property (property belonging to traitors), cultural and propaganda agencies in the liberated districts.
5. Organizing the supervisory work designed to consolidate the system of various tasks undertaken by cultural and propaganda agencies in the liberated districts.

Work of the Equipment and Material Section. The following measures shall be taken by this Section as concerns all equipment and materials coming under the categories of enemy property, property belonging to traitors.

1. Providing for the inventory and safekeeping of all property which has been appropriated.
2. Formulating a plan for utilizing, distributing and disposing of all equipment which has been appropriated.
3. Continuing to appropriate property and equipment which has not already been taken over.
4. Shipping to North Korea of such equipment as is the urgent demand there.

Work of the Staff Section.

1. Registration, control and disposition of art workers in the fields of movie, play, etc.
2. Registration, control and disposition of skilled workers and technicians of publication work.

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3. Supervision aimed at insuring the task of workers dispatched to various technical fields.

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Appendix G

TRANSCRIPT OF NORTH KOREAN CHORAL EPIC
"WE HAVE RISEN FOR THE UNIFICATION OF THE HOMELAND"

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Appendix G

TRANSCRIPT OF NORTH KOREAN CHORAL EPIC "WE HAVE RISEN FOR THE UNIFICATION OF THE HOMELAND"

NOTE: The following transcript is representative of several similar works of this genre some of them already published in NK before the outbreak of the present war the work, the libretts, which follows, was reportedly, staged frequently in NK-occupied areas of South Korea. It was given an open-air performance in Seoul early in August 1950.

The Cast: Males, 15; Laborers, 7; Peasants, 12; Clerks, 15; Females, 8; Laborers, 4; Peasants, 4.

Stage Setting: Use a black curtain; in some cases a curtain may be dispensed. The back of the stage should be made higher by a half meter. Back row may be made semi-circular.

As the curtain rises, in the back stand laborers 3-7, peasants 1-5, clerks 1-3 in that order. In the front row, female laborers 1-3, male laborers 1, 2 in the middle, and female laborers 1-3 line up.

A prelude may be given. Both in chanting in chorus and soliloquizing, a proper gesture should be made. For instance; holding out a fist forward, sideways, or obliquely upward, with a bodily motion, etc. Uniform should be worn preferably: (laborers, peasants, in respective uniforms.)

Laborer No. 1: We, honorable sons and daughters of the Republic, are the Korean people, banded together like steel for our beloved homeland. The flag of our homeland! Shining with our freedom and happiness, it unfurls always fanning a flame of patriotism in our hearts. Oh, the flag of our Korean People's Democratic Republic!

Laborer No. 7: Under this flag, supporting the Central Government of the Republic, under the guidance of Premier Kim Il Song, leader of our people, our national hero, stubbornly we fight on along the road to democratic unification of our homeland, defeating the foe we march on.

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Illegible No. 2: As a country loving peace and freedom, my homeland in the world, headed by the great Soviet Union, as warm hands are stretched out of lasting friendship, between countries of people's democracy; wherewith can be blocked? Crumbling is the Anglo-American block of imperialism. Oh, you, public enemy of mankind, instigators of a horrible, new war!

Illegible No. 1: In the southern half of the homeland, trying to swallow our homeland, American imperialist foes run wild, with the treacherous Syngman Rhee clique; busy stirring up a fratricidal war. Oh, the homeland is for the people, nonetheless. Victory is for the people, nonetheless. For a peaceful unification of the homeland, around the Democratic Front for Homeland Unification, with the might of steel solidarity, like a whirlwind we fight on.

Laborer No. 1: A volcanic eruption, rises the people's indignation, and will not abate before the foes' breath is choked. For the struggle to save the country all its youth, has devoted the fiery resentment of the three-hundred thousand of this one heart bent on vanquishing the enemy. Executing the traitors before the people; up with the People's Committees, popular organ of power; mightily we march on. Fly the flag of the Republic, like a wing of victory, fly forever!

Peasant No. 3: Malicious American imperialists; the day they set foot on southern soil.

Peasant No. 4: Took away from the people their freedom and right that had been built by the will of the people.

Laborer No. 3: People's Committees.

Laborer No. 5: National Council of Trade Unions.

Peasant No. 3: Farmers' Unions.

Clerk No. 1: Dispersed at the point of a gun.

Clerk No. 3: Arrested and imprisoned patriots.

Female Laborer No. 1: Began a slaughter.

Female Laborer No. 3: That incited the reactionary, pro-Japanese traitors, who became their pawns.

Female Peasant No. 2: That called for opposition to trusteeship. It was the American imperialists.

Front Row: Yes, those diabolical and ruthless American imperialists.

Female Laborer No. 1: The Soviet-American Joint Commission.

Female Peasant No. 3: Who disrupted twice?

Female Laborer No. 2: Over the simultaneous withdrawal plan proposed by the great Soviet Union.

Female Laborer No. 3: Bewildered.

Laborer No. 5: With an eerie laughter of a madman rejected.

Back Row: Nobody but the American imperialists.

Clerk No. 1: Those American imperialists with rotten bodies. And they dragged.

Back Row; To the UN General Assembly they dragged the Korean problem.

Laborer No. 4: Opposing the presence of true representatives of Korea.

Clerk No. 2: The so-called UN Commission on Korea—slaves of the Wall Street.

Laborer No. 3: Dummies, automatons raising their hands they invited, alleging that our homeland be made independent.

Clerk No. 3: That danced to this. Traitors Syngman Rhee, Li Pom Sok, Kim Song Su.

Clerk No. 1: Less than a handful of foes.

Laborer No. 1: In order to forge up a treacherous election for South Korea, all pro-Japanese forerunning hounds they set up.

Laborer No. 2: Without a single laborer; without a single peasant.

Female Laborer No. 1: There high officials who almost became Japanese.

Female Laborer No. 2: There landowners and capitalists.

Female Laborer No. 3: There profiteers and racketeers.

Peasant No. 3: Idlers, young and old, who were sucking the blood and fat of the people.

Peasant No. 4: Gathered like rubbish on a pile.

Laborer No. 7: Ran candidates for the so-called National Assembly.

Peasant No. 4: Reactionary police under arms.

Peasant No. 5: With Village Protection Corps terrorists, backed by American troops.

Clerk No. 1: Still scared by the united might of the people, opposing the treacherous election.

All: Afraid of the Korean people in steel solidarity.

Laborer No. 6: With planes.

Laborer No. 5: With tanks.

Laborer No. 3: With warships they intimidated.

Clerk No. 2: Indignant, the people fought in blood.

Front Row: Smashed the treacherous election through struggle for national salvation.

Laborer No. 4: In Cheju-do. At every nook and cranny in the southern half.

Laborer No. 3: Heroically fought.

All: (With a big gesture) This was a democratic election of American imperialist style.

Laborer No. 1: Why is this? On every street fell the young men, who fought on at the head. On the hillsides are scattered numerous bodies, and yet, who love the homeland, the patriotic youth of this country; gone leaving a word: Comrades, down with the enemy. Long live the Korean People's Republic. Even now we hear that voice; that word inscribed in our heart stirs up an angry surge of indignation that beats the enemy. Finally, the treacherous election was thwarted; People's Struggle intensifying.

Peasant No. 1: That has been forced by the armed forces of the aggressors.

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Laborer No. 7: South Korean puppet government. What has it to do with the Korean people?

Laborer No. 4: Far from a labor legislation, with their eyes wild for exploitation.

Laborer No. 3: A flood of unemployment, starvation, fatal nakedness they brought.

Peasant No. 3: For women, feudal subordination unchanged.

Peasant No. 4: Nay, a humiliation that is below human.

Peasant No. 5: From the peasants they take rice at gun point.

Clerk No. 1: Those jerks who wrest high renant tental for the landowners.

Clerk No. 2: Ready to sell out the country.

Clerk No. 3: To line their pockets and wallow in wealth, such are those jerks.

Peasant No. 1: Those jerks straining at the last ditch!

Back Row: (Gesture) Oh, the crime that will go down through the generation.

All: (Gesture) Will not forgive the people!

Female Laborer No. 1: The puppet government of Syngman Rhee, our proverbial enemy.

Female Laborer No. 2: Those jerks' mining concessions.

Female Laborer No. 3: And monopoly rights for petroleum sales.

Laborer No. 1: And even national treasures of the homeland, handed over to the American merchants.

Female Peasant No. 1: Concluded a trade treaty with Japan.

Female Peasant No. 3: Called back the Japanese bandits to the 38th parallel.

Peasant No. 2: Gave decorations to the vicious traitors.

Female Laborer No. 3: Who were loyal to the Japanese emperor.

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Laborer No. 1: Those jerks, who are afraid of a peaceful unification.

Laborer No. 2: Those jerks, who are running around trying to provoke a civil war.

Laborer No. 1: Arrested 480,000 people and put them in jail.

Laborer No. 3: Murdered 100,000 patriotic people.

Laborer No. 4: Set fire to 10,000 houses.

Laborer No. 5: Furthermore, several hundred thousand Chongbo.

Laborer No. 6: Of land of our country, they burned.

Clerk No. 3: Moreover, they violated the 38th parallel four-hundred and thirty times.

Clerk No. 2: Killed as many as 120 innocent people.

Clerk No. 1: Set fire to over 500 houses.

Peasant No. 5: Dragged away 1,300 people.

Peasant No. 4: Before the heroic guards of our Republic.

Peasant No. 3: Routed are the puppet government troops—petty thieves.

Peasant No. 2: Having been dragged into the so-called National Army.

Peasant No. 1: Sons of peasants.

Laborer No. 2: Sons of laborers.

Laborer No. 1: Young men, who love the homeland, over the mountains; by air, by sea, come over in a righteous uprising out of the pit of death in search of a new life they come. Going over to the people's guerrillas. They escape a death of dishonor.

All: Troops of the so-called National Army of the puppet government. Rise in a righteous move today and tomorrow.

Front Row: Fight for a peaceful unification of the homeland!

Back Row: Cleanse your sin!

Laborer No. 1: The Republic will receive you like your parents.

Laborer No. 2: (In a height of emotion) Tell me, the mountains and rivers of the homeland. At any time in the history of our culture lasting five millenia was there any traitor like those before us? Speak, the mountains and rivers of our homeland! How can I, with blood of justice flowing in my veins, shed my blood in vain on this beautiful land of ours? Oh, homeland! Call me and make me glorious; we will rise, not hesitating.

All: All of us offer our youth to the homeland.

Laborer No. 1: The spirit of the people, soaring high.

Laborer No. 2: Channeled into the fight to rout the enemy; breaking the Mokp'o prison; massing into Andong of Kyongsang Pukto; from the mountains into rural areas; from rural areas on to the cities; districts of guerrillas are expanding. Before our eyes looms the unification of our homeland.

All: Peaceful unification of the homeland—the yearning of the thirty million.

Laborer No. 5: In North Korea once occupied by the great Soviet troops.

Laborer No. 4: Happiness flows like waves on the sea.

Laborer No. 3: True liberator of weaker nations of the world.

Peasant No. 4: The Soviet Union with a bulwark of freedom and peace.

Peasant No. 2: Led by the great Party of Lenin and Stalin—the Bolshevist Party—the Soviet troops.

Peasant No. 5: For the cause of lasting freedom and happiness of the Korean people.

Clerk No. 1: For its democratic development, rendered all possible aid.

Clerk No. 2: Thus, under the guidance of our respected leader.

Clerk No. 3: General Kim Il Song.

Laborer No. 1: We are building a democratic construction—a great event of the century.

All: The great democratic construction in the northern half of the Republic.

Laborer No. 1: The life of laboring people is daily improving; all the factories destroyed by the Japanese imperialists are restored. Numberless are new factories that have been built where advanced scientific techniques are crystallized.

Laborer No. 3: Our laborers fighting with patriotic fervor.

Laborer No. 4: Answering the appeal of Premier Kim Il Song.

Laborer No. 5: Through the Two Year Plan of People's Economy.

Laborer No. 6: Already scoring victory for the first year.

Laborer No. 7: Are fighting on with dazzling success.

Female Laborer No. 3: Lowering primary costs.

Female Laborer No. 2: Twice reduced state-enforced price levels.

Female Laborer No. 1: With the aid of the Soviet Union in economy and culture.

Front Row: Our Republic rises in prosperity each day.

Peasant No. 1: We, peasants who became the owner of land.

Peasant No. 2: Through irrigation projects.

Peasant No. 3: Through drives for increased production.

Peasant No. 4: Stepped up grain production output by over 20 percent.

Peasant No. 5: Number of village clubs is close to ten thousand.

Female Peasant No. 1: Over a million of illiterates.

Female Peasant No. 2: Satisfactorily learnt our own letters.

Female Peasant No. 3: One-hundred thousand new houses have been built.

Clerk No. 3: Electric lights in rural areas twinkle like stars in heaven.

Clerk No. 2: An amazing development of education and cultural facilities.

Clerk No. 1: Sixteen universities were opened where there had been none. Sons and daughters of laboring people studying at state expense.

Laborer No. 1: And the compulsory system of primary education to be enforced next year will weave out a great civilization for the homeland.

Laborer No. 3: In the defense of the homeland and people there are the People's Army troops—bulwark of justice. With the patriotic tradition of Gen Kim Il Song flowing in their veins. The steel-hard army of the people.

Laborer No. 2: Such is the proud features of a new country; so free and so happy.

Front Row: Has grown the northern half of the Republic.

All: (Gesture) Shining with democratic victories, the northern half of the Republic.

Laborer No. 7: This is a united, patriotic force of the Korean people.

Laborer No. 5: Power in their hands; the people.

Laborer No. 3: Are leading a free republic on.

Peasant No. 1: American imperialists.

Peasant No. 2: Those jerks are going to allow the hand-raising automaton, the so-called UN Commission on Korea.

Peasant No. 3: To stay on our territory?

Laborer No. 1: But the silly ambition of you, jerks.

Laborer No. 2: The vicious scheme of the instigators of war—international reaction.

Laborer No. 1: Will we not fail to smash.

Front Row: With the united force of the thirty million.

All: We will thwart and crush.

Laborer No. 1: With the People's Republic proclaimed today, like the fate of Chiang Kai-Shek of the reactionary Kuomintang, you, aren't you the puppet government of Syngman Rhee? Who, then, possessing the features of a Korean youth, would join the so-called National Army of the puppet government?

All: The enemy is behind you. Down with the treacherous Syngman Rhee puppet government.

Clerk No. 1: In support of the Central Government of the Republic, we stand.

Clerk No. 2: United around Gen Kim Il Song.

Clerk No. 3: Courageously march on along the road to peaceful unification of the homeland.

Peasant No. 5: Before this might which no one can break.

Front Row: Will fall the enemy.

Laborer No. 7: Those weasels of the UN Commission on Korea.

Back Row: How could they dare come back to our shores?

Laborer No. 1: Fellow-countrymen, brothers; let's fight on devoting our whole bodies along the road to homeland unification.

All: Fight for justice. ("Homeland Unification March" is heard from behind the stage in increasing volume.)

Peasant No. 1: Laborers!

Peasant No. 3: Peasants!

Laborer No. 7: Clerks!

Peasant No. 4: Cultural workers!

Female Laborer No. 3: Young people and students!

Female Peasant No. 1: Fight courageously.

Female Peasant No. 2: The democratic fortress of the northern half.

Peasant No. 5: Is of our heroic fight.

Front Row: The great might.

Back Row: The might of victory.

Laborer No. 1: For the true cause of freedom and happiness.

Laborer No. 2: For the sake of lasting happiness through the coming generation.

All: March on routing the enemy.

Laborer No. 1: The homeland stands before the people.

Laborer No. 2: Victory is before the people.

Laborer No. 1: Forward, for a peaceful unification of the homeland. The road of truth calls us to glory.

Front Row: Calls us to glory.

Back Row: Courageously fight! Forward! Forward!

All: Flying the flag of victory for a peaceful unification of the homeland; let us march on!

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Appendix H

SOVIET PROPAGANDA EXPLOITS "LIBERATED SEOUL"

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Appendix H

SOVIET PROPAGANDA EXPLOITS "LIBERATED SEOUL"

NOTE: The following article is entitled "In Liberated Seoul," and appeared in the Soviet Newspaper "Pravda" under the dateline 22 July 1950. Authored by V. Kornilov, this article extols the "bounty of good" resulting from the NK Liberation of Seoul.

People are pouring into the city from all sides. They are wading across streams, passing bridges blasted by Syngman Rhee's soldiers, descending steep mountain paths, and threading their way through swampy rice paddies. There are women, children, and old people. They are pushing carts loaded with simple household articles or driving oxen hitched to light wicker vehicles.

The eyes of all are turned toward the city, over which tri-colored, star-decked flags shine in the sun. The peaceful residents of Seoul are returning to their birthplace to begin a new free life in a free city. Many of them have yearned for work during five long years of unemployment, unmitigated poverty, and oppression. But today they desire to take their places immediately in the ranks of those fighting for the happiness of the motherland at the front and in the rear.

At the office of Lee Sung Yop, the chairman of the Interim People's Committee for the city of Seoul, there are many people. From morning to late evening he receives the representatives of various elements in the population with their proposals, advice, and requests.

Lee Sung Yop is well acquainted with the people of Seoul. He worked for many years in the underground during Japanese dominion. The pamphlets he had written with their fiery appeals to fight for the people's happiness, were passed from hand to hand; and they were read furtively in many secret anti-Japanese circles. He joined the partisans and helped them to raise more and more villages for the struggle against the hated foe.

When the American businessmen became the masters of Southern Korea, Lee Sung Yop continued his noble mission.

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The American authorities issued an order to capture Lee Sung Yop, and a large reward was posted for his head. But none could be found among the Korean people who would consent to sell their true friend for dollars.

On the day of Seoul's liberation, Lee Sung Yop spoke in a square before the building housing the Interim People's Committee. Six-hundred thousand persons listened to his moving words about the new free Seoul, about the new free life which all must build together hand in hand.

Today he sits alive and unharmed in the same room where the American colonizers wrote the order for his immediate arrest. The door to his office is never closed. All people come to see the mayor of the free city.

A group of teachers come in. They have two very important questions. Five years ago there was an industrial institute with laboratories and workshops in Seoul. It is true that its doors were closed to the children of Koreans. Here were trained the Japanese engineers. When the Soviet Army expelled the Japanese from Korea, this industrial institute was reopened. But two weeks after the landing of the American occupation troops in the south, the American authorities closed this institute. They dismantled and hauled away the tools and machinery and occupied the lecture halls and laboratories as barracks.

"In Korea there is no industry, and we don't need it," declared one of the American "officials." "Everything that we need we will bring from America. The function of Korea is to supply raw materials."

Thus, the industrial institute ceased to exist. A bitter fate also befell the higher women's school. A middle-aged teacher, who had been fired for "wilfulness and insubordination" right before the liberation, quietly told how the drunken American officers broke into the classrooms and carried off the pretty students; after this shame, some girls committed suicide.

And here today the teachers have come to tell how they have already begun to rebuild the industrial institute, while in the women's school from whence all the girls had fled in terror before the Americans, groups of students are already being selected and new teachers being appointed.

After the teachers came the workers of a tobacco factory. They were the first in the city to begin work, although their factory was seriously damaged. The tobacco workers brought Lee Sung Yop several packets of recently manufactured cigarettes. They still have

the old label, but a small star had been traced by hand on the packet, just as on the flag of free Korea. The workers told how they, with their own efforts, had already repaired the ruined shops.

Another delegation of workers—footwear workers from a small enterprise manufacturing rubber shoes. Lee Kwa-jun, a worker, said that their master, a rich Korean, had fled with the Americans. They, the workers, had organized the defense of the factory themselves, and had hidden finished products and stores of raw materials.

"We have enough raw materials for a month. We only want a director to be appointed who will say where to market the finished product," said Lee Kwa-jun in a businesslike manner.

Lee Sung Yop thanked them for preserving the people's property, and advised them what to do next.

Some railroad workers entered; they were greeted with particular warmth. It was they who toiled day and night in the reconstruction of ruined bridges, opening the railroads for the military convoys heading for the front, where the people's armies were smashing the foe.

Fireman Lee Chong Guk, in the tense June days when the Peoples' Army was pursuing the fleeing enemy from Seoul, called upon his comrades to repair a large bridge in the vicinity of Kwanak. At least two days would be required, according to the specialists, to do this work, provided that two thousand men participated in the job. Fifteen hundred engineers, students of the Communications Institute, firemen, and switchmen performed this task in twelve hours. Today the railroad workers have come to report that still another bridge is ready in the vicinity of the Han Kang River.

The conversation with the mayor of the city was interrupted by a telephone call. The head of the city communications section reports that today the mailmen went to work, men who distribute letters, telegrams, and late newspapers.

A messenger brings Lee Sung Yop a note. He reads, and his face brightens.

"The textile combine has begun to turn out the first bolts of cloth," he said. More than six hundred workers worked there previously. Today there were eight hundred workers, and all of them have taken the labor watch in the name of victory.

Life is booming in Seoul—the capital of the Korean People's Democratic Republic. Streetcars rattled past on the fourth day after the liberation, and automobiles scurried about. One after another, the enterprises are going into operation.

The builders have begun work: they are repairing roads and sidewalks. Two new dormitories have already been constructed for workers, as well as a large residential unit.

Theaters, movies, and stores are open. Seoul has received guests from Pyongyang—theatrical performers.

Despite the barbarous bombardment of American airplanes, the people of Seoul are stubbornly building up their beautiful city.

Each day columns of young people pass the building of the Interim People's Committee of Seoul. They hold placards and flags with these inscriptions in the Korean language: "We will volunteer for the front," "We go to defend the motherland," "We have taken rifle in hand—join us."

On different days, more than two thousand young people of Seoul have departed for the front. They are going there, to the south, where the heroic People's Army is fighting for the freedom and independence of the motherland.

They are going to defend the tri-colored people's banner, the banner of liberation raised over free Seoul.

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Appendix I

NORTH KOREAN PROPAGANDA LEAFLET AIR-DROPPED TO
US FORCES IN PYONGYANG 24 NOV 1950

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[REDACTED]

미군장병들이여!

무엇 때문에 그대들은 수만리 떨어진 이국땅에서 가치
없는 죽음을 당하려 하는가?

그리운 고국에서는 사랑하는 부모·처자들이 그대들의
운명을 근심하여 눈물로 세월을 보내고있다.

사랑하는 사람들을 남겨놓고 어찌 짧은 청춘을 무정의의
전쟁에서 이터버려야 한단 말인가?

하루속히 무기를 놓고 손을 들라!

조선인민군은 포로들을 우대한다. 그대의 고국으로 하
루속히 도라가는길은 오직 투항하는 길뿐이다.

주저 말고 한시바디 투항하라!

조선인민군 총정치국

Officers and men of the U. S. Army!

*Why are you going to die a meaningless death on an alien soil,
tens of thousand miles away from your country?*

*Your dear people at home are spending miserable days, worry-
ing about your fate.*

*Why are you going to sacrifice your youthful life for an
unjust cause, leaving your dear people behind you?*

Lay down your arms immediately and surrender!

*The Korean People's Army treats Pows well. The only way
for you to get home soon is to surrender.*

Lose no time and come over to us!

General Political Bureau

of the Korean People's Army

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Figure 103. Reproduction and translation of NK leaflet air-dropped to "Officers and men of the US Army."

[REDACTED]

奪還地高丙查察事務執行狀況(日報)一月彙報作成					
局別	舊察署復舊狀況	支署復舊狀況	不統分區獨立林況	李學地處因我匪森動狀況	備考
特別市	完全復舊	完全復舊	送教放政三五 區湖中放政六	森	11.23日現在
京畿局	完全復舊	復舊數 區九個所	送教放政三五 區湖中放政九	未詳	11.23日現在
江原局	完全復舊	三制支署未復舊	送教放政四二 區湖中放政二	齊齊空者前署管外推 制支署未復舊中	11.23日現在
忠南局	完全復舊	完全復舊	送教放政三五 區湖中放政二	特記事項報告	11.23日現在
忠北局	完全復舊	完全復舊	送教放政九七 區湖中放政九	森而齊齊德林署管 區湖中放政三 森而齊齊德林署管 森而齊齊德林署管	11.23日現在
慶北局	完全復舊	完全復舊	送教放政三五 區湖中放政二	特記事項報告	11.23日現在
慶南局	完全復舊	完全復舊	送教放政二二 區湖中放政二	森而齊齊德林署管 森而齊齊德林署管	11.23日現在
全南局	完全復舊	復舊數 支署數 三〇一 未復舊數 一九九	送教放政七三 區湖中放政二	未詳	11.23日現在
全北局	完全復舊	復舊數 支署數 一九三 未復舊數 六六	送教放政二二 區湖中放政八	森而齊齊德林署管 森而齊齊德林署管	11.23日現在
濟州局					
鐵道	竹堂山清養堂 米外運信禁絶	未詳	送教放政三五 區湖中放政七	未詳	11.23日現在
計			送教放政二二 區湖中放政八		

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1. 李學地處因我匪森動報告表
2. 奪還地高丙查察事務執行狀況表

Figure 104. Activity Reports of Individual ROK Police Districts for representative weeks of November, 1950.

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Appendix J

ACTIVITY REPORTS OF ROK POLICE DISTRICTS AFTER
LIBERATION OF SOUTH KOREA FROM NK

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ACTIVITY REPORTS OF INDIVIDUAL ROK POLICE DISTRICTS (Representative weeks of Nov 1950 following liberation of ROK)								
Report on Surveillance in Areas Retaken:								
DISTRICTS	STATE OF POLICE STATIONS	STATE OF POLICE SUBSTATIONS	ARRESTS AND DISPOSITION OF SUSPECTS		INCREASE OR DECREASE OF ARRESTS OVER PREVIOUS WEEK		GUERRILLAS ACTIVE IN AREAS RETAKEN	DATE
Seoul	Completely restored	Completely restored	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Under interrogation	14,810 7,216 5,758 1,834	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Under interrogation	182 204 56 - 78	None	As of 23 Nov
Kyonggi Bureau	Completely restored	349 restored	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Under interrogation	13,838 3,610 4,127 5,901	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Under interrogation	2,509 1,237 991 281	Unknown	As of 8 Nov
Kangwon Bureau	Completely restored Five units previously deployed north of parallel withdrawn due to puppets' attack	32 yet to be restored	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Turned over to Army Under interrogation	2,834 24 1,971 159 700	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Turned over to Army Under interrogation	411 3 916 - 508	About 600 operating in areas under jurisdiction of Ch'ungh'on, Sapuk, Hongch'on stations	As of 15 Nov
Chungchong Namdo Bureau	Completely restored	Completely restored	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Under interrogation	15,272 2,553 3,742 8,857	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Under prosecution	385 78 173 114	No pertinent info available	As of 29 Nov
Chungchong Pukto Bureau	Completely restored	Completely restored	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Under interrogation	1,783 348 1,444	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Under interrogation	797 489	1,300 guerrillas active in areas under jurisdiction of Poun, Yongch'on, Yongdong, Koesan, Chech'on stations 2,516 killed, 6,458 captured while attempting to proceed north.	As of 20 Nov
Kyongsang Pukto Bureau	Completely restored	Completely restored	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Turned over to Army Under interrogation	3,644 288 2,210 185 961	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Turned over to Army Under interrogation	257 86 9 20 142	No pertinent info available	As of 28 Nov
Kyongsang Namdo Bureau	Completely restored	Completely restored	Total arrests Turned over to Army or released Under interrogation	3,723 3,034 689	Total arrests Turned over to Army or Trans for prosecution Under interrogation	937 1,102 - 185	Approx. 30,000 guerrillas operating in force in Koch'ang, Sanch'ong, Hanyang	As of 22 Nov
Cholla Namdo Bureau	Completely restored	Total No. of subst-301 Restored-199 Not rest-102	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Trans Under interrogation Voluntary surrenders	6,147 955 2,006 332 2,052 42,789	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Trans Under interrogation Voluntary surrenders	785 132 802 66 - 215 1,592	Unknown	As of 29 Nov
Cheju Bureau								
Railroad Police	Lost contact of all district units, except Seoul, Yongsan, Ch'ongyang Ni	Unknown	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Under interrogation	2,318 1,051 885 382	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Under interrogation	26 26 7 - 7		As of 25 Nov
Cholla Pukto	Completely restored	Total No. of subst-193 Restored-107 Not rest- 86	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Under interrogation	5,596 943 2,874 2,779	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Under interrogation	1,871 640 488	About 48,000 guerrillas operating in areas excluding those covered by Kusan, Iri, Kumje stations	As of 7 Nov
Total			Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Under interrogation Turned over to Army Voluntary surrenders	69,774 17,070 23,373 25,638 3,693 42,799	Total arrests Trans for prosecution Released Under interrogation Turned over to Army Voluntary surrenders	8,140 1,768 3,594 1,514 1,102 1,582		

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Figure 105. Translation of Figure 104.

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Appendix K

PROBLEMS REGARDING US PARTICIPATION IN KOREAN WAR AS
SEEN THROUGH THE EYES OF POTENTIAL US ALLIES

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Appendix K

PROBLEMS REGARDING US PARTICIPATION IN KOREAN WAR AS SEEN THROUGH THE EYES OF POTENTIAL US ALLIES

The present conflict in Korea will have, undoubtedly, important implications for US reputation among our potential allies in Europe, Asia, and possibly even in South America. Clever enemy propaganda is already attempting to bring about considerable impairment of their confidence in the power and capabilities of the US to protect Democracy before the onslaught of militant communism. What is worse, our show in Korea, coupled with insufficient public relations activities vis-a-vis friendly nations and communist propaganda directed at them which employs arguments designed to make distrust in the US increasingly plausible to the common man of Western Europe, may bring about (1) new misconceptions, or (2) a strengthening of existing misconceptions—both unfavorable to the US.

We need the goodwill of the common man of an allied nation if we want to expect proper support and cooperation in our operations. It is not enough to have the sympathies of a friendly government if we cannot count on a frame of mind of the common man favorable enough to the US, and the aims of the US, so as to give him sufficient conviction and incentive to accept and readily cooperate with us. The potential US ally must be convinced that his attitude is the right attitude.

We need, undoubtedly, intensive public relations to our potential allies, not only at the time when they become allies de facto, but from the moment on whence we have grounds to consider them potential allies. Logically, such public relations are not less important than effective propaganda directed at the enemy. The presumption is that more individual allies will be affected in a shorter time than would be enemy individuals.

The US is universally considered the material and moral backbone of the Atlantic Alliance (a term to denote the countries of the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact and other actual or potential anti-communist states) which has been formed explicitly for the preservation of democracy and thus, by implication, for a common defense against communist imperialism. Loans, gifts and various

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forms of material assistance have made the US the champion of this alliance.

Whether our potential allies would, or could, mobilize sufficient military manpower in the short time required to assist and to supplement effectively any strategic military planning of the US on the European continent and elsewhere in the democratic world is still somewhat problematic at this point. The populations of many of the European nations are war-weary, materially and morally exhausted from the recent world war which was much closer to them than to the civilian population of this country. A longer time might be required to mobilize the required manpower potential and, particularly, to bring it into fighting condition (i. e., imbued with the necessary esprit de corps and a conviction of the necessity of a new sacrifice).

Although our intervention in Korea is legally an intervention by the UN, and is officially presented as such in the minds of most peoples, undoubtedly it is properly recognized as a fight of the US in the first place and of the UN in the second place. A few of our allies are participating materially in the operations, but not in numbers large enough to drive home to the civilian population the full realization that they, as members of allied countries, are waging war.

The UN troops (US troops for all practical considerations) have not been as successful in Korea as the Western World would like to expect—particularly in view of the US element (personnel as well as material) involved.

Thorough knowledge of the effect of our successes and reverses in the Korean war as reflected in the public opinion of our potential allies becomes increasingly desirable. Our European allies at this time are exposed to propoganda from the West as well as from the East. They do not necessarily interpret news as does the average US citizen. In the case of the European, for example, the formulation of criteria is contingent to a much greater degree on a synthesis of propoganda and information presented to him simultaneously from two sources which usually are contradictory.

NOTE: It must not be forgotten that European newspapers are, as a rule, the official organs of political parties and that radio is owned by the Government. The citizen traditionally takes in news as necessarily tinged with the ideological color of the medium which conveys it to him. Thus, it is normal for him to read at least two different newspapers and to listen to the news broadcast from at least two different countries. It would seem natural that he absorbs news and comments regarding the world situation only after considerable analysis.

The West European citizen is between two currents of information and must create a compromise. His ultimate conclusion will represent a crystallization of conflicting arguments by opposing propaganda efforts superimposed on a solid base of his very personal opinions, conceptions, beliefs, and his general position vis-a-vis the subject matter.

It is logical for communist propaganda to portray the happenings in Korea in a light designed to raise doubts among our potential allies that effective US aid will be forthcoming if needed. At home, we have publicized the heroic efforts of our soldiers on the Korean battlefield; we have talked and written much about mobilization of manpower and raw materials; but we have underestimated our opponent on many occasions. On the other hand, we have presented the war in Korea as a real war in which the US, as a power, is participating.

The communist propaganda line capitalizes on our present situation in Korea and plays up the fact (corroborated by the US press and radio) that we are having a "tough time;" it rejoices in the fact that the mighty US has been unable to crush the "Determined forces of democracy;" it may even say that despite the fact that the intervention in Korea is being conducted by forces of a number of powers (several of which are World Powers), these armies are unable to drive back the NKs or stop their advance. This latter line, however, is not being played up with too great an emphasis. The Korean campaign is predominantly portrayed as an American venture or debacle, to convince the western European population that it is fallacious to believe that the US can defend it effectively against communism.

What is the reaction to all this in the mind of the average man in our allied nations? Will he continue to regard the US as the champion of democracy, the power which, essentially, is waging a war against militant communism? Will he understand the initial problems with which we are faced and realize that we shall win? Will he waiver in his belief in the decided superiority of US weapons which ultimately are successful, as demonstrated during the war against Japan?

These considerations emphasize the necessity for a greater pre-occupation with conceptions of our allies from other areas regarding us. Appropriate public relations with our allies is probably as important a feature of a concentrated war effort as psychological warfare proper, directed exclusively at the enemy. Though these two activities have different objectives, they have many common features: in each case the goal is to present and to sell the US viewpoint. The difference between an ally and an enemy in terms of the effectiveness of the propaganda message is one of degree.

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ORO-T-10 (EUSAK)

Appendix K

Undoubtedly, one of our basic goals is to instil our allies with the greatest possible esprit de corps: to convince them that the principle for which they fight is just; and to strengthen their will to fight and their morale by pointing out that they are not alone in a vital struggle.

Particular attention should be paid to the manner of presenting this argument. A fighting Frenchman should never be told that he is our ally in a fight against communism. The full impact of such a propaganda line would be achieved rather by presenting the US as his ally, thus emphasizing his personal importance in the conflict.

Evidently our European allies have been exposed, in one form or another, to both communistic and to Democratic propaganda. However, communist propaganda has the advantage of penetrating quicker into certain lower strata of the population and speaking in a language more understandable to these strata than does US propaganda. Communist propaganda has more often a full attention of the "listening ear" and the "seeing eye" of the poor, the maladjusted, the dissatisfied, and the weary than propaganda which does not dwell almost exclusively on the acutely sensitive strata of a population.

In the majority of cases, thus far, US propaganda has played up themes which either are of no importance and personal concern to most individual listeners or holds a genuine, but nonetheless somewhat impersonal and "nonessential" interest or curiosity. US propaganda also tends to clarify the advantages of democracy versus communism on a level which is generally too sophisticated to be absorbed by most of the numerous lower (intelligence, cultural, or economic) strata of the allied target population.

Clearly, we need the goodwill of our allies. The sympathy of their governments is one thing; their personal spontaneous support and conviction is a different matter. In a possible joint war effort we will have to obtain this sympathy to overcome the most common misconceptions or antagonisms relating to the US and its citizens. We should root out any major elements of distrust, doubt, or fear that the soldier of an allied nation may harbor with regard to:

1. Our intentions relative to him and his country;
2. Our strength and capability of sustaining our allies in their war effort; and
3. Our readiness to share with our allies the brunt of the enemy's attack.

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ORO-T-10 (EUSAK)

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Appendix K

Above all, we must instil in our allies' minds the conviction that we do not seek to use them as cannon fodder but rather that we will stand with them in the fashion of a true ally.

A proper strategy should be studied, devised, and developed to mold our public relations in respect to our potential allies. If any armed communist aggression occurred in Europe and the Atlantic Alliance faced a fait accompli, full public opinion and support on the part of the allies could hardly be molded due to the lack of time. At that point our main activity would have to limit itself necessarily to the basic task of combating enemy propaganda beamed at our allies, and a proper state of public opinion could hardly be molded or even realigned.

An exhaustive study of this problem at this time is considered of definite importance in order to create a firm basis upon which to build sound public relations in critical times. We should know not only the prevailing opinions and conceptions of our allies regarding the US, but also (and with special emphasis) how such basic opinions are prone to change and fluctuate:

1. Under the impact of enemy propaganda directed to our lines;
2. As a result of the international political life in the allied states;
3. As a result of changing economic conditions in the various countries; and
4. In the light of how the US appears to the world at large (through its own, enemy, neutral, and allied propaganda and information).

It is suggested that the feasibility of a coordinated effort to assess, analyze, and evaluate the probable state of mind and frame of reference with which representative segments of allied minds view us and our actions be considered.

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